Scenes of War - Training Behind the Front

After being called up, the recruit usually joined a replacement formation of his unit or his army corps. For the infantry these were in particular replacement battalions and their recruit depots. There the basic military training took place: drill, weapons handling and shooting, marching, field service, entrenching and guard duty.

The recruit depots were not necessarily limited to the peacetime barracks. Because of the large number of conscripts, additional accommodations in schools, halls, barracks and other buildings were used. The duration and intensity of the training varied considerably over the course of the war.

After the experiences of the first months of the war it became clear that training at home alone was not sufficient to prepare replacement personnel for the particular conditions of trench warfare. Therefore special recruit depots of the field army were established behind the front.

For 21. 11.1914 the secondary literature cites the general recommendation of the Prussian War Ministry to establish such recruit depots.

As early as 08. 12.1914 the deputy general commands were requested to transfer recruits to the corps in the field.

From 22. 03.1916 the designation "Field Recruit Depot" was used officially.

The classic training path began with conscription into a replacement battalion/recruit depot in Germany. After basic training, the replacement transport to the occupied territory took place. In the field recruit depot of the division or corps there was front-line training. Finally, personnel were assigned to the regiment, the battalion, and the company.

Field recruit depots were usually not located in the foremost trenches, but in the rear areas of the divisions or corps. They were mobile field formations and not barracks permanently tied to a single location. When the large formation was relocated, the depot could also change its station.

Their task did not consist only of training newly arriving recruits. They also served as an immediately available replacement reserve. In addition, convalescents or soldiers returning to the front after a longer absence could be prepared there again for deployment.

Front-line training could – depending on the year of the war and the unit – in particular include:

·        Shooting under field conditions;

·        Hand-grenade throwing and hand-grenade combat;

·        Entrenching, position construction and conduct in the trench system;

·        Marching and equipment drills;

·        Night exercises, patrol and guard/post duty;

·        Combat training and cooperation with machine guns;

·        in the later stages of the war, partly storm and assault-troop methods;

·        courses for non-commissioned officers and other specialized training.

A field recruit depot could, organizationally, resemble a battalion. For a depot of about 1,000 trainees, a command structure was envisaged in 1916 consisting of a battalion commander, four company commanders, additional officers, sergeants and a larger number of non-commissioned officers. The training staff was to be provided, as far as possible, from experienced members of the field army.

The depot commander was thus not a mere administrative official, but the military leader of a training formation. Typically, majors or experienced captains would be considered for this position. The companies were led by the corresponding officers; experienced non-commissioned officers took on a significant part of the direct training.

The exact chain of command depended on the organizational form. In addition to division-attached field recruit depots, corps recruit depots are also documented.

According to the records of a soldier from Infantry Regiment Herwarth von Bittenfeld (1st Westphalian) No. 13, he marched from Münster to the field recruit depot of the 13th Infantry Division on 18 April 1916. From 19 April to 9 June 1916 he was at the field recruit depot in Bourghelles near Tournai. From 10 to 27 June 1916 the field recruit depot is listed in Breux near Montmédy; on 28 June he returned to the 8th Company of Infantry Regiment No. 13.

The change of location is an important indication that the field recruit depot should be understood as part of the division's field organization and not as a fixed-location training camp.

The site could change in accordance with the movements of the division.

A German recruit reports (1915/16):

"Soon a detachment of the recruit depot took us in."

Afterwards the men marched to Lambersart-Nord, a suburb of Lille. Further training took place there. The author explicitly writes:

"Our further training took place in Lambersart."

He was assigned to a training company of the recruit depot. Particularly noteworthy is his retrospective assessment: he still remembers this training "with horror." He apparently found the drill extraordinarily harsh.

The diary of Gunther Heerwagen sounds completely different. After just ten weeks of training he was consolidated at the recruit depot of the 8th Landwehr Division in Sierentz.

He describes the service there as comparatively moderate and the stay during the orchard patrol even in retrospect almost as: "a kind of summer retreat"

But that did not mean inactivity. On certain days the men were trained at Istein in pioneer work and close-combat weapons and took on local guard duties. In addition, Heerwagen describes private billets, inns and contacts with the civilian population.

The training of the musketeer Albert Krentel is also well documented. His notebook describes service at the field recruit depot of the IX. Reserve-Korps.

On 20 August 1916 he first marched to Le Quesnoy, took the train via Douai and reached the depot in Flers near Douai. Already 19 days later the depot was relocated to Phalempin south of Lille.

And here we get an excellent insight into daily life. Krentel reports on:

Billeting in a villa directly on the railway,

Air raids,

Labor duties,

Entrenching work on a position near Pont-à-Vendin,

Transport to these works by truck,

Training,

Shooting exercises,

Firing with a gas mask,

Inspections by senior officers.

For example, on 16 September there was an inspection of the 2nd recruit depot of the IX Reserve Corps by General von Boehn. Two days later Krentel returned to his regiment.

A field recruit depot primarily denotes the military organization or formation.

A training or exercise ground, by contrast, refers to the terrain or facility on which shooting, combat, hand grenade or specialist training was conducted.

A field recruit depot could use various terrains and localities for its training.

Furthermore, behind the Western Front a comprehensive network of schools and training grounds emerged.

For special weapons and particular training purposes, for example, field artillery training grounds and shooting schools in occupied territories can be documented.

The training organization of the field army was therefore considerably more differentiated than a single "camp behind the front".

The training also took place at or behind the front at regimental level. For example, the following can be read in the regimental history: Die Hohenzollernfüsiliere im Weltkrieg 1914 - 1918 (ed.: Officers' Association and both associations of former 40ers M.-Gladbach and Rastatt/Baden, Oldenburg 1930, p. 354 ff.):

"It went without saying that the forms of maneuver warfare could not be applied to this positional warfare. The great battles on the Somme and at Verdun had clearly shown that the infantry still had to bear the main burden of the fighting, but the training of 1914 could not suffice. Above all, it had become apparent that the skirmish line was unusable for attack or counter-thrust. It was not mobile enough, lost its shock effect as soon as it encountered obstacles, even the smallest. A not completely destroyed obstacle, a single machine gun — and the skirmish line lost its cohesion and dissolved into individual groups. Why not form such groups and systematically train them as assault groups? That was done and it succeeded.

The infantry rifle receded in importance. The hand grenade became the main weapon of the attack. The decisiveness of the individual man came to the fore; the training of group and platoon leaders became one of the most important [tasks]. Machine guns, mines, Priester- and grenade-throwers supported the infantry in its manifold and important tasks...."

Near the rest camp Neu-Essen the regiment constructed an assault work and established an assault school to introduce the rest companies to the new defensive tactics. The head of the assault school was Oberleutnant Rudolphi; the training staff included Ltn. Kather, Vizefeldw. Olz VI./40 and Wolter 10./40, Utffz. Arndt 4./40 and Schöttler 2. M.G.K. On the second rest day the head of the assault school had the four assault teams of the four rest companies at his disposal; on the following rest days one platoon of the four rest companies was available from 8–11 a.m. and from 2:30–4:30 p.m. The assault school was founded on 11/11. From 16/11 onwards all lieutenants, officer cadets and Fähnriche, half of the non-commissioned officers of each company and personnel from each company at the MG were trained. Several officers, a larger number of NCOs and enlisted men were detached to the Army mortar school near Vouziers and trained on the light mortar. Numerous other detachments for gas protection, signal equipment and other courses provided capable instructional staff who acquainted the fusiliers with the latest advancements in war technology."