The Prussian Officer Corps under Frederick the Great (1740–86)

In the Frederician era the history of the old Prussian army reached its culmination. In this period the political and functional integration of the social elites into the army structure was also completed. The creation of a bureaucratic military organization and the orientation of the domestic economy to the needs of the army had already been completed in the formative phase under Frederick William I (1713–40). Thus a long process of centralization was concluded and the military as a total organization had emerged. Characteristic of the old Prussian example is the mismatch between the sizing of the army and the state’s resources. The resulting overstretch produced on the one hand a high degree of efficiency, but on the other hand a certain one-sidedness with considerable feedback on political culture. The first half of Frederick the Great’s reign was marked by the high-stakes gamble of the Silesian conquest; the ordeal of the Seven Years’ War brought the still relatively young Prussian kingdom close to the abyss. A supporting element of the ultimately successful Prussian army was the officer corps, endowed with high social status, whose internal development in the years 1740–86 will be outlined in the following lines [1].    

[1] The statements on the social structure of the officer corps are based predominantly on preserved lists, in particular on rank and discharge lists and some regimental books (e.g. No. 5, 1771, No. 1783, D IX., 1752 etc.); individual citations are omitted.

In May 1740 the Prussian army counted 1,639 infantry officers, 160 officers of the garrison units and 724 cavalry officers, a total of 2,523 with an overall army strength of 76,278 men. Shortly before the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War (December 1755) the number of officers had risen to 4,276; the actual strength of the army at that time (excluding rear staff, hautbois and barber-surgeons) was about 137,000 men. In 1786 — the year of Frederick the Great’s death — the officer corps, with an army strength of about 195,000 men, numbered 5,511 officers. According to the 1743 regulations (p. 3) each infantry regiment — consisting of a total of 12 companies (10 musketeer and 2 grenadier companies in 2 battalions) — counted 50 officers (No. 3 and No. 15 deviated from this establishment). Each battalion accounted for 25 (including 1 adjutant), and the grenadier and musketeer companies for 4 officers each (Regulation of 1743, pp. 4–5). According to Lossow a “field regiment (of the infantry) comprised 51 senior officers, among whom were counted both the chef (note = regimental proprietor) and all staff officers, namely: 1) the regimental chef, 2) the regimental commander, who at the same time commanded the first battalion, 3) the commander of the second battalion, 4) two staff officers for duties, 5) seven captains, 6) three staff-captains, nine premier-lieutenants and 7) 17 second-lieutenants and 10 ensigns. Two subalterns were adjutants” [1]. The 5th staff officer — the victualling establishment since 1735 comprised only two major posts — resulted from the need for leadership when forming the grenadier battalions, to whose establishment, besides the officers of the four grenadier companies (16), also belonged the battalion commander (usually a major, simultaneously company proprietor), 1 staff-captain (commanded the commander’s company) and 1 ensign (as adjutant). Berenhorst comments: “The number of an infantry regiment was in some fifty-one, in others only fifty.... Because of the added grenadier adjutant, which arrangement in some regiments with fifty officers had also caused a grenadier major, who however did not increase the number of officers” [2]. He also comments on the institution of adjutants: “The generals take their adjutants from the regiment; the battalion adjutant the King gives three thalers per month towards the upkeep of a horse. These positions are therefore highly sought after, and create rivalry among the young men” [3]. The garrison (infantry) regiments each counted 48 officers, the cuirassier regiments of 5 squadrons (or 10 companies) each 32, the dragoon regiments of 5 squadrons each 32 (2 regiments counted 10 squadrons = 64) and the hussar regiments of 10 squadrons each 36 officers. After the reduction of regiments to peacetime establishment in 1763, a field infantry regiment comprised 50 (with partial deviations, e.g. No. 3, 15), a garrison (infantry) regiment 40, a cuirassier or dragoon regiment each 37, a hussar regiment 52, one of the (four) field artillery regiments (created 1762, 1763 and 1772) 52 and the pioneer company 3 officers. The battalion of light infantry counted (after demobilization 1779) with 6 companies a total of 24 officers.                           

[1] Lossow, v., Reminiscences on the Character of the Prussian Army under the Great King Frederick II. From the estate of an old Prussian officer, Glogau 1826, p. 107.

[2] Berenhorst, Georg Heinrich v., Reflections on the Art of War, Leipzig 1827, p. 205. 

[3] Berenhorst, loc. cit., p. 298.

The old Prussian officer corps was predominantly of noble origin, with the domestic nobility in the majority. Under Frederick I non-noble officers were still accepted, but unofficially nobles were already preferred [1]. Frederick William I, still shaped by conflict with the estates, strove to integrate the native nobility honorably into the emerging social system through officer service — as compensation for the losses of the nobility in economic and political power. Thus, under him there was essentially even a compulsion to enter service for the native nobility. While Frederick William I still accepted bourgeois officers in field regiments and thus the officer corps under his regency was more heterogeneous, under Frederick the Great it assumed an almost exclusively noble character. After 1763 the field regiments were “cleansed” of bourgeois elements and the principle of noble origin as the decisive criterion for suitability as an officer — which had necessarily receded into the background during wartime due to the exceptionally high losses of officers — was once again emphasized. In an order of 02.10.1768 to Lieutenant General von Tauentzien it says: “As at the inspection of General-Major von Möllendorff still 4 non-noble officers were present, and are to be placed elsewhere in garrison regiments; so I want you, when departures occur in the Silesian garrison regiments, to submit such to me in proposal, and you will for that purpose receive the nominal list of them sent by General-Major von Möllendorff” [2]. By order of 14.07.1766 the King commanded the transfer of some officers of the Mark and Magdeburg infantry regiments to Silesian garrison regiments, while at the same time stating, “for I otherwise have nothing to say against these officers, but only because they are not of noble birth I would place them in the garrison regiments there” [3]. In 1784 Frederick the Great sent three bourgeois cadets to the artillery with the words: “They may well be there” [4]. The few remaining bourgeois officers are now found chiefly in the garrison troops, the hussars [5] and the technical troops [6]. 

[1] Priebatsch, Felix, History of the Prussian Officer Corps, Breslau 1919, p. 9. A promotion proposal of the infantry regiment Anhalt-Zerbst (No. 8) from 1695 concerns 2 officers of bourgeois origin; one of them was proposed as captain (service time: 24 years and 8 months), while the other non-commissioned officer was to be promoted to lieutenant (service time: 21 years and 11 months).

[2] Preuß, Frederick the Great. A Life Story, Berlin 1832 ff., Vol. III, p. 132; cf. also the royal order of 04.11.1767 to Lieutenant General von Tauentzien and the correspondence regarding the case of Lieutenant (v.) Heyn (ibid., pp. 468 ff.).

[3] Jany, Curt, History of the Prussian Army from the 15th Century to 1914, Osnabrück 1967, Vol. III, p. 36.

[4] Goltz, C. v. d., From Rossbach to Jena and Auerstedt, Berlin 1906, p. 211.

[5] H 6 shows 8% bourgeois officers in 1750 and 26% in 1760; in H 8 it is as much as 58% in 1763 (35 of 60) and 54% in 1764 (22 of 41); the bourgeois share in this regiment however falls back to 31% (16 of 52) in 1772 and 27% (14 of 52) in 1778.

[6] Priebatsch, loc. cit., p. 13; Schmidt, Paul v., The Development of the Prussian Army, Berlin 1902, p. 141. For bourgeois officers under Frederick the Great see also: Schwenke, Elisabeth, Frederick the Great and the Nobility, Berlin 1911, pp. 25 ff. and Preuß, Frederick the Great, loc. cit., Vol. III, pp. 132 ff. Bourgeois officers regularly stand out for their high age and length of service; e.g. in a rank list of D V. (1756) there are premier lieutenants aged 60 and 61 with 36 and 38 years of service respectively. In the period 1740–86 64 artillery officers reached the rank of major (2 of them by brevet); the ratio between noble and bourgeois officers was about 2:1. This result contrasts with an evaluation of an artillery officers’ rank list from 1786, according to which of a total of 333 officers 74% were bourgeois and 26% noble. Apparently even in the artillery officers of noble origin had better chances to reach staff-officer rank.

Frederick the Great regarded it as “right that the nobility devote their services primarily to their fatherland,” sought to instill in them “a patriotic spirit and class consciousness” [1] and perceived the role of the nobility as a supporting element of his state: “It is the sons of the nobles who defend the land, of whom the breed is so good that they in every way deserve to be merited, conserved” [2]. According to the monarch the “best nobility serves in the army” (General Principles on War, 1753) and only in the nobility did he see the inner foundations for the strict service ethos practiced in the Prussian army; therefore they should primarily become officers — not civil servants: “I wished to let you know that I do not like to take the nobles for war councils, but I want them in the army, that is the real calling for the nobles” [3]. The King fundamentally denied bourgeois people a pronounced sense of honor. Another motive for the visible preference of the nobility as officer material is revealed in the remark of a contemporary: “The King wants all officers to be noble; without doubt the immense number of poor nobles in his lands leads him to this decision” [4]. Frederick’s important political opponent, Wenzel Anton Kaunitz, Prince of Kaunitz-Rietberg (1711–94), writes in his Votum on the Military from 1762 about the Prussian military system: “The entire nobility must serve, in advancement there are no favors, and the higher ranks are reached only through merit and seniority....” [5]. Until his last years the King adhered to the view that in the field regiments of the infantry and cavalry as a rule only noble officers should serve; thus in 1786 he wrote: “As for the ensign-cadet Lehmann proposed for ensign, that does not fit; then I would not do well, for he is not a true nobleman” [6]. In 1786 about 10% of the officer corps were of bourgeois origin; this situation was not to change substantially in the next 20 years. In 1806 among the total of 7,166 Prussian officers only 661 were bourgeois officers (9.2%), namely 6 colonels, 3 lieutenant-colonels, 29 majors, 139 captains/rittmayers/staff-captains and 484 subaltern officers. The principle of social privileging of the nobility found its limits in the equally — for economic and military-political reasons — practiced policy of peasant protection. The rising bourgeoisie of late 18th-century Prussia was practically excluded from the military estate, thereby further solidifying the divergence of the army’s social structure from societal developments.     

[1] Political Testament of 1752, cf. Dietrich, Richard, Political Testaments of the Hohenzollerns, Munich 1981, p. 165.

[2] Schwenke, loc. cit., p. 24; cf. also: Preuß, Frederick the Great, loc. cit., Vol. I, pp. 382–383.

[3] Taysen, The Military Activity of Frederick the Great in 1780, Berlin 1880, p. 13.

[4] Berenhorst, Georg Heinrich v., Reflections on the Art of War, loc. cit., p. 297.

[5] Count Kaunitz, Votum on the Military 1762, in: Bleckwenn, Hans (ed.), Contemporary Studies on the Old Prussian Army, Osnabrück 1974, p. 34.

[6] Taysen, The Military Activity of Frederick the Great in His Last Years, Berlin 1886, pp. 70–71.

Officer supply was formed by Junkers who entered the regiments directly, as well as cadets, pages [1], more rarely bourgeois non-commissioned officers and lateral entrants (e.g. by transfer of foreign officers into Prussian service) [2]. Most officers, however, began their military careers as Junkers [3]. They first did 3 months “sentry duty” as privates, then served for at least 3 years as Gefreitenkorporal (or Standarten- or Fahnenjunker) with non-commissioned officer status. According to the 1743 regulation each musketeer or fusilier company had to have at least 2 noblemen as a reservoir for officer recruits (the elder carried the flag or standard) [4]. The grenadier companies (of the infantry regiments) had no flag and therefore no Gefreitenkorporal. The regulation “For the Royal Prussian Cavalry Regiments” of 01.06.1743 states: “When an ensign-cadet runs away from a company, the Rittmeister shall endeavour to have a young nobleman restored to his place” [5]. Officer candidates were often housed with non-commissioned officers or older (married) soldiers and received their first basic military instruction from them. However, close contact with the ranks was judged problematic over time. In the instructions for the major-generals of the infantry and cavalry of 15.02.1763 the King therefore ordered that regimental commanders should ensure “that the Junkers do not have too much association with the common man, beyond what is required in service, since such association always clings to such young men when they rise higher.” By instruction of 11.05.1763 the so-called portepee-ensigns were introduced as a supplement: “Since His Majesty has found that the interaction the Gefreitenkorporals have with the common man is too great and always clings to them, His Majesty will grant the five oldest Gefreitenkorporals ensign patents so that they may associate with the officers.” Berenhorst comments on this measure as follows: “To assist upbringing, Frederick ordained amphibians between senior and junior NCOs, ensign-cadets with ensign patent and silver saber tassel. He wanted to make them more able to join the society of officers, to be trained among them, among people where new training proceeded from ten to one” [6]. In general the generality and the staff officers were expected to “invite the subaltern officers to them, treat them well and speak with them frequently” [7]. The origins of the cadet corps go back to the time of the Great Elector, who founded knight academies in Berlin (1645), Kolberg (1653), Magdeburg (1653) and Küstrin (1666). Frederick I established cadet academies in Berlin in 1701, in Magdeburg in 1706 and in Kolberg in 1703, which Frederick William I consolidated in Berlin in 1716–19. Under his rule alone (1713–40) 1,612 cadets were trained in the cadet corps, of whom 1,483 transferred into the army and of whom — under the successor of the Soldier King — 39 became generals [8]. Shortly after his accession Frederick the Great addressed the partly unsatisfactory conditions in the cadet corps and gave new impulses to the training (and treatment) of the military youth with his “Instruction for the Lieutenant Colonel of the Corps Cadets von Oelsnitz” of 28.06.1740 [9]. The cadet corps owes particular gratitude for its development to its chief and governor (1759–1782), Major-General Johann Jobst Heinrich Wilhelm von Buddenbrock. The cadet corps did not consist only of native sons; in 1751 its composition was as follows: 3 from Hohenstein, 6 from Magdeburg, 8 from Mittelmark, 16 from Neumark, 87 Pomeranians, 31 Prussians, 29 Silesians and 1 from Uckermark, as well as 1 from Anhalt-Köthen, 2 from Bayreuth, 1 Holsteiner, 9 Mecklenburgers, 12 from Posen or Courland, 8 Saxons and 5 from Swedish Pomerania (total: 219 cadets) [10]. Applicants for a place in the cadet corps from Courland or Poland had to expressly pledge not to enter foreign service. Since 1744 there was a kind of preparatory school for the cadet corps in Potsdam. Preparatory institutions in Stolp and Kulm (the latter mainly intended for the West Prussian nobility) were founded in 1769 and 1776 respectively. In the years 1740–86 a total of 2,987 pupils passed through the cadet corps, of whom 41 became generals. Since 1765 an additional knight academy (Académie des Nobles) with 12 places existed in Potsdam. This elite noble academy was intended to prepare for a higher career in the military or diplomacy. The 1743 regulation explicitly provided for the promotion of suitable non-noble non-commissioned officers: “When a non-commissioned officer who is not a nobleman has rendered very great merits and has an open mind, also a good exterior and has served at least 12 years, then he shall be proposed to His Royal Majesty for Second-Lieutenant” [11]. The provisions issued at the outbreak of the Bavarian Succession War (1778/79) also promised those non-commissioned officers who distinguished themselves the noble predicate and promotion to officer [12]. According to Priebatsch [13] this, however, happened very rarely. Following Apel, in total only 63 officers were ennobled under Frederick the Great [14], which says little about the number of bourgeois men who rose to officer rank, since entry of non-nobles into the officer corps did not necessarily result in elevation to the nobility. This applies primarily to subaltern ranks up to company commander (captain/rittmeister). Frederick’s reputed reply to the repeated petition of a colonel (!) for the grant of a noble predicate is well known: “It is not necessary to confer nobility on him, for his sword already ennobles him” [15] — presumably permission to bear the noble predicate [16]. Some officers of bourgeois origin even managed to rise to the rank of general; as examples of generals who had risen from the ranks and were later ennobled, see J. G. von Lehmann (1688–1750), P. von Meinecke (1698–1775), A. von Roell (1676–1745), E. von Schöning (1690–1757), M. F. von Stollhofen (1692–1758), C. G. von Uchtländer (1686–1755) and J. A. von Voigt (1677–1742).    

[1] See Scharfenort, v., The Pages at the Brandenburg-Prussian Court 1415–1895, Berlin 1895.

[2] Of the 471 officers who rose to general in the Frederician period (1740–86), 39% entered directly into their respective regiment as Junker/standarten- or ensign-cadet, 13% came from the cadet corps and 8% from the pages. 4% began their military career as simple soldiers or non-commissioned officers and 8% with a military rank, mostly ensign or cornet. 20% transferred from foreign into Prussian service. The remaining 8% are non-Prussian princelings or come from the royal household (percentage values from evaluation of biographies in Priesdorff, Soldierly Leadership, loc. cit., Vol. I–III, Nos. 263–734).

[3] Gefreitenkorporal in an infantry (or dragoon) regiment; Standartenjunker in a cuirassier regiment and Fahnenjunker in a hussar regiment; as a relic of their infantry origins the officer candidates in the dragoon arm were called Gefreitenkorporale (in lists they are sometimes also designated there as Fahnenjunker). The artillery only received Gefreitenkorporale from 1787 onward.

[4] Regulation For the Royal Prussian Infantry, Berlin 1743, p. 6 (hereafter abbreviated: Regulation of 1743).

[5] Regulation For the Royal Prussian Cavalry Regiments. Berlin 1743, Part VIII, Title IV, Article IV; identical in the Regulation For the Royal Prussian Dragoon Regiments, p. 479.

[6] Berenhorst, loc. cit., p. 143.

[7] Regulation of 1743, pp. 564–565.

[8] Tharau, Friedrich-Karl, The Intellectual Culture of the Prussian Officer, Mainz 1968, p. 72.

[9] Taysen, v., Frederick the Great. Military Writings, Dresden 1885, pp. 438 ff..

[10] Jany, History, loc. cit., Vol. II, p. 222.

[11] Regulation of 1743, p. 566.

[12] Jany, History, loc. cit., Vol. III, p. 36.

[13] Priebatsch, loc. cit., p. 10.

[14] Hoven, Jupp, The Prussian Officer of the 18th Century. A Study on the Sociology of the State, Zeulenroda 1936, p. 56.

[15] Schmidt, Paul v., The Development of the Prussian Army, Berlin 1902, p. 145. Moreover the King was sparing in ennoblements and held the view: “By the sword one becomes a nobleman, otherwise not” (Schwenke, loc. cit., p. 36).

[16] The rank lists of K 3 (Leibcuirassier Regiment) show in the years 1740–1758, 1763–64, 1766–1786 one non-noble officer each, and in 1759 and 1765 two non-noble officers each. In two cases officers are listed as noble from the attainment of the rank of major. This was however not necessarily the rule; e.g. Infantry Regiment No. 35 (Spandau, Nauen) had 2 non-noble officers in 1740, 4 in 1744, 3 in 1756, 2 in 1757; the rank lists of 1758, 1759, 1761, 1763 and 1778 name only noble officers. The officer who rose in the regiment to major is still listed as of bourgeois origin.

Around 1700 the French proportion in the officer corps (infantry: 20%, cavalry: 26%) was particularly large due to the immigration of the Huguenots [1]. Traditionally, many Italians, French and Dutch were also found in the engineering corps [2]. Frederick William I preferred the domestic nobility as a source of officers and was indeed skeptical of foreign officer aspirants [3]. Under Frederick the Great, however, the officer corps received "an influx from almost every land" [4] and thus a somewhat more international character, especially after the Seven Years' War (in particular from Electoral Hesse and Württemberg). Already in 1740, when the infantry regiments No. 39 and 40, partly taken over from foreign services, were formed, many officers were non-Prussians. On 01.01.1742 Frederick the Great wrote to Major General Johann Volpert Frhr. v. Riedesel zu Eisenach, chief of Infantry Regiment No. 40: “You should endeavor whether you cannot, through your officers who belong at home to Württemberg, obtain young noblemen as lance corporals” [5]. Also, upon the almost complete absorption of the Saxon army encircled in the camp at Pirna in 1756, several Saxon officers entered Prussian service (a total of 53; the majority of the Saxon officer corps, however, declined to transfer). Among the 317 generals of the period 1740–63, 54 alone transferred from other armies into Prussian service. In the appendix to the 1779 regulations foreign replacements are explicitly mentioned: “Should noblemen from foreign lands be found who show intelligence, ambition and a true zeal for service: such may be proposed to His Majesty as officers, and the chiefs shall in the meantime see to engaging such in their regiments” (Article 7, p. 63). Below are some examples of the national composition of the officer corps from the Frederician period:

[1] Tharau, a. a. O., p. 54.

[2] Priesdorff, Soldatisches Führertum, a.a.O., vol. III, p. 9.

[3] Krauske, Ott (ed.), Letters of Frederick William I to Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau, Berlin 1905, p. 21, although contrary statements by the king are also known (ibid., p. 602).

[4] Priebatsch, a.a.O., p. 13 and Priesdorff, Soldatisches Führertum, a.a.O., vol. III, p. 12.

[5] Piesdorff, Soldatisches Führertum, a. a. O., vol. 1, pp. 225/226.

Cavalry:

Many Hungarians served as officers in the hussars, by the way [1]. After the acquisition of West Prussia the number of originally Polish nobles in the officer corps steadily increased. Courlanders and Poles were not in Frederick the Great's favor. To Major General v. Götzen the king wrote in 1786: “... In this connection I want to tell you that I do not like to see you take so many Poles. I can send you as many cadets as you need and if Poles are to be taken, they must be very good men” [2]. In 1806, nevertheless, there were alone 1,059 (15%) officers in the Prussian officer corps with Polish (819) and French (240) names [3]. About 20% of the engineering corps bore French names at that time. The high proportion of Polish names in the Prussian officer corps is certainly related to the territorial acquisitions of the Prussian state from the partitions of Poland (1772, 1793 and 1795).

[1] Jany, Geschichte, a.a.O., vol. III, pp. 82 and 222 ff.; see generally Kienast, King Frederick II of Prussia and the Hungarians up to the Peace of Hubertusburg 1763, in: K. u. K. War Archive, N. F., vol. IX. At H 6 in 1750, 77% of the officers had previously "served in foreign armies." 

[2] Taysen, The Military Activity of Frederick the Great in a Last Year of Life, p. 71. Many Courlanders and Poles served in East Prussian regiments. On Frederick the Great's negative attitude toward Courland as a source of officers see, for example, v. Loebell, Under the Prussian Eagle, Potsdam 1936, p. 13. Ernst Friedrich Christian v. Loebell entered Infantry Regiment No. 16 (Königsberg) in 1778 at the age of 14. 

[3] Martiny, a. a. O., p. 80.

Because of their socially shared origin, the officers formed a self-contained—strictly separated from the non-commissioned officers and ranks—homogeneous group, which, being in the overwhelming majority noble, were socially equal among themselves. This phenomenon also found its visual expression in that all officers—except the generality—wore the uniform of their respective regiment without differentiating rank insignia. General badges of dignity of the Prussian officer were the Port d'épée on the sword, the sash as a field sign, the ring collar as a service badge and the spontoon as parade and field weapon. Even though officers did not differ externally in uniform, the officer corps was of course strictly hierarchical and “the subordination between every rank is extraordinarily well established. The lieutenant general is called Excellency; there is a great distance from him to the major general. The same distance exists stepwise downwards between ensign and Fähnrich, the latter of whom the former may punish. It happens that lieutenant generals are placed under arrest and colonels cashiered when they neglect discipline and the instruction of their regiments. The reviews of this year have provided various examples of this kind” [1].

[1] Berenhorst, a. a. O., pp. 297 ff.

Regarding the requirements for officers, Frederick the Great expressed himself in his 1768 testament: “... As for the officers, one wants that they do not give themselves over to gambling nor to excessive debauchery, that they have the morals and inclinations of people who behave as honorable men; in all things entrusted to them they shall be exact, above all not be limited to the tasks given to them, but strive further and qualify themselves in advance for those which they are to assume one day” [1]. An extensive regulation precisely governed the rights and duties of an officer toward superiors, comrades and subordinates. Service conduct was monitored, the roster system checked, and annually submitted so-called conduct lists due on January 1st provided detailed information on the abilities and qualities of the officers, such as “whether the officer is a drunkard, whether he has good sense and an open head, or whether he is stupid?” [2]. The conduct lists, alongside the immediate impression at the annual review, were the basis for promotion, transfer, discharge or pension. Regimental commanders had to ensure “that the officers in the garrisons do not begin excesses, do not ill-treat citizens or their innkeepers, do not run into debt, but live within their pay” [3]. The latter criterion was decisive for the later awarding of a company, since the king held the view “that no officer can properly command a company unless he is a good innkeeper, and one always finds that a company whose captain is an innkeeper is better able than another whose captain is not an innkeeper; therefore a lieutenant or ensign who is a poor innkeeper, and does not correct himself, shall never be entrusted with a company” [4]. “Most scrupulous ... accuracy in service” [5] was demanded, officers should “.. perform the service as becomes men of honor and honest men ... ” [6] and the principle applied: “... the officer who does not perform his duty out of his own ambition, but must be induced to his service, does not merit being an officer” [7]. The officer's official duties in the garrison were mainly characterized by extensive guard and drill service, for the training of the troops was not left to the non-commissioned officers or experienced privates. The company commander was responsible for the company's performance; he had to “... answer before his company, make every possible effort himself to bring the company into order, and constantly maintain it therein” [8] and the regimental chiefs or commanders should “... urge the captains that they always keep their companies in good condition, and when there are incapable men in his company, have them discharged and in their place recruit other capable men. Especially the chiefs and commanders of the regiments must urge those captains who have poor companies to try from year to year to improve their companies as much as possible" [9].

[1] Dietrich, a. a. O., p. 297.

[2] Regulation of 1743, p. 586.

[3] Regulation of 1743, p. 564.

[4] Regulation of 1743, p. 564.

[5] Regulation of 1743, p. 185.

[6] Witzleben, A. v., From Old Password Books of the Berlin Garrison at the Time of Frederick the Great, Berlin 1982, p. 13.

[7] Regulation of 1743, p. 185.

[8] Regulation of 1743, p. 183.

[9] Regulation of 1743, p. 577.

But not only was the conduct of duty controlled; the officers' private lives were also regulated by various rules and subject to restrictions, whether it was that travel abroad was forbidden, contact with civilians prohibited [1] or a planned marriage required the consent of the General Inspector or the King. The regulations imposed strict rules for officers' marriages: “Whenever a staff officer or captain, who has a company, wishes to marry, he shall write to His Royal Majesty for permission, and His Royal Majesty will, when the match is suitable to his character and the officer can support himself by such a marriage, not deny it; nevertheless His Royal Majesty would prefer when an officer wishes to remain unmarried” [2]. For the lower officer ranks it was stated: “Subaltern officers shall not at all be permitted to marry, and therefore they shall not present themselves before His Royal Majesty; It might be that a poor officer could make his peculiar fortune by a marriage; In that case the colonel or commander of the regiment shall write to His Royal Majesty about it and report the circumstances truthfully; After which His Royal Majesty will reserve to himself whether to allow the officer or not” [3]. Overall, marital consent was hard to obtain and officers’ celibacy was therefore almost the rule. The seven infantry regiments garrisoned in Berlin had together only 43 married officers in 1772 [4]. Against this background the 24 (of 52) married officers (with 9 children) of Infantry Regiment No. 8 (Stettin) in 1783 appear as an unusually high proportion. The King - if anything at all - valued socially appropriate marriages: “I have seen from your letter of the 2nd instant how you seek permission to marry; but I do not approve that officers marry merchants' daughters, and thus your intended marriage is all the less likely to succeed, since such is in any case not fitting for the subalterns. You must therefore wait until you receive a company, then you may apply for such permission” [5]. In view of the state's meagre coffers, the King was moved, besides concern about any need to provide for officers' dependents, above all by the fear that the interest of married officers in royal service might decline. In some preserved royal letters this motive is openly addressed: “My dear ... I cannot answer your letter of 21 June other than I have already done, namely that I do not like to see a brave hussar officer marry, because such a thing is not suitable to his circumstances, which require a free heart, and instead of the hoped-for advantage he only brings many worries upon himself” [6]. The ban on unauthorized marriage was taken quite seriously: in the discharge list of Infantry Regiment No. 8 (Stettin) there is the note under the year 1783: “Lieut. v. Bardeleben cashiered for unauthorized marriage”. This rigid practice sometimes motivated falsifying the lists, i.e. the married officer was entered as unmarried in the lists [7], which presupposed the tacit approval of the superiors.

[1] Instruktion vom 11.05.1763, vgl. auch Jähns, Max, Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften vornehmlich in Deutschland, München und Leipzig 1891, Bd. III., S. 2435.

[2] Reglement von 1743, S. 600.

[3] Reglement von 1743, S. 600/ 601.

[4] Jany, Geschichte, a. a. O., Bd. III., S. 38.

[5] Kgl. Schreiben vom 04.10.1747 an Lieut. v. Plotho, Christian Dohnaschen Regiment, Preuß, Friedrich der Große, a. a. O., I. Urkundenbuch, S. 110.

[6] Kgl. Schreiben om 03.07.1747 an Rittmeister Tydaeus v. Wartenbergschen Husarenregiment, Preuß, Friedrich der Große, a. a. O., I. Urkundenbuch, S. 53.

[7] Schwenke, Elsbeth, Friedrich der Große und der Adel, a. a. O., 27. Dort wird als Beleg auf eine Geschichte der Familie von Elsner, Breslau 1860, S. 40 verwiesen. Es handelte sich um die Heirat eines Offiziers mit einer Pastorstochter.

A leave request from an officer had to be justified and also required approval. Per battalion only 2 officers were allowed to be on leave for up to 4 days at the same time [1]. The instructions for the major generals of the infantry and cavalry from 1763 forbade granting an officer more than one day’s leave without consulting the King; even when the General Inspectors were present in the province they were allowed to grant officers at most 3-4 days’ leave. The leave request had to be justified; the regulation states explicitly: “But if the officer only wants to go for a walk, the colonel shall not write to His Royal Majesty for his leave, then such an officer shall not be granted leave.” For family matters, in connection with the management of an estate, or for the restoration of health, the King also granted longer leaves. The officers' freedom of movement was restricted; they should not “go out the gate (of the garrison)” and in an order of the day of 18.06.1780 (No 23, Berlin) it reads “All officers who go for walks shall be reported” [2]. Officers' household management was also subject to regulation; the regulation of 1743 demanded: “... that no captain much less a subaltern officer shall presume, without the knowledge of the commander of the regiment, to borrow money from anyone, nor under any pretext accept goods on credit” [3]. For subaltern officer ranks 8 Reichsthaler were the maximum credit limit. Officers' living standards were predominantly modest; a contemporary wrote: “The noble officers, however, from the captain upward were paid very generously; only the Prussian subaltern officers had to content themselves with a small pay and console themselves with honour and prospect for the future!” [4]. Lossow also confirms in his memoirs: “As a subaltern one lives very restrictedly” and adds: “But whoever received a company had a plentiful livelihood .... Finally, when one obtained a regiment, one was provided for life” [5]. Due to the scant budget, younger officers were often supported by their superiors through free board or occasionally by direct allowances [6]. Monthly pay ranged in the infantry from 414 Thlr., 22 Gr., 6 Pf. for a colonel down to 11 Thlr. for the second lieutenant or ensign. The (musketeer) captain received 45 Thlr., 15 Gr., 2 Pf. (the grenadier captain: 48 Thlr., 22 Gr., 10 Pf.). In the cavalry the pay rates were slightly higher. Company owners' pay included, in addition to the flat rate for the so-called company expenses, the so-called rifle funds which served to maintain the stock of firearms. Before the reorganization of company economy as a remainder of self-sustaining management of the units by their owners in 1763, the company owner benefited outside the drill season from the wages including the small equipment payments of those on land or city leave (Freiwächter), so that, after deduction of recruiting costs, considerable income remained. The reorganization of the replacement and leave system after the Seven Years' War caused a noticeable decline in the profit opportunities from company economy; Berenhorst estimates that company owners' income fell from an average of 1600-1800 Thlr. to 600-700 Thlr. [7].

[1] Reglement von 1743, S. 596.

[2] Witzleben, a. a. O., S. 14. Am 07.06.1780 hieß es: „Die Offiziers sollen nicht nach ihrem Belieben zu den Thoren herausgehen, sondern sich vorher bei ihren Chefs und Kommandeurs melden. Dieses soll jederzeit beim Regiment nach der Parol geschehen“.

[3] Reglement von 1743, S. 612/ 613.

[4] Archenholz, Johann Wilhelm v., Gemälde der preußischen Armee vor und in dem Siebenjährigen Kriege,  Berlin 1791, S. 27. Archenholz diente in dem Infanterie-Regiment No. 23 (Berlin). 1763 wurde er als Kapitän verabschiedet.

[5] Lossow, Dankwürdigkeiten, a. a. O., S. 30.

[6] Siehe u. A.: Carl Wilhelm v. Hülsen, Unter Friedrich dem Grossen. Aus den Memoiren 1752 - 1773, Berlin 1890, S. 77, 127.

[7] Berenhorst, Betrachtungen über die Kriegskunst, a. a. O., S. 178.

Central concepts in the value system of the Prussian officer were honor and glory; Schieder points to the important guiding motif Ambition and its change in content over time [1]. The already mentioned “Instruction for the Lieutenant Colonel of the Corps Cadets by von Oelsnitz” begins with the exhortation: “The first and foremost thing upon which the Lieutenant Colonel von Oelsnitz and the captains assigned to the Corps must work shall be to instill a reasonable ambition in the cadets; furthermore to imprint in them, as if from early youth, a certain love and high regard for Prussian service, such that the idea whether there is any service in the world better than the Prussian grows up with them and is firmly impressed upon them.” In the instructions for the commanders of the infantry and cavalry regiments of 16.03.1759 the King expressly states: “All young nobles and officers who do not base themselves on honour and ambition, but are kept to their duty by constant punishments, from such it is difficult to form capable and able generals.” The intellectual horizon of the Prussian officer before 1740 was determined, alongside Lutheranism, by Calvinism of Swiss influence and a Pietism shaped by August Hermann Francke from Halle. Under Frederick the Great, the reason-oriented Enlightenment and subsequently the flourishing sciences enlivened the intellectual culture of the officer corps. The King's educational efforts became noticeable only after the Seven Years' War and consequently in the second half of his reign a revival of officers' educational striving can be observed. Moreover, the military sciences developed and military progress placed higher demands on the officers. Frederick the Great actively promoted the scientific-military training of officers (especially after 1763) and contributed himself through a multitude of writings, instructions, etc. The educational level of officers, who often entered the regiments at a very young age [2], was usually very modest; at best the young nobles had received a few years of elementary instruction from a tutor or attended the knight academies in Brandenburg and Kolberg, the Joachimsthal Gymnasium, or the universities in Frankfurt an der Oder, Halle or Königsberg. Most officers had at best a village school education. On 24.12.1784 an order of the day of Infantry Regiment No. 23 stated: “Her Majesty further commands that the corporals be used and instructed more often in the regiments so that they learn to make a proper report; it shall also be checked whether they can write, if not, they must learn it” [3]. Illiteracy is sometimes complained about even among candidates for the cadet corps [4]. The educational level of officers who transferred from the cadet corps to the regiments was of course higher than that of the Junkers. A formalized education for officer candidates outside the cadet corps did not take place, nor was there special preparatory training for higher warfare. A proper general staff did not exist or only in a small form from 1756/57. After the Seven Years' War the King then formed a quartermaster staff in Potsdam in 1764, which served the intensive training of young talented officers. In 1786 the following belonged to this General Staff: Colonel von Hanstein as Quartermaster General, the captains von Lindenau, von Thadden, von Rüchel, von Phull and the lieutenants von Massenbach and von Elsner. The training and further education of officer candidates and officers remained the responsibility of the regiment, making this area dependent on the initiative of the respective regiment owner. However, they often engaged in this. Christian Wilhelm von Prittwitz and Gaffron, who had joined Infantry Regiment No. 7 (Stettin) as a Junker shortly before the outbreak of the Seven Years' War, reports: “To occupy us usefully outside service, the Duke (note: of Brunswick-Bevern) engaged his own professor who gave us lectures on geometry and mathematics in a hall arranged for that purpose and assigned various tasks to take home which we had to work out and later present for correction, whereby it cannot be denied that our principal would have achieved his purpose with most of us if the tedious war had not existed and interrupted the studies begun” [5]. The regimental chaplain belonging to the substaff was not only to instruct soldiers' children but regularly also the Junkers. Already in the instruction for the major generals of the cavalry of 16.03.1759 Frederick the Great dealt extensively with the “supervision and discipline of the officers” and introduced advanced courses in fortification studies, which suitable officers selected for this purpose could attend in the winter months after the autumn manoeuvres. The courses took place in Berlin, Breslau, Königsberg, Magdeburg and Wesel. The governors there should watch over the conduct of the course participants and the King announced that on the occasion of regimental inspections he would inquire about the officers' conduct. In particular the knowledge of the French language and fortress construction including terrain studies was regarded as indispensable knowledge for a later general's career. All officers should at least read the regulation [6], the regulation demanded that officers “know the regulation by heart” [7]. In addition to theoretical instruction, officers were temporarily seconded to certain regiments for tactical training; thus after the Second Silesian War cuirassier and dragoon officers were repeatedly sent to the von Wartenberg hussar regiment for supplementary training. To the chief of H 3 the King wrote on 16.03.1753: “The officers will bring their own horses, he shall give them nothing, put them to daily service, allow them no indulgence and if they commit any fault, put them on guard without any compliments” [8]. In an order of the day of D V from 16.09.1785 it reads: “All gentlemen officers shall diligently practice preparing plans on how to make patrols and ambushes and work these out for themselves. This becomes them better than when some of them in the evenings go to Oesten (note: tavern in Pasewalk), spend their time there uselessly and commit misbehaviour ....” [9]. After 1763 diaries, journals, memoranda and manoeuvre descriptions became increasingly traceable. Regimental libraries were set up in isolated cases and military literature flourished [10]. Under the influence of the Enlightenment and especially in the sign of the emerging Romanticism and sensibility, interests outside purely military topics can also be found — especially among younger officers. However, literary-minded officers often had a hard time among their comrades; the well-known poet Ewald von Kleist (1715-1759), officer in Infantry Regiment No. 35 (Spandau/Nauen), writes to his friend the writer Gleim: “... among officers it is a disgrace to be a poet” [11]. Karl Ludwig von Knebel seems to have had similar experiences as an officer in Infantry Regiment No. 18 in Potsdam (1765-1773); he notes: “For some time I have noticed that I am received very coldly in the large gatherings of officers. My low rank may contribute much to this, but even more perhaps that I take little part in their usual occupations and seem little inclined to do so. It is very painful for a somewhat sensitive mind to be regarded indifferently and at times even despised by persons whose company is indispensable to it. Sensitivity about this has at times led me in my officer career to various excesses. I wanted to make myself equal to them to be loved by them. In doing so I became like them and lost, along with many other good things, the peace of my soul, without however my conduct having completely succeeded” [12]. These statements are probably symptomatic. A number of lateral entrants meant an important enrichment for the Prussian officer corps, notably Jacob von Keith (1696-1758, since 1747 a field marshal in Prussian service), Friedrich Rudolf Count von Rothenburg (1710-1751, in Prussian service since 1741 and chief of D III), Carl Christoph Imperial Count von Schmettau (1696-1774, in Prussian service since 1741, major general and quartermaster general), Curt Christoph Count von Schwerin (1684-1757, in Prussian service since 1720 and field marshal since 1740, chief of No. 24) are to be mentioned here.

[1] Schieder, Theodor, Friedrich der Große, a. a. O., S. 62 ff.

[2] Bei No. 2 sind die Gefreitenkorporale im Jahre 1785 zwischen 15 und 19 Jahre alt, die Dienstzeit beträgt 1 bis 3 Jahre. Bei No. 8 ist die Lebensaltersspanne der Gefreitenkorporale (mit und ohne Port d`Epee) im Jahre 1783 mit den zuvor genannten Werten identisch. Das Dienstalter variiert zwischen 6 Jahren und 8 Monaten. Die 6 Fahnenjunker von K 3 sind im Jahre 1779 zwischen 18 und 16 Jahre alt, die Dienstzeit schwankt zwischen 1 Jahr, 6 Monate und 6 Monaten. Eine Rangliste des Herzogl. Weimarischen Kürassier-Regiment (K6, die Liste stammt allerdings aus dem Jahre 1788) führt einen neunjährigen und einen zehnjährigen Estandartenjunker auf. Aus der Memoirenliteratur (teilweise postfriderizianisch) kennen wir (bei der Infanterie - einschließlich Füsiliere und Jäger -, Kavallerie und Artillerie) Eintrittsalter von 12 bis 17 Jahren.      

[3] Witzleben, Aus alten Parolebüchern, a. a. O., S. 83.

[4] Kgl. Ordre an Obrist v. Oelsnitz vom 17.01.1752, Preuß, Friedrich der Große, a. a. O., 1. Urkundenbuch, S. 215.

[5] Prittwitz-Gaffron, Christian Wilhelm v., Unter der Fahne des Herzogs von Bevern, Breslau 1935, S. 55. Vgl. auch: Barsewisch, C. F. v., Von Roßbach bis Freiberg 1757 -1763, Nachdruck Krefeld, S. 193. Barsewisch darf als Subalternoffizier im Infanterie-Regiment No. 24 zeitweise die Universität Frankfurt a. d. O. besuchen. Weitere Beispiele zur Aus- und Fortbildung von Offizieren bei Preuß, Friedrich der Große, a. a. O., Bd. III., S. 148 ff., Priebatsch, a. a. O., S 14 und Tharau, a. a. O., S. 106 ff., von Interesse ist in diesem Zusammenhang auch: Friedrich Meinert, Was muß ein Offizier wissen, wenn er seinem Stande wahre Ehre machen will. Beim Anfange des Unterrichtes in den Kriegswissenschaften für die gefreiten Corporale des hochlöblichen Musketierregiments von Thadden, und der beiden Füsilierbataillone von Langlair und von Renourd in Halle; nebst Plan und Nachricht, Halle 1789.

[6] Kgl. Befehl vom 09.11.1743 an Oberst Otto v. Schwerin, Preuß, Friedrich der Große, a. a. O., 1. Urkundenbuch, S. 72. 

[7] Reglement von 1743, Anhang, S.  5.

[8] Priesdorff, Soldatisches Führertum, a. a. O., Bd. I., S. 383.

[9] Albedyll, v., Soldaten und Garnisonen in Pommern, Stettin 1926, S. 111. Auch v. Witzleben (Aus alten Parolebüchern, a. a. O., S. 83) überliefert eine Reihe von Parolebefehlen (No. 23, Berlin), die die Offiziere zum Studium der Kriegswissenschaften anhalten sollten.

[10] Vgl. hierzu allgemein: Daniel Hohrath,/ Rudolf Henning, Die Bildung des Offiziers in der Aufklärung. Ferdinand Friedrich von Nicolai (1730 - 1814) und seine enzyklopädischen Sammlungen, Stuttgart 1990, sowie speziell:  Ursula Waetzoldt, Preußische Offizere im geistigen Leben des 18. Jahrhunderts, Halle 1937.

[11] Taeglichsbeck, F., Das Füsilier-Regiment Prinz Heinrich v. Preußen. 1740 - 1806, Berlin 1891, S. 10.

[12] Aufschlußreich über das geistige Klima im Potsdam ist auch der überlieferte Briefwechsel dreier Offiziere aus den Jahren 1774 - 1778, vgl. hierzu: Mitteilungen des Vereins für die Geschichte Potsdams. Neue Folge Bd. I. (1875), S. 269 ff. und Jahrbuch für Armee und Marine. Bd 11 (1874), S. 263 ff.  

The elevation of the concept of honor frequently led to duels, which the repeated royal duel edicts could not prevent [1]. The regulation tried to tread a fine line between officers' pronounced sense of honor and operational requirements. On the one hand, officers were granted a right to complain in the case of dishonorable insults by superiors, on the other hand the army had to remain functional: “When a staff officer would like to use unbecoming expressions towards an officer, His Royal Majesty will not approve of this, but the officer must nevertheless, when it happens in the firing line and in zeal for duty, not consider himself offended on the spot, but the officer must, as long as his honour is not attacked, not defend himself; afterwards he may report to the commanding officer and complain about it” [2]. Overall, the duel bans could not prevent the phenomenon of duels, as evidenced by their constant repetition and a number of transmitted individual cases with sometimes fatal outcomes. The King, close to the Enlightenment, condemned duels, but in practice he could not deny a certain respect to the deeply rooted sense of honor in the aristocratically motivated value world of officers. The officer who did not follow this supposed sense of honor in his actions necessarily stood aside and was consistently excluded from the officer corps; accordingly it was stated in the regulation: “When an officer commits a cowardice or is found to be wanting and is not a brave fellow; then the colonel shall report it and His Royal Majesty will cashier such an officer; For this reason the duel edict shall not be repealed, but His Royal Majesty confirms it in this new regulation and instructs the military courts anew accordingly” [3]. Frederick the Great ultimately had to accept the pronounced sense of honour as a moral category and in practice protected his subordinates' sense of honour from unjustified attacks by superiors; thus he wrote on 23.12.1743 to Major General Johann Volpert Freiherr von Riedesel (who had come over from imperial service and was chief of No. 41 from 1741) after an incident with a lieutenant: “... as it has been decided from time immemorial that in Prussian service it has always been the custom, and must remain the custom, that no commander, whatever the cause may be, shall meet an officer with abusive words or treat him in an dishonorable manner ... as this is contrary to the honour of Prussian service, however it may be customary in other services” [4].

[1] Vgl. hierzu: Boguslawski, A. v., Die Ehre und das Duell,Berlin 1896 und Kluth, Rolf, Die Ehrauffassung im preußischen Heer des 18. Jahrhunderts, Diss. Hamburg/ Berlin 1941.

[2] Reglement von 1743, S. 547.

[3] Reglement von 1743, S. 587, siehe auch in den Reglements von 1743 der Kürassiere (VIII. Theil, S. 43 -46), der Dragoner (S. 501 - 505) und der Husaren (S. 320 - 324). Frühe Duelledikte datieren vom 17.09.1652, 06.08.1688, vgl. ferner: Reglement von 1726, S. 562 - 566.

[4] Zitiert nach Jany, Geschichte, a. a. O., Bd. II., S. 229. Riedesel ist mehrfach durch vergleichbare Konflikte mit Untergebenen aufgefallen und wurde nach einer kriegsgerichtlichen Untersuchung zu einem zweimonatigen Festungsarrest verurteilt. Das Kriegsgercht hatte auf Kassation geurteilt, der König das Urteil aber abgemildert. Der General verließ 1746 den preußischen Dienst.

According to Lossow's “Memoirs” under Frederick the Great one was “captain for 4 to 8 years, major for 4 to 6 years, lieutenant colonel for 1 to 2 years, and only colonel for 5 to 6 years .... The subaltern officers of the army were thus in their twenties, the captains in their thirties, the majors and lieutenant colonels in their forties, and the colonels, as well as the major generals, in their fifties, namely on average” [1]. Here are some examples of the average age situation in the officer corps of Frederickian regiments:

[1] Lossow, a.a.O., p. 34.

"Advancement took place according to the ladder of ranks, according to seniority" [1], i.e. it followed the so‑called principle of seniority, a frequently applied basic rule for the allocation of opportunities for promotion and of positions of command according to the criterion of length of service. This principle was strictly observed in promotions: "To give preference to higher ranks within the same regiment, or even to cause advancement outside the normal turn among the staff officers in the army; this as a rule did not occur. Even a mere demotion of the subaltern officers and captains (never of the staff officers, who ranked as a whole) was considered to do someone wrong, i.e. an injustice" [2]. Although promotion was fundamentally tied to seniority (date of the patent) and the resulting order, there were nevertheless promotions made outside the principle of seniority. For special aptitude and performance, rapid promotion, even skipping rank steps, could be the reward: Hans Joachim von Zieten (1699–1786, later General of the Cavalry and chief of H 2) was promoted directly from major to colonel after the engagement at Rothschloß in 1741. Friedrich Wilhelm Freiherr von Seydlitz‑Kurzbach (1721–1773, later General of the Cavalry and chief of K 8) rose in 1743 from hussar cornet to Rittmeister (and squadron leader). After the Battle of Roßbach in 1757 he was elevated to General‑Lieutenant, although he had been General‑Major for only a few months. Wilhelm Friedrich Karl Graf von Schwerin, a nephew of the famous Field Marshal Curt Christoph Graf von Schwerin (1684–1757), became a captain before he was twenty. Seydlitz was 24, Friedrich Christoph von Saldern (1719–1785, later Lieutenant General and chief of No. 5) 29, Karl Heinrich von Wedel (1712–1782, later Lieutenant General and initially chief of No. 29, then of No. 26) 31 and Hans Karl von Winterfeldt (1707–1757, later chief of No. 1) 33 years old when they became majors. Hans Kaspar von Krockow, Friedrich Ehrentr. von Ramin and Johann Jakob von Wunsch became colonel and major general in the same year. These are, however, exceptions; the usual promotion path was that which Berenhorst described "according to the ladder of ranks, according to seniority." After the Seven Years' War the King confirmed this principle with certain restrictions: "Furthermore His Royal Majesty declares hereby that advancement in the turn shall remain up to and including the lieutenant‑colonel, unless from time to time officers by their bad conduct give cause, or other faults are to blame, that younger ones are preferred before them" (Instruction for the commanders of the infantry regiments of 15.02.1763, IV. Chapter). The longed‑for goal — namely to become the holder of a company and thus to leave behind the limited financial circumstances of the subaltern officer — had to be waited for by the Prussian officer for many years. War, of course, brought opportunities for rapid promotion through the increased number of officer vacancies, but these stagnated in peacetime. One of the cardinal points of criticism in both contemporary and later literature is the advanced age of the old Prussian officers, chiefly from company (squadron) commander (captain/rittmeister) upward, a trend that already became apparent in the last years of Frederick the Great and can be documented from surviving rank lists. The King, however, held on to the older officers not only because of a lack of means of provision, but also regarded their professional experience as a significant asset. To General von Wunsch he wrote on 29.07.1773: "Old officers are a treasure which one must try to preserve in the regiment" [3].

[1] Berenhorst, a.a.O., p. 297. An evaluation of a "table giving an overview of all field marshals, generals of the cavalry and infantry, lieutenant generals, major generals and colonels who have had regiments" showed that officers who rose to the rank of major general in the period from 1740 to 1786 had, on average, been colonels for 6 years previously.

[2] Lossow, a.a.O., p. 25.

[3] Priesdorff, Soldatisches Führertum, a. a. O., vol. II, p. 239; cf. also royal letter of 02.10.1752 to Michael von Szekely, chief of H 1 (ibid., p. 462).

Already as a company commander the officer left the limited economic circumstances of the subaltern ranks. The award of a regiment or a garrison battalion, however, was the dreamed‑of goal of every Prussian officer. The regimental chief stood at the head of the hierarchy of the regimental formation. The regiment bore his name and did not rank according to the regimental number, but (with exceptions) within the inspections according to the seniority of the chief [1]. "The regimental chief was primarily responsible for the training and the overall condition of the regiment. In peacetime, although a general, he was effectively the first commander of the regiment, since higher formations, brigades, were only formed in war and for larger troop exercises with the establishment of the Ordre de Bataille. Under the chief stood a commander, a colonel." [2]. In the "Instruction for the Major‑Generals of the Cavalry" Frederick the Great comments on the duties and scope of action of the regimental chief: "In peacetime and in garrisons the Major‑Generals of the Cavalry actually perform colonel duties; nevertheless they also have the opportunity in peacetime to distinguish themselves, namely if they keep their regiments in very good order...." [3]. The same applied analogously to the infantry. On the occasion of the award of a regiment Frederick the Great frequently articulated his expectations of the future holder in similar phrases: "I do not doubt that you will always conduct the regiment with due fidelity and application and maintain it in such good order and discipline as I am convinced I require" [4]. The King's correspondence with the respective regimental holders dealt in essence with all matters of the regiment and even referred to minor details. In particular, the regimental chief was required to exercise consistent leadership of people — especially with regard to the officer corps. When the holder of Infantry Regiment No. 31 (Breslau) in 1746 interceded on behalf of a subaltern officer sentenced to fortress imprisonment, the King reacted angrily: "This is precisely what I am entirely dissatisfied with you about, namely that when an officer merits to be punished, you are so kind and do not know how to use any severity against officers who act against the service or otherwise behave impertinently; rather you spare and protect them in a wholly unjust manner, whereby it then happens that the regiment, from the good order in which it previously was, falls into disorder. Since you can surely believe that I did not give you the regiment to ruin it, I hereby again seriously remind you to change your previous conduct in this regard and to urge the officers of the regiment with all rigor and emphasis to duty and to good conduct, otherwise I shall necessarily make a change with you, give the regiment to another and have to put you on pension" [5]. The King demanded cooperation between regimental chief and commander [6]. The regimental chief had considerable powers, especially with regard to recruitment, which however were already curtailed by the rescript of 09.10.1738 (discharge of enrollees unfit for military service) and again by the creation of the general inspections (1763) and in the course of the reorganization of the canton system in 1764. Independently of this, the regimental holders played a weighty role in their respective garrisons — in particular concerning the condition of the city walls and other building matters, issues of internal security (e.g. fire protection and hygiene) and order, as well as billeting and price setting — so that conflicts with the civil administration (and the guilds) were not absent. The regimental commander, as is already evident from the aforementioned royal letter to the chief of H 7, nevertheless had an important function, especially when the actual regimental holder was burdened by other duties, e.g. as general inspector. In time of war the regimental chief, usually a general, took on a higher command which separated him from his regiment. The regimental commander (before 1763 always the oldest staff officer) then automatically represented the absent regimental chief. Since the regiment was not a tactical formation but the battalion was the fighting unit and considered as an independent organism in the Ordre de Bataille, the regimental commander then commanded the 1st Battalion, while the 2nd was led by its senior staff officer. After 1763 the function of regimental commander experienced an elevation, as they were now formally appointed by the King. While rank relations became only secondary criteria, personal abilities and merits now came to the fore. The appointment of younger staff officers as regimental commanders, however, led in practice to conflicts, since bypassing the seniority principle touched the pronounced sense of honor and ambition of the old Prussian officer. Bevern does not leave this point of friction unmentioned in his "Army History": "... although it was declared that advancement should go in turn up to and including the lieutenant‑colonel, instances were found that in some regiments the 2nd and 3rd staff officer obtained command of the regiment and the elders of the same character had to obey the orders of the younger" [7]. Similar conflicts arose with the establishment of the general inspections after the end of the Seven Years' War.

[1] Jany, Geschichte, a.a.O., vol. 1, pp. 627 ff. and Kling, Constantin, Geschichte der Bekleidung, Bewaffnung und Ausrüstung des Königlich‑Preußischen Heeres, vol. 1 The Infantry Regiments in the Year 1806, Weimar 1902, p. 2.

[2] Duvernoy, The Training and Education of the Prussian Soldier under Frederick the Great, in: Militärwochenblatt 1899, p. 153.

[3] Quoted after Kluth, The Conception of Honor in the Prussian Army of the 18th Century, a. a. O., p. 161.

[4] Frederick the Great on 05.01.1758 to Jakob Friedrich von Bredow, chief of K 9, Priesdorff, Soldatisches Führertum, a.a.O., vol. 1, p. 454.

[5] Cf. royal letter to Major‑General Johann Georg von Lestwitz of 15.08.1746, Priesdorf, Soldatisches Führertum, a.a.O., vol. 1, pp. 321 ff..

[6] Letter of 11.11.1767 to Paul Joseph Malachow von Malachowsky, chief of H 7, Priesdorff, Soldatisches Führertum, a.a.O., vol. 1, p. 466.

[7] Droysen (ed.), Herzog August Wilhelm von Braunschweig‑Bevern, Versuch und Auszug einer Geschichte der Churfürstlich Brandenburgischen und nachherigen Königlich Preußischen Armee, Berlin 1886, p. 170.

The risk of being killed in a military confrontation rose rapidly for the old Prussian officer under the reign of Frederick the Great in view of the numerous campaigns. This is also evident in the preserved casualty lists. Thus the regimental book of Infantry Regiment No. 8 (Stettin) records a total of 31 officers lost to war in the period 1713–1783, most during the Silesian Wars: e.g. Mollwitz (1741) 1, Leuthen (1757) 2, Prague (1757) 8, Hochkirch (1758) 3, Torgau (1758) 12. For Infantry Regiment No. 5 (Magdeburg) there are 39 war‑related losses (1 of them in captivity) in the period 1713 to 1771; here too Torgau exacted the most victims (11). The number of those killed, however, was generally very high [1]. Altogether the King himself quantified the loss of officers in the Seven Years' War — besides 31 generals and 161 staff officers — at 1,500 [2], a loss from which the Prussian nobility never recovered in the 18th century.

[1] According to Jany and other sources the Prussian army suffered officer casualties of 191 at Mollwitz (1741), 61 at Chotusitz (1742) (including severely and lightly wounded and missing officers [1]), 183 at Hohenfriedberg (1745), 145 at Soor (1745), Kesselsdorf (1745), Lobositz (1756), 401 at Prague (1757), 392 at Kolin (1757), 7 at Roßbach (1757), 223 at Leuthen (1757), 355 at Zorndorf (1758), 246 at Hochkirch (1758), 569 at Kunersdorf (1759), 13 at Liegnitz (1760) and 649 at Torgau (1760) (of which 68 were dead officers).

[2] Preuß, Friedrich der Große, a. a. O., vol. II, p. 349.

Irregularities and offenses by officers were severely punished. Corporal punishments, however, were applied only to officer candidates, and never with the cane but with a special — flat — fuchtel blade. The range of possible punishments for officers extended from confinement, fortress imprisonment, fines (e.g. for hunting offences), temporary loss of pay, cashiering (compulsory discharge) or infamy cashiering (= dishonorable dismissal from army service). Capital punishments were carried out by shooting or hanging. Arrest was not dishonorable and threatened a commander of a company already "if henceforth a fellow in the rank does not march properly" (parole order of 21.03.1781, No. 23, Berlin). Desertion was primarily a problem affecting the ranks, but there were also isolated cases of deserter officers [1]. Within 63 and 80 years, for example, the infantry regiments No. 5 (Magdeburg) and No. 8 (Stettin) lost 1 and 8 officers respectively to desertion, mostly very young officers. If an officer deserted and his whereabouts were known, the regimental commander was to summon him within a deadline; if the deserter did not comply with this summons or his whereabouts could not be ascertained, he was tried in absentia, his likeness "hung on the gallows" and his estate fell to the invalid fund. At the same time he lost all honors and dignities, and his relatives under severe penalty were forbidden from supporting him financially. In addition, punishments could be imposed on entire units if they were conspicuous for poor performance [2]. Such collective punishments affected above all the East Prussian regiments (because of their behavior in the Battle of Zorndorf, 1758) and the units involved in the capitulation of Maxen (1759). Even in 1772 the King refused a captain promotion to an over‑complement major with the justification: "The regiment has constantly run before the enemy, and if he necessarily had to run everywhere with them, I promote the officers who have beaten the enemy, but not those who held nowhere" [3]. There is a wealth of comparable examples of Frederick the Great's assessment of military performance, which overall attest to a pronounced performance ethos. The high profile of demands was enforced not only against the officer corps as such but also consistently against the generality, and even membership of the royal house did not protect against corresponding consequences in cases of failure [4].

[1] A "Circular order to all chiefs and commanders of those regiments regarding the desertion of officers" of 12.06.1743 addressed this evil.

[2] Denial of leave because a regiment performed poorly at a review, cf. Preuß, Friedrich der Große, a. a. O., 1st Document Book, p. 101.

[3] Preuß, Friedrich der Große, a. a. O., 2nd Document Book, p. 231; cf. also Jany, Geschichte, a. a. O., vol. III, p. 10.

[4] For this topic, see in particular: Wolfgang Lotz, Courts‑Martial of the Seven Years' War in Prussia, Frankfurt/Main 1981; also instructive is the protocol of the interrogation of General von Finck about his conduct in connection with the capitulation of Maxen printed in Preuß, Friedrich der Große, a. a. O., vol. II, pp. 423 ff.

In his political testament of 1752, under the heading "Rewards for Officers," Frederick the Great remarks on the provision for officers: "We do not have enough means that would be necessary for the rewards of the officers who have distinguished themselves. The orders are: the Order of the Black Eagle, which is owed only to the lieutenant generals, and the Order Pour le Mérite. But both do not bring in a penny. The pensions are: in the domain treasury about 25,000 thalers and 40 Amtshauptmannships, each of which brings in 500 thalers. I have instructed the ecclesiastical foundations in Silesia to pay out some pensions for the officers; in addition I have prebends to grant in all cathedral chapters as well as some government posts. But, to tell the truth, all the various prebends do indeed give so much that one can live decently from them, but not enough for the officers and generals to find a livelihood for their families. That would, however, not only be desirable for a number of deserving but little fortunate military persons, but it would also be honorable for the state itself to reward the services rendered generously. Then the grandchildren of those living today could say in the families: our grandfather acquired this property when he served the fatherland"[1]. The provision for officers leaving active military service was inadequate. There was no statutory entitlement; the granting of maintenance payments was purely a matter of grace, mostly merit‑based and needs‑oriented. Frederick the Great did have favorites, but a system of patronage without reference to qualification cannot be identified. Specifically, there was the possibility of 1) granting pensions (generals received 1,000–1,500, staff officers 200–500, captains 200 thalers and the subaltern officers retained their pay), 2) bestowal of Amtshauptmannships and ecclesiastical prebends. With royal approval these could also be sold, 3) employment in the civil service, e.g. as chief forester, forester, forestry councilor, postmaster, customs inspector, salt factor, paymaster, district administrator or in the tax and mint offices, 4) transfer to a provincial regiment or to a garrison unit. After 1786 depot battalions and the invalid companies served to accommodate officers no longer fit for field service, 5) assignment of a new sphere of activity as governor or fortress commander.

[1] Quoted after: Dietrich, Rudolf, Political Testaments of the Hohenzollern, Munich 1981, p. 228; cf. also: E. Schnackenburg, The Invalid and Provisioning System of the Brandenburg‑Prussian Army up to the Year 1808, Berlin 1889, pp. 95 ff.

Already under Frederick the Great's father the officer corps began to conceive of itself as a homogeneous estate and distinguished itself from the civilian estate. The sword nobility was fully aware of its privileged social position in society. In the gravamina of 1740, for example, the Uckermark nobility complained about the arrogance of the officers, and the estates of Magdeburg also complained that "the soldier estate was not being kept within its bounds." In the literature, however, the conflicts of interest between the officer corps as a self-contained professional group and the other civilian nobility are often negated; on the contrary, a personal identity between Junker and Kompanieinhaber is even assumed and a complete coincidence of class interests is deduced from this. In contradiction to the theory "landowner = company owner" [1], for example, stands Bleckwenn's demonstration of the provincial origins of captains for the period 1733 to 1740 [2]. At first glance, however, Martiny's information seems to contradict Bleckwenn's thesis, namely that most landowning officers in the Kurmark were also garrisoned there [3]. This information, however, says nothing about the local relationship of any estates to the relevant replacement districts, and this is the crucial question for Büsch's critical approach. According to Martiny, officers on average served only up to lieutenant or captain/rittmester and, as soon as they inherited an estate and wanted to manage it themselves, often returned to the countryside. The bulk of the longer-serving officers therefore consisted of landless nobles or owners of fairly small estates. This was probably a general condition for the other provinces as well. This is also supported by the fact that the roughly 20,000 noble families exceeded the number of knight's estates by around threefold [4]. Those officers who were also estate owners, however, primarily had to attend to their official duties. Thus Frederick the Great wrote on 30.08.1779 to General von Dalwig: "Only thinking of the regiment and not of the estate; for I will not establish that: either a proper soldier or a landed gentleman, for the two do not go together" [5]. On the other hand, resignation petitions from officers who wanted to devote themselves to their estates were disapproved of and rejected by the king [6]. These pieces of evidence argue for a deliberate separation of official and private spheres of activity not only for civil servants [7], but also for officers [8].

[1] Otto Büsch, Military System and Social Life in Old Prussia 1713-1807, Berlin 1962, in particular pp. 25, 30, 71, 72.

[2] Bleckwenn, Hans, Old Prussian Military and Land Nobility, in: Zeitschrift für Heereskunde, No. 3290/321, pp. 93 ff.

[3] Martiny, The Question of the Nobility in Prussia before 1806 as a Political and Social Problem. Illustrated by the Example of the Kurmark Nobility. Stuttgart-Berlin 1938, p. 37.

[4] Schieder, Theodor, Frederick the Great, op. cit., p. 75.

[5] Priesdorff, Soldierly Leadership, op. cit., vol. II, p. 33.

[6] Cf.: Preuß, Frederick the Great, op. cit., vol. IV, pp. 303 f. and Jany, History, op. cit., vol. III, p. 417.

[7] According to Schmoller, for example, the district administrators in the Magdeburg region were of Märkisch origin, often former officers (Schmoller, Gustav, Prussian Constitutional, Administrative and Financial History, Berlin 1921, vol. II, p. 155).

[8] Cf., among others: Preuß, Frederick the Great, op. cit., 2nd document collection, p. 223.

Frederick the Great's relationship with the officer corps was difficult and decidedly ambivalent. On the one hand, numerous letters reveal the king's concern for the personal fates of the generality and subordinate officers; there are many examples of acts of clemency (also for officers' survivors). On the other hand, the king presents himself as a superior with ruthless severity and is characterized by abrupt changes between favor and disfavor. After 1763, the distance between the monarch—occupied with rebuilding the state—and the officer corps increased; already from 1759 he no longer signed the commissions of second lieutenants and ensigns. Moreover, the institution of general inspectors came between the king and the regimental officers. But at the annually held special reviews and autumn maneuvers, officers still had the opportunity to see Frederick the Great face to face. With advancing age the king's severity increased, and his patriarchal relationship to his rooted officer corps—shaped by a transformed vassalage—now in individual cases showed despotic and at times cynical features. Frederick the Great did not remain without critics in the army, and in particular a certain opposition organized itself around his brother, Prince Henry of Prussia, who was successful as a commander in the Seven Years' War. In addition, there were indeed party divisions within the officer corps; Schmettau reports: "The king indeed constantly guarded against the emergence of parties in his army; nevertheless it remained impossible to completely prevent the influence of the Prince of Dessau and Schwerin, as an old famous warrior. Both commanders were entirely opposed to one another. Schwerin's gentle, humane character, his humanity, his engaging appearance, his cultured social manners, contrasted with the rough, purely warlike, somewhat harsh conduct of the Prince to his displeasure, and made every friend of Schwerin detested by him. He and his followers therefore used every opportunity to incite the king against the field marshal. And such people were found in various..." [1]. Despite the undercurrent of criticism and party divisions in the officer corps, the king remained the dominant guiding figure for the officer corps.  

[1] Schmettau, Count v., Life Story of Count von Schmettau. By his son, Captain Count von Schmettau. Berlin 1806, vol. 1, pp. 291/292.

Forty-three years after the Peace of Hubertusburg and twenty years after the death of Frederick the Great, the old Prussian army—endowed with international renown and high self-confidence—went under in the conflict with the French Empire on the battlefields of Thuringia, the subsequent events of the twin battle of Jena/Auerstedt in particular being describable only as a disaster. Contemporaries and posterity mainly assigned the primary blame for the failure of the tradition-driven war instrument of the old Prussian state to the noble warrior caste. This criticism falls short. Among the manifold causes of the catastrophe of 1806/07, however, there was also a conditioned crisis of attitude within the officer corps, especially in the higher ranks. In this historical example too, the military elites proved incapable of recognizing their own deficits and of responding to changed circumstances. The roots of the decline reach back to the Frederickian era, where weaknesses already became apparent in the Bavarian Succession War (1778/79). However, the bulk of the omissions dates from the post-Frederickian period. The ultimate debacle, however, also represented the opportunity for a painful new beginning. By that time, however, the Frederickian type of officer definitively belonged to the past.