A Short History of the Imperial Navy - Part 3

The origin of the marine infantry dates back to 1849¹. From 1852 the Marinierkorps was called the Seebataillon. In 1889 it was split into the 1st and 2nd Seebataillon. The later 3rd Seebataillon was formed in 1897. The 1st and 2nd See-Bataillon (Kiel and Wilhelmshaven respectively) each comprised 4 companies, 1 fortress telegraph platoon and 1 machine gun detachment. Of the 3rd Seebataillon only 2 companies and the home battery were stationed in Cuxhaven; the remainder were with the East Asian naval detachment (in the Kiautschou protectorate).

Originally the Seebataillone were primarily intended for service aboard the armored ships. However, the newer warships (from the late 1890s) no longer had marine infantry detachments assigned; instead they were used, for example, as garrison troops for the Kiautschou colony (1898) or to protect the legation in Skutari (1913).

The III. Seebataillon in the Kiautschou protectorate/leased territory (supplementary text)

Twice a year the Seebataillone held exercises on troop training grounds. Recruits were required to be at least 1.67 m tall and had to have an impeccable police record. The marine infantry saw service in the uprisings in South West Africa (1904) and in East Africa (1905).

In the First World War, Tsingtau was besieged from the beginning of September 1914 by Japanese and British troops. The torpedo boat S 90 attempted to break out of the harbor on 17.10.1914. Subsequently S 90 sank the Japanese protected cruiser Takachiho, but then could not escape and subsequently scuttled herself.

At the outbreak of war the marine infantry was greatly expanded, with the IV–VII. Seebataillon being formed. They were initially deployed in the naval fortresses at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven. Already in August 1914 a marine infantry brigade with 2 regiments was formed from the existing Seebataillone. The regiments each included a machine gun company, 1 cyclist company and 1 telephone detachment. Replacement Seebataillone remained at the garrison locations.

The marine infantry fought mainly in Flanders and, for example, provided the garrison of Antwerp and occupied positions up to the English Channel coast.

In 1915 the 2nd Marine Infantry Regiment was deployed at Ypres.

Subsequently the two marine infantry regiments were stationed around Westende. Here the marine infantry – with interruptions – was to defend and hold the fortified positions until spring 1918; coastal defense was also among the brigade's tasks.

At the end of 1915 the 3rd Marine Infantry Regiment was formed. Heavy defensive battles took place in the autumn of 1916, with losses reported at about 3,000 men.

After reinforcement, the regiments were used separately from October 1916 in the Somme battle. Frontline deployments and employment as an emergency/assault division alternated.

From March the marine infantry participated in the so-called Great Battle in France, partly on the front (e.g. at Cambrai), partly in reserve.

At the beginning of November the planned withdrawal began first to the Antwerp–Meuse line, and from 14 November toward the homeland.

From autumn 1914 the Marinekorps Flandern took over the covering of the northern flank of the Western Front².

Its task was the protection of the Belgian-Flemish coast and the construction and securing of a strong base for naval operations against Great Britain.

By order of 15.11.1914 it was determined that the Marinekorps Flandern should consist of 2 divisions; later (1917) the marine infantry left the corps as a 3rd division for special employment.

1st Marine Brigade

o    1st Sailors' Regiment

o    2nd Sailors' Artillery Regiment

2nd Marine Brigade

o    2nd Sailors' Regiment

o    2nd Sailors' Artillery Regiment

o    1st Landwehr Squadron

o    I. Landwehr Field Artillery Detachment

o    2nd Marine Pioneer Company

In addition to coastal protection, the Marinekorps Flandern also occupied a land sector around Ostend. Heavy fighting took place around the town of Lombardzyde.

After four years of positional warfare, the Flemish coastal sector and the adjoining land fronts were evacuated pursuant to the corps day order of 16.10.1918.

Air defense also gained increasing importance for the Marinekorps Flandern as enemy air superiority grew.

The corps also had its own air forces, which were uniformly subordinated to the command of the naval aviation service of the Marinekorps.

Before the war the navy favored airships, so naval aviation was barely developed at the start of the First World War. Only during the war did this branch develop enormously, as its importance—especially for reconnaissance—was recognized. Tasks such as attacking naval forces were also taken on by naval aviators over time. Initially there was a lack of a suitable seaplane. In 1914 there was only a small naval aviation detachment with about 200 men and 20 trained pilots. The air stations were in Putzig and Kiel-Holtenau as well as in Wilhelmshaven and on Heligoland.

In rapid technical development suitable seaplanes were produced that had to be seaworthy and later were also equipped with radio gear. Moreover, single- and two-seat naval fighters were developed. The torpedo squadrons formed from 1915 were—not least because they were too heavy—unsuccessful. The main task remained reconnaissance in the North Sea to guard against surprise attacks, particularly by the British fleet. The German navy did not have an aircraft carrier, but several ships were converted into seaplane tenders.

At the head of naval aviation stood the Chief of Naval Aviation in Berlin. By the end of the war the naval aviators numbered about 18,000 men across 32 stations. The naval aviators were also active in Bulgaria and in Turkey. The exploits of the Tsingtau aviator, recorded by Günther Plüschow in his widely read memoirs (first edition: Berlin 1916), became famous.

Text on the above image: At the beginning (August 1914) of the First World War a Volunteer Naval Aviator Corps was founded. It was garrisoned at the Joachimsthal established by Berlin. The following year it was planned to split this corps into a department for seaplanes and a department for landplanes. In the autumn of that year, however, a different new structure for the naval aviators was chosen. The seaplane pilots joined the naval/sea aviation detachments and the landplane pilots transferred to the naval field aviation detachments. The latter belonged to the Marinekorps Flandern. A naval land aviation detachment remained in Joachimsthal. There was a fortress air station in Wilhelmshaven. This is said to have been moved to the island of Wangerooge in 1917.

For the conduct of naval warfare the operations plan of 30.06.1914 for the North Sea provided the following:

1. The aim of the operations shall be to damage the British fleet by offensive incursions against the patrol and blockade forces of the German Bight and by a ruthless mine and, where possible, submarine offensive carried out up to the British coast.

2. After this readiness and concentration have created a balance of forces, an attempt shall be made, when readiness and concentration of all forces permit, to bring our fleet into battle under favorable conditions. If a favorable opportunity to strike presents itself earlier, it must be seized.

3. Commerce warfare shall be conducted in accordance with prize regulations; the extent to which it is to be carried out in home waters shall be ordered by the Chief of the High Seas Fleet. The ships designated for commerce warfare in foreign waters shall be sent out as early as possible.

   Quoted from: Heinz Neukirchen, Seemacht im Spiegel der Geschichte, Berlin 1982, p. 334.

For the conduct of naval warfare the operations plan of 30.06.1914 for the Baltic Sea provided the following:

1. The main task of military conduct is to disrupt any Russian offensive as much as possible. In addition, the Kiel Bay is to be secured against British and Russian naval forces and enemy trade in the Baltic is to be harmed.

2. Mine operations against the Russian coast are to be commenced as soon as possible after the outbreak of war.

3. The temporary dispatch of parts of the High Seas Fleet to carry out an action against the Russian fleet remains reserved in accordance with the course of war events.

Quoted from: Heinz Neukirchen, Seemacht im Spiegel der Geschichte, Berlin 1982, p. 336.

Despite the comparatively powerful High Seas Fleet, the operational plans of the German naval command were rather restrained and also provided for no cooperation with the army. The intention was to damage the enemy fleet by offensive incursions in the North Sea and, after achieving a balance of forces, to seek battle; a commerce war according to prize regulations was also planned. However, since the British operational plan primarily aimed at a (long-range) blockade, the naval war resulted only in smaller operations. The Battle of Jutland in 1916 was, at least with regard to the scale of the naval forces involved on 31.05./01.06., unintended³.

The deployment of the German overseas cruisers revealed the dilemma of German naval policy: there was a lack of suitable overseas bases. The East Asian cruiser squadron under Vice Admiral Reichsgraf von Spee had no chance against the overwhelmingly superior force due to lack of supply possibilities and did not achieve more than an initial success off the Chilean Cape Coronel⁴. Winston Churchill offers the following assessment: "The commander of the German cruiser squadron lacked no aim for his operations. He only had to conceal himself and appear suddenly. The vastness of the Pacific Ocean and the multitude of islands offered him ample protection. Once the ships had disappeared into the expanse of the ocean, who could say when and where they would reappear? Of course the actions of the German squadron were limited by numerous factors which formed a vague but nevertheless certain limit to its survival. After the blockade of Tsingtau the German units were cut off from their only base in that part of the world. They henceforth had no possibility of dry-docking the ships or carrying out major repairs to damage suffered in action or wear incurred during long cruises, and the wear on modern warships is considerable. These difficulties multiply with each month after a dockyard inspection. Voyages at high or forced speed for extended periods in search of prey or in military operations had to shorten the service life of these units rapidly. The German ships were like cut flowers in a vase: beautiful to look at, but nevertheless condemned to an early death if the nourishing water is not constantly renewed"....

"Moreover, the procurement of coal for the German units was associated with extraordinarily great difficulties and dangers. The extensive organization of the British Admiralty watched every ton of coal and movements of colliers in every port very closely....." to be continued

Text on the above photo: The SMS Breslau was originally a light cruiser of the Imperial Navy and before the outbreak of the First World War belonged to the Mediterranean division. In 1914 the ship entered service with the Ottoman Navy and was then called Midilli. It had been officially sold to Turkey together with the SMS Goeben. The SMS Breslau sank in January 1918 after several mine hits off Imbros. The Turkish fleet had entered a minefield.

The sometimes considerable successes of individual cruisers⁵ (Karlsruhe, Emden⁶) and auxiliary cruisers (Möwe, Wolf, Seeadler) were not war-deciding but did at times cause considerable disruption and interruptions to Allied shipping.

The High Seas Fleet played primarily a passive role, especially since the first combat encounters, e.g. the Battle of Heligoland on 28.08.1914 with the British fleet, went negatively. Although after a change in leadership and a more offensive presence the longed-for major engagement at Jutland occurred, the tactical victory could not be exploited strategically in favor of the German High Seas Fleet.

As the British fleet continued to hold back, an attempt was made to bring about a reversal of the war by unrestricted submarine warfare. The quite considerable successes of the German U-boats could not, however, seriously and permanently reduce Allied merchant tonnage, particularly because the economic capacities of the USA could compensate the losses and the convoy system introduced was able to significantly reduce the effectiveness of the German U-boats. Overall the number of U-boats on site was always too small. The politically controversial unrestricted submarine warfare had, however, one concrete consequence: the entry of the USA into the war on 06.04.1917.

Ultimately the Imperial Navy, due to a misjudgment of the unfavorable geopolitical conditions and flawed naval strategy (fleet in being), did not fulfill the expectations placed on it and, driven by the mutinies in 1917 and 1918, became a cause of the revolution and the collapse of the Empire. However, there is no doubt in retrospect about the willingness to fight and personal bravery, nor about the good quality of the materiel and the high level of training. In total the German navy lost 35,000 men. Duppler concludes: "Thus the First World War, as twenty years later to an even greater extent the Second World War, was primarily a naval war that the not-yet-complete naval power Germany lost"⁷.