The economic importance of the military for the Münster garrison.

The history of Münster as a Prussian garrison town is not only a history of regiments, barracks, generals and maneuvers. The military was at the same time a considerable economic factor. Thousands of soldiers had to be housed, fed, clothed and equipped. Horses required fodder and stabling, barracks had to be built and maintained, uniforms repaired, boots made, wagons shod and food procured. Officers and military officials received regular state pay and spent part of it in the city.

The larger the garrison became, the more strongly the Prussian military budget intervened, directly and indirectly, in Münster's economy.

However, it would be too simple to regard the military solely as an economic gain. Especially during the early 19th century, billeting, services providing draft animals and troop movements could cause considerable burdens. The economic relationship between the city and the garrison therefore changed fundamentally: from the citizens' burden of billeting to an institutionalized military economy, from which numerous Münster trades and businesses benefited.

After the final incorporation of Westphalia into the Prussian state, Münster received a prominent military status. In 1820 the city became the seat of the General Command of the VII Army Corps. Thus Münster was not merely the station of individual units, but the military administrative center for a large part of Westphalia and adjacent areas.

The garrison initially comprised roughly 2,000 officers and men; after the army reform of the 1860s it was already more than 3,000. For 1871 the proportion of the military in Münster's population is given as almost twelve percent (11 - 14% according to Bernhard Sicken).

This is a remarkable magnitude economically. If military officials, family members, service staff and those whose livelihoods depended directly or indirectly on the garrison are added, the economic impact extended considerably further.

Münster was therefore, up to and even after the founding of the Reich, a site with a strong troop presence; however, the percentage share of the military declined in relation to the steadily growing civilian population. According to Bernhard Sicken, the share of the military population ranged from 11 to 14 percent after the Wars of Unification and around 5 percent in 1910.

At first, however, the stationing of soldiers primarily meant a burden. Soldiers were quartered in private houses; during troop movements accommodation, provisions and sometimes transport services had to be provided. Especially during the Wars of Liberation such services were by no means always fully compensated.

With the permanent housing of troops in barracks this relationship changed.

What had been a short-term burden increasingly developed into a lasting demand.

The most immediate economic effect of the garrison lay in the regularly paid allowances. Of course, an ordinary soldier had only small amounts of disposable income. But with several thousand soldiers, even a small individual purchasing power added up to a steady demand.

The situation was different for officers. A regimental, brigade or divisional staff brought a considerable number of better-paid officers to Münster. Added to them were members of the General Command, military doctors, quartermaster officials, paymasters, veterinarians and other military officials. Some of these people lived with their families in Münster. Their income flowed into: rents, food, clothing, furniture, domestic staff, inns, cafés, social events and numerous services.

The military thus brought to Münster a regular — for a city without a pronounced heavy industry particularly valuable and relatively independent of local economic trends — state purchasing power.

Even the ordinary soldier did not remain in the barracks at all times. Leave meant consumption. Inns, smaller shops, tobacconists, bakers and other tradespeople found in the soldiers a large and regularly renewed clientele. This is particularly clearly illustrated by the cuirassier barracks built between 1898 and 1901 on Steinfurter Street. On the opposite side of the street the establishments “Driesen” and “Zum Kronprinzen” were built. This is a small but extremely telling example of the economic connection:

Where a barracks was established, demand arose – and where demand arose, businesses settled. The military thus even changed the commercial structure of individual stretches of street. Even more important than private consumption was the institutional demand of the military. A garrison of several thousand men had to be provisioned daily. Among other things, bread and flour, meat and sausage, potatoes and vegetables, pulses, dairy products and other foodstuffs were required.

Not everything was procured directly from Münster producers. The army administration had regulated tendering and procurement procedures, and some supply contracts went to outside firms. Nevertheless, the garrison generated a continuous demand that radiated via traders and suppliers far into the Münsterland. The agriculturally dominated surrounding area in particular could benefit from this.

Bernhard Sicken, however, points out that there were no production facilities for weapons and heavy equipment in Münster.

Of particular importance was the large number of military horses. Münster housed cavalry and field artillery; in addition there was the train. Horses were also required by staff units and for transport tasks. Each of these animals had to be cared for daily. This created a substantial demand for oats, hay and straw. The economic effect was not limited to the city. Farmers, estates and merchants of the Münsterland could act as suppliers of forage. In addition there were saddlers, wheelwrights, blacksmiths and farriers.

A cavalry garrison was therefore different not only militarily but also economically from a pure infantry garrison. The cuirassier barracks built around 1900 illustrate the scale. Their complex included not only accommodation buildings but extensive stables, carriage houses, riding halls, a sick stable and a horseshoeing forge.

Each horse meant ongoing costs – and thus ongoing contracts, insofar as these needs were not handled by military personnel themselves, e.g. farriers.

The military required a wide range of artisanal services. Tailors worked on uniforms, shoemakers on boots, saddlers on leather goods, blacksmiths on horseshoes and fittings, carpenters on furniture and fixtures, wheelwrights and carriage builders on vehicles. However, the economic structure also changed here.

With the increasing centralization of army supply, certain services were no longer procured decentrally from individual regiments or private craftsmen. From the late 19th century, corps clothing offices were established within the army corps. For the VII Army Corps such an office was located in Münster. The military records there explicitly list tailor and shoemaker workshops, storage buildings, coach houses (Remisen) and a joinery.

This gave rise to something remarkable:

The military was no longer merely a client of the local crafts, but in part became itself a large artisanal employer. In addition to soldiers, the military administration employed clerks, laborers and specialized craftsmen, albeit in modest numbers. Most of the people who worked for the clothing office of the VII Army Corps belonged to the military.

In my view this point should be given particular emphasis in the chapter. The military created not only jobs for soldiers in Münster.

The military apparatus included the quartermaster's department, clothing office, pay offices, military hospital (Lazarett), train depot, artillery depot, garrison administration as well as numerous technical facilities.

For 1914, in Münster, in addition to the general command and the actual troop units, among others, the corps court, corps quartermaster's office, medical department, corps clothing office, train depot and pay office can be documented. Behind these were jobs that were occupied predominantly, but not only, by military personnel.

Clerks and administrative officials, craftsmen and laborers, nursing staff, drivers and stable personnel as well as numerous other employees lived at least partly from the military infrastructure.

The economic importance of the garrison was therefore considerably greater than the mere number of soldiers suggests.

A second major effect stemmed from military construction activity. At first the Prussian military administration often made do with existing buildings. Secularization had made numerous former monasteries and church institutions available.

A city map from 1839 already shows eleven military buildings in or immediately adjacent to the old town.

Over the course of the century, however, this infrastructure was no longer sufficient. In the first half of the 19th century the military did attempt to shift construction costs onto the inhabitants, since it wanted to free itself as much as possible from the burdensome billeting duty.

An example of this is the erection of the Aegidiikasere (constructed from 1828), financed through mixed financing. A considerable portion of the construction costs was provided by a joint-stock company.

Around 1869, according to Bernhard Sicken, only 100 soldiers in Münster were said to still have been dependent on civilian quarters.

Barracks, stables, magazines, military hospitals, workshops, riding arenas and administrative buildings had to be built, expanded and maintained. That meant contracts for building contractors, bricklayers, carpenters, roofers, joiners, locksmiths, glaziers and transport companies.

How considerable state investments in military infrastructure could be is already shown by the Reich budget 1879/80: solely for the first construction phase of a steam laundry for the Münster garrison, 50,000 marks were allocated for land acquisition and project preparation.

Around the turn of the century this construction activity increased again considerably.

This became particularly visible in the north of Münster.

Between 1898 and 1901 the large cuirassier barracks was built on Steinfurter Straße. It comprised five multistory accommodation buildings as well as stables, coach houses, riding halls, forges, utility and ancillary buildings. The complex was part of a systematic expansion of Münster as a garrison location.

Artillery barracks and an artillery depot were also located in this area. Thus a veritable "barracks town" developed on the northern outskirts of the city.

Extensive military facilities were also built in the south. The Train Battalion required accommodations, stables, vehicles and magazines.

Around 1910 another large complex was erected between Habichtshöhe and Weißenburgstraße as a materials depot and for the vehicle fleet of the Westphalian Train Battalion No. 7.

The military thus became a factor in the city's expansion.

This expansion inevitably had an impact on the real estate market.

The military administration required large contiguous areas for barracks, stables, depots and training grounds. Areas on the then city outskirts were thus put to new uses.

Already in 1827 the military had purchased about 107 hectares in the Loddenheide. Larger military exercises were to take place there. Firing ranges were also established there for that purpose. However, due to modern developments in weaponry these areas soon proved insufficient. Therefore about 120 hectares near Haus Spital and an area for a modern firing range in the Coerheide were acquired.

The city of Münster had to bear the costs for the relocation (1818) of dangerous war materiel — especially projectiles and quantities of powder — from the inner city (Kreuzschanze) to outside the city in the Mauritzheide (powder magazine).

In 1890 the munitions manufacturing and storage facility that had remained within the city followed suit.

Roads had to be developed and utility lines extended. Residential and commercial uses arose in the vicinity of the barracks. Thus the military indirectly influenced land values and urban development. However, there was also a downside: large military areas were taken out of normal urban use and partly formed barriers to further development.

Economically, therefore, the garrison was not solely an advantage.

A particularly marked change can be observed in accommodation. At the beginning of the 19th century soldiers often lived with private citizens. For homeowners this could mean income or compensation, but it was often perceived as a burden. With the expansion of the barracks this form of accommodation increasingly disappeared.

By 1896 almost 90 percent of the Prussian troops were already barracked; the older practice of billeting thus played hardly any role anymore.

Officers and married military personnel, however, remained important participants in the private housing market.

Especially senior officers had incomes that enabled them a corresponding standard of living. They rented apartments or houses, employed domestic staff and took part in the social life of the city.

Around 1905, according to Bernhard Sicken, about 500 active military personnel had rented accommodation, of which about 33% were in the so‑called old town.

The line between economic and social significance is hard to draw here. Officers visited restaurants, cafés and social events. Soldiers filled public houses during leave.

Military music also had an influence on civilian life. Regimental bands played not only at military ceremonies but also at public and private events.

This in turn generated income for innkeepers and organizers.

The military brought people to the city who consumed and spent their money there.

Another factor, now easily overlooked, was military visits.

Inspections, maneuvers, officers' meetings, swearing-in ceremonies, and other military events repeatedly brought visiting officers, reservists, and family members to Münster. They required accommodation and provisions.

Hotels, guesthouses, transport companies, and later also the city's public transit benefited from this. Especially larger maneuvers could produce a considerable additional demand at short notice.

With the expansion of the railway network, this development gained another dimension. Troops, recruits, reservists, horses, equipment, and supplies had to be transported. Münster thus became not only a garrison but also a military traffic hub.

The railway connection also increased the strategic importance of the location.

In the event of mobilization, thousands of men and large quantities of materiel had to be moved within the shortest possible time.

The garrison thereby in turn generated traffic and demand for transport services.

The economic importance of the garrison did not end at the city limits. This is especially true for the supply of food and horse feed. The agriculturally shaped Münsterland formed a natural hinterland for this. Farms, cattle dealers, grain merchants, and transport companies were able to profit from the military demand. Thus there was an economic interaction between the garrison and the surrounding area:

The city housed soldiers and military facilities – the surrounding area supplied part of what was needed to provision them.

In economic terms the garrison held a special advantage for Münster.

The military's demand did not depend directly on the local business cycle. Pay, salaries and construction expenditures were ultimately financed from state or imperial funds. Purchasing power thus flowed into Münster from the outside.

This economically distinguishes a garrison, for example, from a commercial enterprise whose sales could be heavily dependent on the local economic situation. General command, division, regiments and military authorities continuously brought state funds into the city.

For a Münster shaped predominantly by administration, trade, services and its surrounding countryside, this effect was likely considerable.

A balanced account must not forget the countercalculation. The garrison occupied land. Streets were strained by military traffic and horses. Large barracks complexes influenced urban development. In the first half of the 19th century the burdens from billeting were added.

During maneuvers and mobilizations horses, wagons and other civilian resources could be requisitioned. The relationship between military and municipal financing of roads, development, water supply and other facilities could also lead to conflicts of interest.

Therefore the garrison should not be understood economically as either a mere burden or a pure gift of the state. Rather, it was a permanent large consumer and major employer whose presence brought significant advantages while at the same time causing costs.

By 1914 this development had reached its provisional high point. Münster not only housed the General Command of the VII Army Corps, but also the command of the 13th Division, several brigade staffs, Infantry Regiment No. 13, Cuirassier Regiment No. 4, Field Artillery Regiment No. 22, Train Battalion No. 7 as well as numerous administrative and supply facilities. These included, among others, intendancies, courts, medical services, the clothing office, train depot and pay office.

The garrison had thus become a military-economic complex. Soldiers and officers were consumers. The military administration was an employer. The regiments were major purchasers. The cavalry and artillery generated demand for horses and forage. The construction of barracks brought contracts for the construction industry and trades. Military personnel and their families needed housing. Inns and shops relied on their custom. And the German Reich invested considerable public funds in buildings and facilities that were erected and maintained in Münster.

The economic importance of the military for Münster therefore cannot be measured solely by the number of stationed soldiers.

Around the garrison a far-reaching network of state expenditures, private consumption, construction investment, craft services, food supply, horse husbandry, transport and services developed over the course of the 19th century. The garrison not only shaped Münster’s streetscape. It influenced the labor market, trade, crafts and urban development.

This is precisely where a peculiarity of the Prussian garrison town Münster lies: it was neither a large industrial city nor a fortress town. Its military-economic significance rested rather on the combination of a troop garrison, corps command and extensive military administration.

When mobilization took place in August 1914, this relationship between city and military that had grown over decades entered a completely new phase. The economic factor of the peacetime garrison now became a war economy – with replacement troops, military hospitals, procurement, prisoner-of-war camps and an ever-stronger influence of the deputy general command on economic life.