The Prince-Bishopric Period in the Era of Absolutism (1661 – 1802). Part 2: The 18th Century.

The army of the Prince-Bishopric of Münster consisted of the standing army and the militia.

The latter was established by the territorial sovereign's edict of 07.04.1633, but was essentially worthless militarily.

In the first half of the 18th century the prince-bishopric's army numbered 7 infantry regiments, 1 land regiment, 2 cavalry regiments and 1 artillery detachment.

An infantry regiment comprised 8 companies with an approximate strength of about 50 men each. Thus the regiment counted 400 men; in wartime this manpower doubled.

Each company had three officers: the captain and company commander, the lieutenant and the ensign.

The Leibkompanie was commanded, in place of the regimental proprietor, by an older officer. The Leibkompanie also included additional staff personnel.

Each company had among the non-commissioned officers one sergeant (Feldwebel), one quartermaster (Fourier) and a Feldschwerer, two corporals as well as two drummers or one piper and one drummer.

Oboists could also be added to the Leibkompanie.

In 1744 the headcount of the companies was increased (to 100), but by 1750 it was again only 50 men. The grenadier company had 64 men.

However, the regiments' authorized strength was often not reached in practice.

The land regiment is said to have comprised 10 companies.

A cavalry regiment had only six companies, each with a strength of about 40 men. However, only a small proportion of these were mounted.

The number and distribution of officers in the cavalry corresponded to those in the infantry.

Furthermore, each company had a sergeant and a trumpeter. The life company had a kettledrummer.

The artillery detachment had only about 100 men.

The artillery detachment is said to have had over 200 heavy guns.

In 1781 the artillery detachment consisted of one colonel, one lieutenant colonel, one chief sergeant (Oberstwachtmeister), two captains, five lieutenants and three ensigns.

To these were added 6 Stückjunker, 4 cadets, 12 fireworkers, 6 bombardiers, 23 cannoneers, one armourer (Rüstmeister), one feldscher (barber-surgeon), one master carpenter, one cooper and one fourier rifleman.

After 1763 no guns were produced in Münster any longer; the existing guns were soon considered obsolete. They were sold off gradually. In 1785 there were still 68 guns.

In 1799 (according to Zeigert) only half of them were operational.

With reference to the particularly good Münster artillery, Johann Conrad v. Schlaun should already be mentioned at this point.

Schlaun was not only an important artillery and engineer officer, but also a significant architect of Westphalian Baroque.

Schlaun began his military career in Hanoverian service. There he became an ensign and was trained as a survey engineer.

Subsequently Schlaun entered Münster service, initially in an infantry regiment as a lieutenant. In 1720 he became captain-lieutenant of the artillery, thus changing branch.

After a longer study trip Schlaun continued his career in the Münster military and was promoted to major in 1726, to lieutenant colonel in 1728, to colonel and commander of the Münster artillery in 1733, to major general in 1745 and finally to Governor-General of Meppen in 1750.

At the same time Schlaun developed into a significant architect and in 1729 succeeded Pictorius as Landbauingenieur of the Prince-Bishopric of Münster.

Under the belligerent Prince-Bishop Bernhard von Galen the Münster army strength amounted to up to 25,000 men; the frequently cited larger headcount (up to 60,000 men) appears too high.

After the Peace of Nijmegen the Münster army was significantly reduced, namely to 4,370 men (11 companies of horse and 37 companies of foot).

Around 1700 the Münster military consisted of only 3,151 men, but then again reached a headcount of over 6,000 men.

In the first half of the 18th century the army strength according to Diembach was at most between 3,800 and 4,000 men.

The wartime strength was, or should have been, about twice as large.

Individual regiments were commanded by colonels or generals and were — as was customary in the 18th century — named after their proprietors.

Accordingly, the names of the units also changed when the regiment's commander changed.

In the War of the Austrian Succession (1744) the Prince-Bishopric of Münster practiced an armed neutrality.

In the Seven Years' War (1756–63) Münster troops (against Prussia) took part in military operations, but fought with little success.

The Münster troops of the Prince-Bishopric of Münster fought in the Seven Years' War (1756–1763) on the side of the anti-Prussian coalition, but remained largely unsuccessful and suffered heavy military losses early on.

The Prince-Bishopric was under the influence of the Elector of Cologne and oriented militarily against Prussia and its allies (Great Britain–Hanover). The Münster contingents fared poorly.

A drastic low point occurred on April 1, 1759, when no fewer than two Münster regiments were surprised in their winter quarters at Meiningen by enemy troops and taken completely prisoner.

The Münsterland and the city of Münster itself became the scene of occupations, marches and sieges by French and allied (Hanoverian/Brunswick) forces during the Seven Years' War.

After French troops occupied Münster in July 1759, the city became their garrison. The Catholic population initially even received the French positively, as they were regarded as allies of the Prince-Bishopric.

Private houses, however, were massively requisitioned to accommodate soldiers. The inhabitants not only had to provide living space ("Naturalquartier"), but also had to cover the troops' provisions or pay high servis fees (levies paid to be exempted from in-kind billeting). The city administration, represented by the so-called Billetsherren (councilors responsible for quartering), almost collapsed under the bureaucratic and financial pressure. As a result, Münster bore enormous fiscal burdens (tax levies) to finance the war.

The real horror followed in the autumn, when the allied troops (in particular Hanoverians, Hessians and Brunswickers under General Imhoff and the Count of Schaumburg-Lippe) attempted to recapture the fortress of Münster from the French. On September 3, 1759, the Hanoverian artillery opened a heavy bombardment on the city. Large parts of the Martini quarter were completely reduced to rubble and ashes. The historic Lotharingian monastery and the tower of St. Martini's Church burned down completely.

The siege dragged on for months, as the French had been reinforced again in September. In November the pressure from the Allies became unbearable. On November 19, 1759, an allied shell hit the arsenal of the citadel, whereupon the powder magazine there exploded and caused enormous damage to the fortress area. In view of the catastrophe, the French commander General Gayon negotiated the surrender. On the night of November 20 to 21, 1759 the capitulation was signed at the nearby Wilkinghege Castle. The French were granted free passage, but the misery of the people of Münster remained.

Around 200 houses and important public buildings lay in ruins after the events of 1759. The city's economic strength was so exhausted that Münster had to cease the independent minting of small copper coinage that year.

After the Seven Years' War not only was the city of Münster demilitarized, but the number of formations was also reduced to 4 infantry regiments and 1 cavalry regiment — with a simultaneous reduction of the artillery.

The land regiment had already been disbanded earlier.

The regiments remaining after the aforementioned reduction are then found, on the basis of subsidy contracts (e.g. with the Dutch, still in 1793), on a wide variety of theaters of war.

Furthermore, military imperial obligations had to be fulfilled. As early as 1681 Münster had to maintain 787 men on foot and 384 men on horseback. This led, for example, to Münster having to supply its troops to the Imperial Army at times, but then having no or only inadequate own troops available to defend its own territory.

After the Seven Years' War the Münster army — as mentioned — was drastically reduced.

From the previous organization of seven infantry and two cavalry regiments there emerged after 1767 a considerably smaller army. This now comprised:

4 infantry regiments and

1 dragoon regiment as well as

artillery.

The land regiment had already been discontinued earlier.

The calculated peacetime establishment was at approximately 2,300 men, with the units in peacetime being staffed at about half strength.

Overview of the four infantry regiments:

Replacements were obtained primarily by recruiting, mainly in the Münsterland, but also in Rheda, Steinfurt, or Bentheim.

The recruits received a signing bonus.

There were at times also forced levies (e.g. for the land regiment) or in times of war.

To spare the local population and/or to meet the pressure to fill the prescribed troop strength, recruiting was also carried out abroad.

Under the Münster minister (1762–1780) Franz von Fürstenberg an attempt was made to reform the procurement of replacements (see Alwin Hanschmidt, Franz von Fürstenberg als Staatsmann, Münster 1969).

A recruitment regulation sought a different recruitment mode intended to reduce desertions and to counteract the aging of the active soldiers. Furthermore, they wanted to lower the army costs. The so-called Losung was introduced. This drew on the "young manpower" of the territory with reference to the militia idea. Local soldiers were considered more reliable than recruited soldiers, who were often deserters from other armies. Thus they turned away from the principle of voluntary enlistment and introduced a lottery procedure.

In principle this service duty applied to all fit-for-service men aged 18 to 40. Personal military service time was, however, limited to three years.

Substitution was not possible, but for various — above all economic — reasons there were a number of exemptions.

There was also a prohibition on marriage so that those liable for service could not evade military duty.

This new principle resembled a general conscription, but it applied only in principle. The use of the native population resembled comparable systems, e.g. the canton system introduced in Prussia in 1733.

However, the aforementioned reforms quickly turned into a failure. When von Fürstenberg wanted to extend the system around 1779 into a kind of general conscription for the rural population, he encountered bitter resistance from the estates. Over this conflict he fell and lost his ministerial office in 1780. Under his successor, Prince‑Bishop Max Franz of Austria, the government acceded to the demands of the estates. As early as 1786 the obligation under the Losung was officially abolished again. Thus the precursor to a regional conscription was denied lasting success, since it could not be implemented socially and politically in the prince‑bishopric.

After the abolition of the obligation to be drawn, the system of voluntary recruitment (forced enlistment or mercenary recruitment) was reactivated.

Since the rural population could no longer be compulsorily bound, the military had to recruit its soldiers again on the open market with bounties. Because the recruitment of foreign mercenaries was extremely expensive and the estates — which controlled the budget — did not want to approve funds for a large standing army, the army was radically reduced. In peacetime a large part of the troops were only rump units.

Klaus Hell assesses this return to the voluntary principle as follows: "Whether the levy imposed on the subjects at the reintroduction of recruiting volunteers is to be regarded as equivalent to the service that might otherwise have to be rendered in kind cannot be judged, because information on the number of men subject to the draws is lacking and therefore any statement about the probability of drawing one of the lots 'SOLDIER' is not possible. That in the debate over the return to volunteer recruitment the same argumentative figure was used as previously in the introduction of conscription and drawing, namely an 'depopulation' of the country due to the flight of the subjects, may be a timeless example that in political disputes the quality of the arguments advanced is of secondary importance as long as the intended purpose can be achieved." Same author, "From the Levée of the Superfluous via Conscription and Drawing of Duty-Bound Men to the Recruitment of Volunteers in the Military of the Prince-Bishopric of Münster from 1763 to 1786," in: Westfalen 1999, pp. 57 ff.).

At the muster at the end of May 1785 the actual strength of the four infantry regiments mentioned together amounted to 1,377 men. That corresponded to 94% of the nominal strength.

This already refutes any possible notion that the army, after the Seven Years' War, was practically nothing more than an assemblage of remnants.

But personnel turnover was enormous, namely:

Between May 1785 and May 1786, 573 soldiers = 42% left, while at the same time 672 volunteers were recruited.

At the next muster only 594 of these were actually in service, including 236 foreigners = 40%. 69 of the newly recruited had already deserted.

One year later, of the volunteers recruited in the first year only 491 = 73% remained.

The problem was therefore not necessarily obtaining soldiers at all, but keeping them in service for the long term.

Even this small army was not cheap. In the first recruiting year up to May 1786 a total of 9,539 Reichstaler was expended, including 1,600 talers advanced to the regiments.

The recruitment bounties advertised in 1786 brought in 22,159⅓ Reichstaler.

By December 1788, however, 27,408 Reichstaler 22 schillings 8 pfennigs had already been spent from the recruitment fund.

In addition, the estates had to approve funds again.

Since the defeat of the city of Münster in the struggle with Prince-Bishop Christoph Bernhard von Galen there had always been a strong garrison in Münster. Only part of the soldiers were housed in the citadel. Beyond that there were no barracks. Consequently, the accommodation of soldiers in civilian quarters was necessary.

These had to be taken in by the citizens without compensation, although the billeting in private houses applied only to non-commissioned officers and the rank-and-file. Only the "tax-liable" houses were affected. Properties within the scope of immunities, the clergy, the nobility and the military itself did not belong to the "tax-liable" houses. Further details on exemptions from the billeting burden followed from a regulation of 16 May 1683.

Officers had to arrange their own accommodation. For these the citizens had to pay a levy, the so-called "Service-Support." These funds were administered by the Landpfennigkammer.

There was a graduated system of billeting burdens, namely whole, half or quarter duty. From a whole duty, for example, followed the obligation to take in an entire soldier's family.

The billeting burden was also defined in content. The accommodation provided had to be appropriate. The room had not to be too small and had to contain a bed. Furthermore the landlord had to provide fuel for heating and arrangements for lighting.

In individual cases there was the possibility to buy oneself free from the billeting burden. For this money the soldiers not assigned to a house then had to find their own lodgings. This mostly concerned married soldiers.

The soldiers were accommodated in "cantons," in which the individual companies were housed together as much as possible. This was necessary so that in the event of an alarm a certain order could be guaranteed immediately.

The practice of billeting followed precise guidelines, regulated in an instruction of 17 May 1765. A special commission was responsible for this and compiled a list of billet and service providers. The city magistrate, on the other hand, had to ensure sufficient quarters. The requirement followed from the authorised and effective strength of the troop. Allocation was made by the magistrate with so-called "billets." The distribution of the billeting burden was to be carried out fairly. Changes of billet could only take place by consultation between the regimental commander and the magistrate. If no agreement was reached, the aforementioned commission had to decide.

For the year 1764 there are records for the city of Münster of 1210 houses that were subject to a billeting obligation.

These were distributed according to Diembach over the individual Leischaften as follows:

Aegidii-Leischaft: 116 houses with a full duty, 73 houses with a half duty and 57 houses with a quarter duty.

Ludgeri-Leischaft: 88 houses with a full duty, 77 houses with a half duty and 45 houses with a quarter duty.

Lamberti-Leischaft: 65 houses with a full duty, 34 houses with a half duty and 124 houses with a quarter duty.

Martini-Leischaft: 99 houses with a full duty, 21 houses with a half duty and 20 houses with a quarter duty.

Liebfrauen-Leischaft: 54 houses with a full duty, 48 houses with a half duty and 102 houses with a quarter duty.

Jüdefelder-Leischaft: 34 houses with a full duty, 60 houses with a half duty and 84 houses with a quarter duty.

Thus there were in total 456 houses with a full duty, 313 houses with a half duty and 441 houses with a quarter duty.

Houses with a half duty normally took in single soldiers. Houses with a quarter duty were properties of the poorer urban population. These houses were often inadequate for accommodation. Individual houses were assessed with regard to their quality as good, merely passable or poor. The latter, for example, had no window or no usable bed or too low headroom. Thus there were quarters where soldiers had to sleep only on planks between the roof beams. It also occurred that soldiers sublet their actual chamber and therefore (out of self-interest) accepted the poorer sleeping place.

For the entire garrison of the city of Münster a need of 1002 quarters was stated. This number could not be fully satisfied. For this reason the military also complained about the, from their point of view, excessive number of exemptions from the billeting burden. In this context the lack of barracks was also mentioned (1766).

In 1777 a total of 1994 houses were listed for the city of Münster, of which only 1162 were subject to quartering. Of these, however, 361 households paid a service. Therefore only 801 houses remained for actual accommodation with soldiers. Of these, 462 houses had a quarter duty, which were only partly suitable for billeting. On average there were two soldiers per quarter.

However, the number of available quarters increased over time; thus in 1795 there were 1514 houses subject to quartering.

Source: the account follows in particular the statements in the master's thesis by Thomas Diembach (1990).

On the origin and social composition of the Münster military the following can be read in the aforementioned master's thesis by Thomas Diembach on the military of the Prince-Bishopric of Münster in the age of absolutism:

"Because the ranks consisted of deserters and of people who could find no place in other occupations, and moreover were very poorly paid, the common soldiers were regarded in the city's bourgeois society as scum. Until Fürstenberg's reform the Münster military probably also had something of the character of a penal institution, since someone sentenced to penal servitude could, if needed, be placed among the soldiers. It can be assumed that the reputation of the common soldiers improved after the introduction of the lottery, since the army then essentially consisted of the local rural population. The right of discharged soldiers to wear their old regimental uniform for life points to this."

These statements are also confirmed by Haas-Tenkhoff and Hanschmidt and Diembach refers to these authors. According to Haas-Tenkhoff "the recruits were partly people who had not found a better line of work, and on the other hand those to whom peasant or petty-bourgeois life seemed too monotonous. The main mass of the engaged consisted of deserters. Given the multiplicity and smallness of the German lands it was not too difficult for a soldier to leave the unit in which he had taken service. The expected enlistment bounty tempted, and the change happened quickly enough. The old uniform was cast off and instead the dress of the territorial lord was put on, to whom one had now pledged oneself." Thus, according to Diembach, for example, in one year in the Münster garrison a total of 47 men deserted: 24 men from Infantry Regiment No. 1, 15 men from Infantry Regiment No. 6 and 8 men from the company of the infantry regiment stationed in Münster.

The consequence of this rampant grievance were countless cartel agreements against accepting deserters; at the same time so-called "general pardons" were repeatedly granted for one's own deserters. Their constant repetition, however, indicates that this problem persisted and therefore had a fundamental character.

To ensure stability, the marriage of recruited soldiers was therefore promoted, but this required official permission. Without such consent from the superior, engagements or marriages were considered null and void. This also applied if the bride was pregnant. Several princely-bishopric decrees (1748, 1763 and 1768) pointed to this legal consequence.

Haas-Tenkhoff states the following on this subject: "The pay was poor, indeed insufficient to satisfy daily needs. In 1756 the enlistment bounty for the common man in the infantry amounted to 10 Reichstaler, in the cavalry 5 (?) Reichstaler; the monthly pay was half a thaler, the cavalryman's 2 1/3 thalers, the kit of the infantryman was reckoned at 18 thalers, that of the cavalryman at 24 thalers. In addition, pay was not always disbursed punctually. For this reason, binge dining avoidance, wood and vegetable thefts by the soldiery occurred more often than the citizens liked. The militia, in its motley jumble, was regarded almost as a dangerous rabble and in the language of the people, alongside the "pack Jews" and the itinerant folk, belonged to the main ills of the land."

On the social position of the officer corps, Bruno Haas-Teckhoff (The Prince-Bishopric of Münster's Military in the 18th Century, in: Westfalen, 1930, pp. 141 ff.) writes:

"As low as the esteem for the common soldier was, so high was the regard for the officers, who, somewhat differently even in the time of Christoph Bernhard von Galen, formed a separate estate and cultivated a special class honour after the Prussian pattern. In Prussia, after all, the Soldier King Frederick William I subordinated the military estate to all other estates; there it was such that officials' rank position was determined by military commissions. The court physician had, like the district councillor, the rank of captain, the tax councillor that of lieutenant; the consistory councillor and the archivist were ranked as ensigns; the librarian, like the court confectioner, had to be content with the dignity of a sergeant, while the court apothecary was treated merely as a musketeer. The special status of officers in Münster did not go nearly that far; here the high clergy, whose members at times exercised governmental power in the cathedral chapter, enjoyed an even greater class honour. In the court calendars the clergy ranked before the military, and it is telling that no provincial soldier in arms was allowed to enter the cathedral square. In any case, the Münster officer corps, which belonged at least half to the nobility and, on the other hand, emerged from the urban patriciate, was certainly distant from the bourgeois circles."

On military chaplaincy, Bruno Haas-Teckhoff (The Prince-Bishopric of Münster's Military in the 18th Century, in: Westfalen, 1930, pp. 141 ff.) reports:

"Military pastoral care within the Münster garrison as well as at the other stations and likewise in the field was entrusted primarily to the Order of the Franciscan Observants. More detailed information is provided by P. Berthold Bockholt in his History of the Münster Franciscan Foundation. Bockholt also describes a dramatic incident from 1729 in which the Franciscans saved a soldier's life: A deserter from the prince-bishopric's army, who had been captured in Rheine, was led under secure escort through the city of Münster to his execution. When the escort reached the Überwasserkirchhof, the soldier broke away and leapt into the portal of the Observant church to seek asylum there. He was immediately dragged out of the church by the provosts by force and placed in chains and leg fetters. But in the criminal proceedings that were then initiated, the guardian of the monastery, P. Godefridus Stüve, appealed in a petition to the Vicar General v. Ketteler as special apostolic representative in this matter for the preservation of the right of asylum and ecclesiastical freedom; and he succeeded in having the offender returned to the asylum."

The last deployment of Münster troops saw them take part, in 1790, as part of a so-called Reichsexekutionsarmee on behalf of the prince-bishop of Liège who had been expelled by his subjects.

On the political background and course of the execution against Liège.

This action was aimed at suppressing the Liège Revolution, which had broken out in August 1789 simultaneously with the French Revolution.

In the Prince-Bishopric of Liège – a spiritual principality that, like Münster, belonged to the Empire – the population rebelled against the authoritarian rule of their prince-bishop Cäsar Konstantin Franz von Hoensbroeck. Inspired by the events in Paris, the insurgents overthrew the old government, installed democratic mayors, and forced the bishop to flee to Germany. The Liège radicals even went so far as to abolish the prince-bishopric and proclaim a republic.

The Imperial Chamber Court in Wetzlar condemned the revolution sharply and ordered the restoration of the old order. Since Liège lay in the Lower Rhenish–Westphalian Imperial Circle, the princes there – including the Prince-Bishop of Münster – were commissioned to provide troops for a military punitive expedition (Exekution).

Prussia initially sent its own troops to Liège at the end of 1789 but withdrew politically in the spring of 1790 after failed mediation attempts. Thereafter the troops of the Imperial Circle took the matter seriously. Münster provided a considerable contingent of infantry regiments and companies. Together with Imperial Austrian units, the circle and imperial troops advanced over the course of 1790 and occupied the region. At the beginning of 1791 the resistance of the Liège revolutionary army finally collapsed, and the fleeing prince-bishop was reinstated in his office.

For the Prince-Bishopric of Münster this was one of the last large military foreign deployments before its own dissolution in the course of the Napoleonic Wars. Incidentally, the costs of the Münster invasion had to be repaid by the estates of Liège.

On the composition of the Münster contingent.

After the devastating losses of the Seven Years' War, the Landstände (the representation of the nobility and clergy) forced a drastic reduction of the standing army. For the imperial execution in 1790 the prince-bishopric therefore scraped together its remaining forces:

The core consisted of detachments from the remaining Münster regiments (such as the Pleuren, Elverfeldt or Töller regiments). Since in peacetime many companies only had a skeleton strength of about 50 men, the units for the march to Liège were brought up to the required marching strength by recalling those on leave and merging companies.

Münster did not march alone, but provided the main part of the contingent for the Lower Rhenish-Westphalian Imperial Circle. Together with smaller units from other territories of the circle (such as Jülich-Berg or Electoral Cologne) they formed a motley, but often only moderately trained, force.

Since the troops of the smaller imperial estates were hardly sufficient for a real siege, the Münster troops operated more as flank protection and garrison troops, while imperial-Austrian units bore the main military burden of the actual advance in the winter of 1790/91.

At the end of the prince-bishopric the army was once again considerably smaller.

At that time only the following still existed:

Infantry Regiment von Dincklage No. 1

Infantry Regiment von Tönnemann No. 7

Dragoon Regiment von Nagel No. 1

Artillery.

The following effective strengths are given for 1802:

Depending on the method of counting, 1,399 infantrymen, 326 dragoons and 47 artillerymen are given. The difference is explained by the counting method used or the respective strength.

According to Jutta Nowosadtko (Standing Army in the Estate State. The coexistence of military and civilian population in the Prince-Bishopric of Münster 1650–1803, 2011) the Münster military was not an “operetta army”. That is probably her most important military-historical thesis.

Earlier research had often regarded the military of small ecclesiastical territories as militarily insignificant. Nowosadtko explicitly challenges this image. She shows that the Münster army could present itself as a modern army of its time and that its military capabilities were recognized even outside the prince-bishopric.

In this respect, the reduction of troop strength after 1763 did not automatically mean a qualitative “decline” of the army. Quantitative weakness and military capability must therefore be considered separately.

The aforementioned author does not describe the military as an institution standing opposite a civilian city. Rather, military and society were closely intertwined. The military was therefore not a foreign body in Münster, but a component of urban society.

This thesis sounds euphemistic. The military was certainly an economic factor in the garrison town of Münster, since it generated demand. But the quartering of troops meant a considerable burden for the households affected, and the soldiers' side activities resulted in economic competition for the local craftsmen. In this respect, conflicts were preprogrammed. The low social prestige of the (common) soldiers has already been mentioned. Such a tension also existed in other territories of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, also in the cities in Prussia that hosted troops. There is no sufficient evidence to suggest that things should have been different in Münster.

Below is shown a ranking list that lists the Münster officer corps on 03.08.1802. Taken from: Westfalen. Bulletin of the Provincial Museum of the Province of Westphalia. 1930.

Contemporary list of the Münster officers not transferred to Prussian service and those transferred to Prussian service.

From the estate of Dr. H. K. Junk (deceased). The estate was taken over by the author. The list originally comes from the archive v. Boeselager - Höllinghofen (Arnsberg).

The list was made available to Dr. H. K. Junk (deceased) by the Archive Office of the Landschaftsverband Westfalen-Lippe on 01.09.1988.

For the Military Academy Münster, reference is made to the separate contribution on this subject in this special section.

For the uniforms of the prince-bishop's army, reference is made to the separate contribution on this subject in this special section.