The Soldier Through the Ages - Part 2 - The Early Modern Period (16th and 17th centuries) - with drawings by the author

As presented in the previous article, warfare changed from the 14th century onward. At first the knighthood still predominated on the field; it had not yet reached the peak of its prowess, but it already faced various types of arms. Over time the knighthood was displaced in its leading role on the battlefield by foot soldiers. With the advent of firearms it was divided into shooters (musketeers) and pike-men (pikemen). Artillery also appeared. The previously usual army levies were largely replaced by mercenaries.

When the mounted knightly arm receded behind the infantry, which had risen in importance, a new epoch in warfare began — a process that had taken about 200 years. The money economy, promoted above all by the wealthy Italian cities, provided the first incentives for the temporary employment of large mercenary troops. The Lombard foot soldiers were the first to generate such mass formations. The foot troops now appeared en masse, initially still as auxiliary arms, but already in the 14th century their importance grew beyond this secondary role.

Yet this (new) infantry could not yet win a battle alone, but it filled the background against which the knightly battle took place. Over time the pure knightly charge evolved into a violent clash of combined arms. In 1302 (11.07.) for the first time civic, urban and peasant Flemish foot troops — in particular citizen militias — achieved a remarkable success in the Battle of Coutray (the so-called Battle of the Golden Spurs at Kortrijk) over armored (French) horsemen under the command of Robert, Count of Artois. At the end of the battle, which took place in swampy terrain ("Battle of the Golden Spurs"), 700 French knights had lost their lives, including the commander and several high-ranking French nobles. Further comparable military defeats of knightly cavalry followed.

Thus a new chapter in the history of warfare was opened. The history and the outward appearance of the Swiss mercenaries, German Landsknechts and Spanish foot soldiers, who soon came to dominate the military scene, are described below.

The Swiss mercenaries consisted of lightly armed foot soldiers who, with their long-shafted weapons (halberds, pikes, spears, war hammers) attacked successfully in dense columns (hedgehogs) even against knightly forces.

The Swiss contingents had a lasting influence on contemporary European warfare through their surprising victories at Grandson (1476), Murten (1476) and Nancy (1477).

The origins of the Swiss mercenaries, which over time developed into a true export hit, go back much further. Partly this Swiss special path is explained by the task of guarding trade routes across the Alps. However, "Reislaufen" (Reiseläufer = war travelers) became an attractive secondary occupation, especially for members of poorer social strata, until the engagement of Swiss in foreign service was systematically organized by the cantons.

The heyday of the Swiss mercenaries lasted from the 15th century to the 18th century. They were feared, for they showed no mercy — even to the wounded. This was officially decreed by the cantons in 1499. The measure was chiefly about maintaining discipline so that the columns would not break up prematurely when individual mercenaries set off in search of prisoners to extort ransom.

Under Emperor Maximilian a new type of infantry emerged. According to Hans von Gottberg (p. 52), mercenary troops had long existed alongside the Imperial knightly army. The men-at-arms and the attendants of the heavily armored knights were essentially mercenaries. In and after the Hussite wars (1419 - 1436) the Bohemian troops arose.

The new foot soldiers — equipped with the halberd or the pike — showed the limits of knightly cavalry armies in bloody battles.

In the wake of the hostilities between the Eidgenossen and the Habsburgs under Leopold I. (Duke of Austria and Styria, * 04.08.1290 in Vienna, Duchy of Austria; † 28.02.1326 in Strasbourg) the importance of the Swiss levies grew. The Swiss later hired themselves out as mercenaries to other warlords as well and developed a veritable business model from it.

Only in the 16th century did the German Knechte, i.e. the Landsknechts, overtake them in standing. These were organized into companies of about 500 Landsknechts and into regiments of 6,000 - 9,000 Landsknechts. Such a regiment was raised and commanded by a Feldobrist.

Like the Swiss, the Landsknechts fought in attack in four-ranked blocks and in defense in massive bodies of force, reminiscent of the huge triangles of the thousands-strong keils of the Germanic armies.

Originally the clothing of the Landsknechts corresponded to civilian fashion, but the mercenaries developed a veritable clothing luxury that significantly influenced their outward appearance.

Early on the war dress — e.g. the slashed and torn attire of the Landsknechts — already showed a certain uniformity. This developed especially among the German Landsknechts into a colorful war dress characterized by an abundance of fabric.

However, the Landsknechts were not the inventors of decorative slashes; this fashionable feature migrated from civilian fashion into soldier clothing. But these slashes were made particularly varied in Landsknecht garments and marked the mercenary as an individual warrior.

The exaggerated war dress was also a status symbol. In civilian fashion the decorative slashes were considerably more restrained.

Caps served as headgear, which developed into decorative feathered berets. A well-known Landsknecht song says: "From the beret the feather sways." The beret is probably of Italian origin. It was originally a flat — round or square — head covering made of felt, cloth, velvet or silk — without a brim. In Landsknecht times the feather-adorned beret became increasingly wide-brimmed.

Breeches were initially tight and were later replaced by trunk hose. Bear-claw shoes were worn with them.

The Feldhauptmann was generally a senior commander. He commanded a regiment or even an entire army. The Feldhauptmann thus primarily denoted a particular function.

The lieutenant held the office of deputy. Here he is wearing almost a full suit of armor. The horse is also covered with protective armor.

The regiment of the Landsknechts was subordinate to the Oberst (= colonel). He was also the judge and had to take care of the upkeep and the pay as well as the supply of provisions, clothing and equipment.

However, the Landsknechts themselves had to provide for their own clothing and armament.

The captain wears, in addition to the classic feathered beret, a half-armor. This was also necessary, as he stood in an exposed position in the battle order, namely in the front rank among the so-called Doppelsöldner. In addition to the short pike he is armed with the Katzbalger (short sword) and a dagger.

The Landsknechts were armed with the roughly 6-meter-long pike, similar to the Swiss mercenaries.

In addition, halberds and long swords as well as daggers were common.

In close combat the so-called Katzbalger was used. This short weapon had a blade length of about 50 - 55 cm. The blade was broad and the quillon was often S-shaped.

Later the Katzbalger received a proper basket hilt to better protect the hand that wielded the weapon.

The armament of the Landsknechts also included maces, morning stars, war flails, pole-hammer-axes and also hook guns, which were used by specialized gunners.

The Landsknecht depicted above carries the actual large battle sword with him here, which could also be used with both hands. Therefore this weapon was also called a Bidenhänder, Zweihänder or two-handed sword.

It arose in the 15th century and was used until the end of the 17th century.

As a rule this weapon had a total length of 1.70 m, the blade being about 1.20 m long.

Often the two-handed sword had a crossguard and at the lower end of the blade there was usually a false edge, which was sometimes wrapped with leather and allowed the other hand to grasp it.

According to Martin Lezius (Vorwärts ... vorwärts. The Book of the German Landsknecht, Leipzig n.d., p. 76) "the exercise of jurisdiction and legal procedure was placed in the hands of the Schultheiß, who was appointed by the Feldobrist. It was generally customary, at the assembly of the Landsknecht community, also to reach an agreement about according to which rules and laws justice within the regiment should be administered. The Schultheiß should be a pious and honorable man of mature years, who had not only knowledge of civil law but also of criminal law. "Peinlich" was then the term used for anything that could endanger a perpetrator’s head or neck. It was a condition that the Schultheiß had previously, as a captain, exemplary commanded a company and had thereby acquired knowledge about the life, habits and views of the knechte, so that one could reasonably expect from him a just judgment."

Besides the Schultheiß (judge), the Provost held the police power. He was assigned to the regiment and also had assistants.

The Provost was a kind of military policeman and oversaw compliance with the obligations arising from the articles.

A large baggage train always belonged to the army of that time. It served provisioning and supply; in camp the purchase and sale of booty took place, and it also served as a dressing station.

The train included train servants, grooms, but also traders, sutlers and soldiers' wives and children, as well as innkeepers and prostitutes.

In camp they were subordinate to the camp provost.

He had to ensure the necessary discipline and also carried out punishments. He was supported by the train- or whore-sergeant. The Rumor Master ensured peace and order.

He also demanded fees from the traders and likewise money from imprisoned captives.

The visored helmet was soon replaced in the late 16th and early 17th centuries by other helmet forms, in particular by the Zischägge — a special form of assault hood derived from Turkish models.

This usually consisted of a hemispherical, onion-shaped skull with a long extended or laced neck guard and cheek plates as well as a flat eye brim with an adjustable nasal bar. The latter could be individually set at the front with a wing screw. The rounded skull often had (six) raised ribs hammered out.

At times larger wings attached to the sides offered additional protection against cuts with a bladed weapon.

This helmet form persisted until the end of the 17th century and was also worn by light cavalry.

The aforementioned Zischägge had Turkish roots, just as the martial encounter with the Turks in general had various influences on the tactics and armament of European armies. For example, the sabre also became widely used.

In the 17th century the infantry often wore only half armor, especially the pikemen protected themselves with gorgets, shoulder plates (spaulders), upper arm defenses and leg pieces reduced to tassets.

In addition, a morion or a tin assault hood (shotter’s hood) was regularly worn, as shown here. The latter is depicted further above.

The morion or the shotter’s hood could protect against cuts from a bladed weapon; the comb contributed to this. However, this headgear could not protect against gunfire. As a rule such a helmet consisted of two halves joined by a folded rim or riveting.

According to Heinrich Müller (Old Helmets, 74) the quality of these headgear pieces fell in the 17th compared to the 16th century, probably also because the armorer’s craft declined.

By the Morion one understands an open helmet type without a visor. It arose in the first half of the 16th century and developed from the Spanish iron hat — called Cabasset (pear helmet). Partly, however, a reverse line of development is also reported.

The conical shape of the Morion is at least characteristic. The skull was also surrounded by a broad brim, which was turned up at the front and back. Often the Morion had a high comb and cheek pieces.

Morions were sometimes decorated with heraldic or ornamental patterns or embellishments, e.g. with a fleur-de-lis and occasionally surrounded by a wreath with fish-scale motifs.

The morions of bodyguards often bore the coat of arms of the respective lord and were blackened and provided with gilded etchings.

The liner was attached with rivets that were visible from the outside. They too could be more or less elaborately designed — e.g. covered with brass lion heads (Heinrich Müller, Old Helmets, 64).

During the first half of the 17th century a trend toward a uniform military dress can be observed (Förster/ Hoch/ Mülle, Uniforms of European Armies, p. 54). During this period foot troops differentiated in particular into pikemen and musketeers. The number of the latter steadily increased during the 17th century at the expense of the former.

Over time the protective armor described above was further reduced in favor of mobility. Under the half armor a leather doublet was often worn. This was a sleeveless garment. It had replaced the doublet as the main garment. Over time the leather doublet — initially not yet among cavalry — was displaced by a cloth camisole.

In particular the pikemen still often wore blackened assault hoods, while the musketeers typically wore broad-brimmed felt hats with plumes, as shown here.

Regarding the headgear of the pikemen and especially the musketeers, Christian Beaufort-Sponton (Armor and Weapons of Europe. The Military Equipment in the 17th Century, p. 120 ff.) provides the following description:

"In the second third of the 16th century still largely subordinate to the pikemen, their number had been steadily increasing since about 1570. Accordingly, the pikemen were numerically reduced, and thus the offensive role within the infantry gradually passed to the musketeers.

The Orange musketeer, as Jacob de Gheyn presents him at the end of the 16th century, is entirely unarmored, therefore not even wearing a shotter’s hood.

De Gheyn himself explains this in the introduction to his work: '... one should know that the shooters with assault hoods, and the musketeers with hats are depicted and dressed in different clothing, not because this should be necessary, but only so that such variation may make the depictions appropriate and also that the manner of the military men in their clothing, as is customary in these times, should be shown.'"

The musketeers were regularly armed with the matchlock musket and were unarmored; at least by the mid-17th century they usually no longer wore actual protective armor.

The matchlock musket weighed about 8–10 kg. For this reason it was rested on a forked staff when fired. The loading process consisted of over thirty individual actions and was very elaborate and time-consuming. During this phase the musketeers necessarily had to be protected by the pikemen.

In the above image the musketeer’s bandolier with the leather-covered wooden charges is also visible. These containers held the powder measured out for a single shot and were referred to in soldier slang as the “Twelve Apostles.” The full equipment also included the powder flask for the fine priming powder and a leather pouch for the lead balls.

The Swedish musketeers were later equipped with lighter firearm models.

In the 16th century Spain held a dominant position in Europe. Since the discovery of America in 1492 (until 1504) by the adventurer and seafarer Christopher Columbus (1451–1506), the conquest of Mexico by Hernando Cortés (1485–1547) and of Peru by Francisco Pizarro (1478–1541), and the founding of various colonies in the New World, Spain—financed by the gold and silver from Latin America—even achieved the status of a world power for a time. By the end of the 15th century the Reconquista was also complete, i.e., the reconquest of the entire Iberian Peninsula from the Moors.

As the European hegemonic power, Spain attempted to restore the Catholic faith throughout its realms. This was the cause of the uprising of the Protestant estates in the Netherlands. That conflict lasted until 1648. In the Thirty Years’ War, Spain was one of the belligerent parties. In this conflict, which began as a religious war, Spain belonged to the Catholic League and the Spanish supported the Austrian Habsburgs. In parallel, the Franco-Spanish War (1635–1659), fought mainly over Italy, ended Spanish dominance and established French preeminence. The aim of a universal Catholic Spanish empire had failed.

The rise and decline of Spain as a great power lasted many centuries. From about 1600 onward Spain’s significance began to decline.

To attain and maintain this role required a strong and effective army and navy. On the importance of the Spaniards in European warfare the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein comments in his World History of Battles and Campaigns (p. 211) as follows: "Spain also occupied a leading position in the development of military technology and tactics on land and sea; its most important technical contribution was, however, in the development of firearms. At the Battle of Cerignola Gonzalo de Córdoba, rightly regarded by the Spaniards as one of their great generals, proved that the arquebus would henceforth be the most important weapon of war. The fitting of ships with cannons first made the conquest of the seas possible for the European nations. The creative spirit in navigation and sea tactics was exemplified by the Englishman Sir Francis Drake, but Spanish seamen, despite the defeat of the Armada in 1588, were also ready to introduce innovations. After 1525 land warfare was largely limited to the mutual outmaneuvering of enemy armies and to siege warfare. Open-field battles became rare. The most important field commanders in the European wars of that era were Alexander Farnese, Ambrogio Spinola and Maurice of Nassau. The first two were in Spanish service."

Eduard Wagner (Dress, Defense and Weapons in the Thirty Years’ War, Prague 1980, p. 9) adds the following about Spain’s role: "At the head of the Habsburg coalition stood Spain. As a powerful state it had already secured its leading position in European politics at the beginning of the 16th century. At that time Spain was already a feudal state with an almost completed centralized civil administration. The Spanish Habsburg Charles V became German King in 1519 and Roman Emperor in 1530. Thus Spain reached the height of its power for about a quarter of a century (1530–1556). The stream of silver that flowed from the colonies into the Spanish treasury formed the foundation of Spain’s power politics. The Spanish mercenary army, whose most important element was the well-trained and equipped infantry, was the best and strongest army in Europe. Even though it later became apparent that the ambitions of Spanish policy exceeded the means of its treasury, Spain stood at the head of the Habsburg coalition until the beginning of the Thirty Years’ War."

Spanish ordinance envisaged the infantry fighting in so-called tercios. These were combat formations of roughly 3,000 men that developed in the first half of the 16th century.

Most of the soldiers in the large square formations were pikemen, surrounded by musketeers or arquebusiers. The latter had already proven themselves at the Battle of Pavia (24.02.1525) against French cavalry.

The four tercios of a brigade were deployed in a checkerboard pattern. The rigid formation, however, proved unsustainable in the long run, especially as the number of soldiers armed with pole weapons gradually declined in favor of musketeers, and the dense masses became too easy a target for increasingly powerful artillery.

Characteristic for Spanish infantry of this period was the high morion, a wide-brimmed helmet with a crest. The doublet was made in one piece with the sleeves. The rolls on the shoulders were intended to prevent the bandolier from slipping. A thin breastplate, usually without a central ridge, served as protective equipment.

As a cold weapon the rapier was used. It had a double-edged, straight slim blade with a very sharp point. The hilt also protected the index finger.

In the spring of 1618 Europe was at peace; various conflicts had come to an end by that time. Even Spain and the Netherlands had concluded an armistice (1619).

One event ended that state and set off a European civil war: the so-called Defenestration of Prague on 23 May 1618. For Archduke Ferdinand—the later Emperor (successor to Emperor Matthias)—this was the hoped-for pretext to act against the estates (in Bohemia).

What followed was on the surface a religiously justified conflict (war of faith) lasting several decades; ultimately, however, it was about political power and the hegemony within the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. The Thirty Years’ War was in essence a collection of several wars.

"The true tragedy of the Thirty Years’ War was not that it was inevitable, but that a conflict of this magnitude could have been avoided. Initially confined locally, it rapidly and devastatingly expanded—with consequences for all of Europe" (Peter H. Wilson).

The Thirty Years’ War, with its intensity and catastrophic demographic, economic and political consequences, imprinted itself on the collective European, and in particular German, consciousness. About 30–40% of the population died from hunger, cold, epidemics and the effects of war. "Estimates suggest the population in Germany shrank from 16.5 million in 1618 to 10.5 million in 1648. The rural population fell by about 40 percent, the urban population by about 25 percent" (Diercke). In the countryside, through which the mercenary armies moved, more people died than in the cities. Entire regions—especially in central Germany, Mecklenburg, Pomerania and the Palatinate—were devastated and practically depopulated. Trade, crafts and agriculture were ruined. Villages, towns and farms were looted and destroyed. It has been estimated that it took almost 100 years (until around 1720?) before population numbers and economic output returned to pre-war levels. The traumatic experience of this long war also changed the worldview and fostered a pessimistic basic attitude. At the same time absolutism was strengthened in the territorial states and political fragmentation (territorialization) increased, since the territorial princes received extensive sovereign authority. This drastically weakened the power of the Emperor, while the Netherlands and Switzerland left the Empire.

The Thirty Years’ War, as a traumatic historical event, long shaped the image of the soldier; soldiers were perceived as undisciplined rabble. "Thus, for example, the image of the vagabonding and marauding mercenary belongs to the most persistent clichés of historical tradition. Epidemics, poor harvests and war were the apocalyptic scourges to which people of the late Middle Ages and early modern period were repeatedly exposed. All three were equally dreadful in their effects. While hunger and disease had to be accepted as divine providence, war was also considered an unchangeable fate; yet it was easy to personify it in the figure of the mercenary as the superficially main culprit." (Bernhard R. Kroener, Soldier or Soldateska? In: Military History. Problems - Theses - Ways. Edited by the Military History Research Office, Stuttgart 1982, p. 100 ff.).

In the 16th and 17th centuries necessary troop levies were carried out by a territorial levy and/or the recruitment of mercenaries. The respective ruler requested the estates to raise the territorial levy, which was regularly a peasant or burgher militia. This territorial levy consisted of a populace not trained militarily and in principle could only be used within the realm’s borders, i.e. not for offensive military operations. The estates covered their clothing and equipment. The territorial levy was often neither usable nor reliable; therefore the supplementary recruitment of professional soldiers was necessary. The rulers often preferred to dispense with the ineffective territorial levy and instead had the corresponding funds approved for raising a mercenary army. "Therefore mercenary armies, even though the system of territorial levies continued to exist in many European states, became the fundamental, defining element of warfare" (Wagner).

In principle the respective territorial lord (or the estates) commissioned a war entrepreneur to raise a military unit (e.g. a regiment). The appropriate patents authorized the recruitment of soldiers, either by the war entrepreneur himself or by officers he appointed. The best-known war entrepreneur was the Bohemian commander Wallenstein (actually Albrecht Wenzel Eusebius von Waldstein; born 24 September 1583 in Heřmanice on the Elbe, Kreis of Königgrätz; † 25 February 1634 in Cheb in the Eger district; see Josef Polišenský / Josef Kollmann, Wallenstein. Commander of the Thirty Years’ War, Cologne 1997). He fought for the Emperor on the side of the Catholic League and in part, on the basis of his extensive estates, raised entire armies at his own expense. There were also other war entrepreneurs, e.g. Count Mansfeld, the Marquis of Hamilton or Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar. According to Geoffrey Parker (The Thirty Years’ War, 1991, p. 286), about 100 persons performed these tasks for most of the war, and in the years of particularly intensified military activity (1631–1643) their number rose to about 300. Accordingly, in total approximately 1,500 such entrepreneurs financed the recruitment of one or more regiments for a belligerent lord during the Thirty Years’ War.

Recruited soldiers usually received an advance pay. Actual pay depended on the armament and equipment of the recruited soldier. The recruits were listed by a clerk. When the unit was complete it was regularly inspected and, after review—to prevent list fraud—practically accepted. The war entrepreneur appointed the officers and filled the other ranks. In this respect they were accountable only to him. The agreed funds were provided by the contracting party and the entrepreneur paid the wages. The soldier had to provide his own food and equipment, although these were sometimes supplied. The longer the war lasted, the easier it became to obtain replacements, since the increasing devastation of the war caused many members of peasant and even bourgeois classes to lose everything (Knötel, Cavalry Life in the Thirty Years’ War, op. cit., p. 146 ff.).

A regiment also included a large baggage train, as with the German Landsknechte—among them soldiers’ wives and children.

J. Heilmann (The Military System of the Imperial and Swedish Forces at the Time of the Thirty Years’ War, Leipzig and Meissen 1850, p. 3 ff.) describes the clothing of the imperial troops as follows:

"The soldiers wore baggy breeches, a camisole with very wide sleeves that closed tightly at the body. Cloaks were not yet in use. The hats were shaped like a worn cone with small drooping brims at the base, similar to the hats of Dutch sailors.

The pikemen had, as protective weapons, a bulletproof breastpiece..., gorget, vambraces, a metal apron and an iron skullcap. The main offensive weapon was the pike, whose length varied between 15 and 18 feet; the ashwood shaft had at its extreme end an iron point two inches wide, double-edged and serrated, which was attached to the shaft by two iron bands; the opposite end of the pike was iron-shod and terminated in a spike. A long sword hung on the left side.

The musketeers, who had replaced the arquebu­siers, had as protective weapon only an iron skullcap, which was often replaced by the aforementioned hat. The offensive weapons were a three-foot-long broad saber, curved at the end, and the matchlock musket, which fired balls of 8 to 10 to the pound. Their entire length amounted to 5*, the barrel to 3 1/2 Rhineland feet. The firing range was 300 paces. The musket fork... was 4 feet long, had one iron point below and two above, and during marches was carried by the musketeer on a strap which ran through a hole at the upper end of the fork. The charge was contained in eleven capsules of wood or tin, covered with leather and closed by a lid; they hung on a bandolier that ran from the left shoulder to the right hip. Ten of these capsules contained the charge, the eleventh the powder for filling the priming pan. In addition, a tinned powder flask hung from the bandolier, a leather pouch with bullets and rags for cleaning the musket, a cleaning needle, a little oil flask, the hat and three to four pieces of match, each two feet long. The burning part of the match was stored at night and in wet weather in a tin match-holder."

"The officers of the pikemen carried pikes; those of the musketeers carried partisans along with swords. As protective armor they had a breastplate.

Plumes of various colors on the hats, gold chains and sashes were the distinctions of the time."

According to Heilmann (op. cit., p. 15) the great superiority of firearms induced the Swedish king Gustavus Adolphus as early as 1626 to reduce the weight of the muskets. Now they could be used without forks. For this purpose so-called "Schweinsfedern" were carried to protect the infantry from cavalry attacks. Later these were only provided as a follow-up supply to the troops. "The musket, which had displaced the arquebus, fired 2 1/2 löthoge bullets and was discharged by a matchlock. The match, to protect it against the weather, was kept in a match-holder of yellow or white tin. In addition to this weapon the musketeer carried a 3-foot-long saber. As protective equipment he had an iron skullcap" (Heilmann, op. cit., p. 16). The matchlock musket was about 125–144 cm long. Its weight was 4–7 kg. The effective range was a maximum of 200–300 m. The heavy musket had to be rested on a fork when fired. Later its weight was reduced to 4–5 kg. Additional armament for the musketeer included a sword and often also a dagger.

"The pikemen carried as offensive weapons a pike 15 to 16 feet long, called a partizan, whose two-foot-long iron tip was 4 1/2 inches wide and cutting on both sides, and a long sword. As protective weapons they wore a breastplate, vambraces, a metal apron and an iron skullcap" (Heilmann, op. cit., p. 16). The pike was a roughly 6 m long spear with a relatively small head. Often pikes were early in the war replaced by more manageable halberds. Headgear included the morion or the 'pot' helmet (see above).

According to Wagner the numerical ratio between musketeers and pikemen in a unit of 300 men was 160 musketeers to 120 pikemen. The remaining numbers were non-commissioned officers, drummers, etc. In the Swedish army the less useful pikemen were soon replaced by ever more musketeers. As early as 1631 there were entire musketeer regiments. From 1626 musketeers and pikemen were deployed separately. Swedish musketeers were in part said to have been equipped with muskets with so-called wheellocks.

The two different variants—namely musketeers and pikemen—in the Thirty Years’ War have already been mentioned. They differed in function and therefore in equipment. A foot regiment consisted, according to Wagner (op. cit., p. 86), of about 5–10 companies ( Fähnlein), corresponding to companies. Each company counted about 300 men. A regular regiment often numbered about 1,500 to 2,000 men. Often the roster strength of regiments was significantly lower. Companies were subdivided into corporals' units. Other infantry units were less large, e.g. in the Hungarian regiments, the hajduks or Croats.

The regiment was commanded, as usual, by an Oberst (colonel). The lieutenant colonel was his deputy.

There was also the sergeant major, the chaplain, the regimental quartermaster, the provost, etc. This strongly resembled the organization of the German Landsknechte.

The company was led by the captain. The lieutenant was his deputy.

The (imperial) company counted, according to Heilmann (op. cit., p. 14): 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 1 sergeant major, 1 sergeant, 1 quartermaster for arms, 1 quartermaster, 1 guide, 1 muster clerk, 6 corporals, 18 sergeants of squads, 3 drummers and 144 rank-and-file.

"In the battle order all the pikemen and musketeers of a regiment formed, depending on actual strength, either one 'heap' or two 'heaps', one commanded by the colonel, the other by the lieutenant colonel. The strength of the 'heaps' varied from 500 to 900 men. In each the pikemen stood in the center, the musketeers on the wings; the company grouping played no role. In the middle of the pikemen stood the flags side by side. The musketeers were divided into files, and through the lanes left between these divisions the first line ran back after firing, then the second line, etc., to reload. The number of ranks was determined by the time the first rank needed to reload so that it would be ready to fire again as soon as the last had shot. Typically this was 10. In larger formations the 'heaps' of foot troops stood in a checkerboard arrangement in three lines" (Curt Jany, History of the Prussian Army from the 15th Century to 1914, Osnabrück 1967, Vol. 1, p. 38).

According to Richard Knötel (History of the German Cavalry in Individual Images, reprint Krefeld 1969, p. 141 ff.) "... the German cavalry units existing around the middle of the Thirty Years’ War were divided into cuirassiers, carabiniers (arquebusiers) and dragoons. Cossacks, Croats and hussars, which also made up an important component of the imperial armies and were recruited from Hungarian and Slavic peoples, are not considered here. The cuirassiers, heavily armored and armed with sword, carried slung in a scabbard slanting to the rear, and two pistols, formed the heavy cavalry, while the carabiniers and dragoons, lightly or not armored at all and equipped besides swords with arquebuses or long matchlock muskets (the carabiniers also carried pistols) formed the light cavalry. The dragoons, often also used in infantry combat, wore low shoes, mostly without spurs, and are to be regarded as a kind of midpoint between foot soldier and rider, which is why the excellent Grimmelshausen has his Simplicius remark jokingly: 'When a dragoon falls from his horse, a musketeer stands up again.' The often-mentioned mounted hunters were likewise unarmored riders who differed from the aforementioned light cavalry only in name"....

Wahlhausen also names in his 'Horse Warfare' the lancers, the cuirassiers, the arquebusiers and the dragoons as cavalry types. The first two variants formed the heavy cavalry and the latter two types the light cavalry.

According to Heilmann (op. cit., p. 33) a squadron comprised: 1 captain of horse, 1 lieutenant, 1 cornet (who carried the standard in battle), 1 muster clerk, 1 sergeant, several quartermasters and corporals, 2 trumpeters, 1 blacksmith, 1 barber-surgeon and 1 saddler. According to Wallhausen (ibid.) a cuirassier squadron counted: "1 captain or Rittmeister, 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 1 quartermaster, 1 corporal, 2 or 3 trumpeters." A carabinier squadron counted: "1 captain or Rittmeister, 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign or cornet, 2 corporals and 2 trumpeters."

On the equipment and armament of the cavalry in the period 1600–1700 Gohlke (The Cold Weapons and the Protective Weapons, reprint Krefeld, p. 32 ff.) adds the following:

"Henrik Sattler writes about the armament of the riders: 'Every cuirassier wears a helmet, chain and gorget, breast- and backplate along with shoulder pieces, both vambraces and an iron glove to hold the bridle, then a pistol or musket whose barrel is 2 feet (0.6 m) long, a riding sword for cutting and thrusting. Officers wear, from the belt down to the knee, tassets, knee pieces and culet (apron), and also a musket. Riders who are not cuirassiers wear no shoulder pieces and vambraces. They carry, in addition to the sword, a carbine or a musket of 3 feet (0.9 m) length; they are to be clothed in coats of arms, as formerly the lancers.'

To describe the equipment of the cuirassier Heilmann (op. cit., p. 33 ff.) states critically: "The cuirassier was clad in iron from head to foot, so that he almost succumbed to the weight of his armor. An iron helmet with visor, gorget, double cuirass, tassets, iron gauntlets, greaves, stiff boots with enormous spurs. The sword with a large basket hilt was straight and unbending for cutting and thrusting. In the holsters there were two pistols with German locks; the barrel was 2 feet long and fired balls, of which twenty went to a pound. On his enormous saddle the cuirassier sat as if pinched between two cushions or two bulwarks. At the Battle of Lützen the cuirassiers do not, however, seem to have been so abundantly equipped with protective weapons, especially cuirasses, since Wallenstein attributes the poor conduct of such regiments, which shamefully fled, merely to the fact that not all riders were equipped with the aforementioned protective weapon. The following order (Note: Prague, 02.01.1633) from Wallenstein to Aldringer refers to this, as well as to the use of the carabine...".

"The cuirassiers wore closed visored helmets, often with a plume, and iron armors, usually blackened, that reached to the knee and covered it: gorget, cuirass, arm armor, gloves, rear apron, leg plates. The full armor weighed with the helmet 52 1/2 pounds. Besides the sword fastened around the waist they carried two long pistols in holsters on the saddle. The horse pistols (fist pistols), since the match could not be used well on horseback, had wheellocks, in which a wheel wound by a spring was set in rapid rotation by the trigger and thereby struck sparks from a piece of pyrite that fell onto the pan and ignited" (Curt Jany, History of the Prussian Army from the 15th Century to 1914, Osnabrück 1967, Vol. 1, p. 38 ff.).

Already in the 16th century the development of knightly cavalry into cavalry proper took place. As shown in the first article, the knight was essentially a lone fighter who fought little or with no discipline. The solitary fight was sought. Already around the middle of the 16th century there were also mounted musketeers, who, although they were also armored, nevertheless differed from the knightly riders (Theodor Fuchs, Geschichte des europäischen Kriegswesens, Teil I: Vom Altertum bis zur Aufstellung der stehenden Heere, München, p. 222 ff.). The gendarmes retained the lance for a long time, while the mounted musketeers soon gave theirs up. An example of this new orientation of the cavalry were the so-called "Black Riders" in the Schmalkaldic War. "The Schmalkaldic War was fought from 1546 to 1547 by Emperor Charles V against the Schmalkaldic League, an alliance of Protestant territorial princes and cities led by Electoral Saxony and Hesse. The emperor sought thereby to push back Protestantism within the Holy Roman Empire and to strengthen imperial power vis-à-vis the imperial estates" (Wikipedia).

Mounted "reiters" were also used increasingly in the Huguenot Wars in France (1562–1598). At the end of the 16th century the cuirassiers were (also) equipped with wheellock pistols. In addition there were the harquebusiers mentioned above and later the dragoons. It should be noted, however, that the pistols of the time were by no means reliable and firing from horseback was difficult. The effective range of the pistols was also very short. To optimize the fire effect, the tactical maneuver of the "caracole" was used. With it one mainly tried to weaken closed pike formations before a direct attack. "In a caracole the cavalry rode up to the enemy lines in several ranks one behind the other. Each rank fired its volleys with their wheellock weapons at the enemy and then immediately turned away (cuirassiers could fire twice with their two pistols, pistoleer-riders with their harquebuses once, but at greater distance). If the enemy was sufficiently weakened, the cavalry advanced in closed formation with drawn sabres against the disintegrating enemy ranks" (Wikipedia).

Curt Jany adds: "In the battle order the 'flags', 'cornets' or 'troops' of the cavalry stood side by side with small intervals, stronger cavalry in 2, 3 or even more files, the rear ones being echeloned out beyond the flanks of the front ones. The depth of the 'troops' was 5 ranks, but fell in the following decades to 4, then to 3. Some harquebusier troops opened the fight. The first rank galloped forth in open order, discharged its carbines, fired the pistols stuck in the holsters, and then raced back behind its troop, where it reloaded. The second and following ranks could repeat the same maneuver until one part, tired of the skirmishing, decided to break in. The whole procedure presents itself as a transfer of the infantry combat initiated by the musketeers and carried out by the pikemen to the cavalry. The cuirassiers also fired their pistols at the initial assault. That even in the densest hand-to-hand fighting the firearm was preferred can be seen in the paintings of Dutch painters of that time" (idem, Geschichte der Preussischen Armee vom 15. Jahrhundert bis zum Jahre 1914, Osnabrück 1967, vol. 1, p. 39 ff.).

On the tactics of the cavalry in this period and their changeover, the work Krieg und Kriegführung im Wandel der Weltgeschichte by Dr. Paul Schmitthnner (Potsdam, p. 266 ff.) adds: "With the displacement of bow and crossbow, mounted arquebusiers were introduced who shot from horseback, just as later the dragoons were added as mounted infantry. Alongside the heavy knightly rider, cavalry thus began increasingly to differentiate into individual branches of arms. But the core of the modern cavalry development did not lie in this, but in the creation of the squadron. In the Middle Ages one already knew the cavalry mass, but not as a combat, only as an approach form. The knightly nature resisted being cramped in as raw force. Ambition and skill drove the knight to single combat in the hedge. From the infantry combat form of the pike mass the same deep mass form was now adopted as the combat formation of the cavalry. With the drill technique, which was likewise transferred from the infantry, and with the acquired ability to skilfully move the masses, the same change from deep to flat and broad formation was completed in the cavalry arm. From the 17-rank cavalry mass of the Duke of Alba a 10-rank one became, and finally around the turn of the century a 6–7-rank cavalry formation. Germany was the birthplace of the new cavalry arm. The development built on the almost drilled German 17-rank squadrons of the Schmalkaldic War. When the 'Black Riders' or 'reiters' of the French and Italians appeared, the mounted lance-rider squadrons, like the Swiss before them, continued as models. They were further developed in the non-German wars of France and Italy and became the fathers of the European cavalry. The tactical nature of this new cavalry arm lay in the closed charge of the mass used as a combat form. It was superior to the line, the hedge of knighthood. Even in the fight against the new infantry this new cavalry sometimes remained successful. That it was fundamentally inferior, however, was demonstrated by the only thereby explainable sudden turn that the further cavalry evolution suddenly took. It was to be expected that from the flattening squadron masses the two- or one-rank line attacking with the lance would gradually emerge, which would mean the densification of the old knightly mass into a tactical body and which indeed proved itself in the next century and from then on up to the world war as the cavalry close-combat form...."

In fights between the still existing lance riders and cuirassiers, the latter had the advantage, since the heavy lance was a hindrance in close combat. The Swedish king Gustavus Adolphus, who stood in the Dutch tradition, favored the direct charge with the cold steel at the gallop. For this the cavalry was formed in only three ranks. The Dutch retained the mentioned caracoling, but the Imperial forces (under Wallenstein) adopted the Swedish method of deploying the cavalry. From then on, at most one volley was fired shortly before the immediate confrontation. In this respect a modern battle cavalry was thus created.

Curt Jany adds (preferably for the situation in Brandenburg): "In the cavalry the heavy knightly lance and the old armor had already disappeared at the beginning of the 17th century. Even in a lighter form the lance was only rarely to be found, preferably in life guards. One essentially distinguished only the two cavalry branches from which the Brandenburg cavalry in the Jülich War also comprised: cuirassiers and harquebusiers" (Geschichte der Preussischen Armee vom 15. Jahrhundert bis zum Jahre 1914, Osnabrück 1967, vol. 1, p. 38).

"The term artillery does not only mean artillery technology itself, but also the operation of the cannons, the loading, the artillery ammunition, artillery tactics, the organization, etc. In the 16th and 17th centuries pyrotechnics and a number of engineering works were added to the artillery, which later became the responsibilities of the engineering troops. However, the basis of artillery were and remained the cannons" (Wagner, loc. cit., p. 129).

Firearms spread rapidly in the modern era: both the aforementioned classical artillery and the use of slow-match muskets with a fork or arquebuses or lighter muskets by the foot soldiers as well as pistols by the cavalry changed the face of war profoundly. With the introduction of the wheellock pistol, cavalry also had a usable handheld firearm. Cannon barrels were made of bronze and as a rule not of iron. They were muzzle-loaders.

"At the beginning of the Thirty Years' War heavy guns with large calibers were widespread, some weighing more than four tons and having to be drawn by more than 20 horses. Such a heavy cannon, which fired shot weighing up to 50 pounds, was also accompanied by a group of 20 to 30 pioneers who first had to prepare a firing position to protect the position provisionally against incoming fire and to ensure a stable platform for the gun so that it would not be damaged by the recoil when firing. Cannons were therefore very cumbersome in open field battles in the early phase of the war; a position once taken could hardly be changed during the battle and guns often had to be left behind during a retreat. Generals were therefore forced to anticipate in front of a field battle where their artillery would achieve the greatest effect" (Marius Wieandt).

Over the course of the Thirty Years' War the number of types of cannons decreased. These were transported by horse teams (e.g. four- or tandem-hitches). The heavier models were, however, dismantled and transported by wagons. In tactical and organizational terms the artillery was commanded by the master gunner, while the gun-smith was responsible for technical matters. The latter were basically organized like a guild, i.e. essentially like craftsmen. This included the artillery shooters, apprentices and laborers. They also brought their own measuring instruments etc. (quadrants, leveling and calibration instruments). The cannons themselves were provided by the commander. An essential function in operating the guns was the aiming shooter, who aligned the cannon barrel on the selected target by means of wedges.

In battle the guns were grouped into batteries and, if necessary, positioned in proper artillery positions protected by redoubts, earthworks or baskets filled with earth. At the Battle of Breitenfeld (1631) the Swedes had 75 guns. The imperial-league army brought along only 26 guns. Swedish artillery was not only superior in numbers but also much more mobile. The Swedish king Gustav II Adolf had reformed the artillery early on and introduced, alongside the heavy pieces, light field guns. These, with a shorter barrel and smaller caliber, were lighter and were intended to support the infantry directly in the front line. For a short time less robust leather guns were also used. With these models only 10 to 12 shots could be fired in succession. Afterwards the gun had to cool down. The less mobile heavy guns were still grouped into batteries in battle.

In particular the large compact units of infantry (e.g. the Spanish tercios) presented good and rewarding targets for the artillery.

One of the most significant historical figures in the Thirty Years' War is undoubtedly the Swedish king Gustav II Adolf (1594–1632). According to Felix Berner he was "celebrated simultaneously as the promising savior, as the 'Lion of the North', and on the other hand disparaged as a booty-hungry adventurer." The entry of the Swedes into this 'religious war' opened a new chapter. In the years 1621–1626 Swedish troops conquered Livonia. Riga was taken in a short time. From 1623 Sweden prepared the invasion of Poland and from 1626 the conquest of Polish Prussia followed.

On 6 July 1626 Gustav II Adolf landed at Pillau. By 1630 the Swedes had established a bridgehead in Germany and from 1631 advanced into central Germany. After the storming and plundering of Magdeburg (20 May) by the Imperial forces, the allied Swedes and Saxons defeated the army of the Catholic League under the supreme command of Tilly in the Battle of Breitenfeld (7 September 1631) (Johann T’ Serclaes von Tilly (also Johannes T’ Serclaes von Tilly or Jean T’ Serclaes von Tilly, Dutch Johan t’ Serclaes van Tilly; * February 1559 at Castle Tilly in the Duchy of Brabant; † 30 April 1632 in Ingolstadt).

In the following year the Swedes pushed further south in Germany. This was followed by another Swedish victory in the Battle of Rain on the Lech on 14/15 April 1632. Here Count von Tilly was mortally wounded. Augsburg and Munich were occupied. However, a Swedish attack on Wallenstein’s camp near Nuremberg failed. In the Battle of Lützen — southwest of Leipzig — on 6 November 1634, one of the main battles of the Thirty Years' War, the Swedes won a costly victory. However, in this bloody confrontation Gustavus Adolphus II fell, as did the imperial general Pappenheim. This shocked the Swedes and they fell into the defensive.

In the Swedish army there were numerous regiments named after colors, e.g. the yellow, blue, red, green, black, white, orange regiments. This inevitably raises the question whether these color names referred to the basic color of the uniform or to the color of the flags. And the answer is: the latter in any case, the former only in individual cases. Explicit regulations on this have not been preserved. However, there are accounts by contemporaries who at least attested to the yellow, blue and red regiments wearing the corresponding uniforms. Green clothing is also mentioned.

Originally the first Swedish troops, when they intervened in the events of the Thirty Years' War, were clothed in uniforms made of an undyed — coarse — woolen cloth. Its color was grayish-white. The Swedish king improved cloth production and processing at home and built up a more efficient war industry, but complementary English cloths were also purchased or imperial stockpiles were captured or plundered, for example in Würzburg or Munich. Clothing and equipment suffered in the field and due to numerous new levies the possibilities of equipping the Swedish army became strained over time. After the death of Gustav II Adolf the outward appearance of the Swedish soldier even deteriorated markedly.

Incidentally, the life guard of the Swedish king wore a uniform of fine gray woolen cloth and gray hats. A white collar was also put on.

Although leather jackets came increasingly into fashion from the beginning of the 17th century, the Swedish cavalry probably predominantly or initially did not wear leather jackets. These were very costly. The cavalry mainly wore clothing made of cloth, namely as riding cloaks, riding jackets or riding coats. In the imperial army, within a regiment or company at least uniform jackets in the same color were to be worn. Equipment included jackets and, where appropriate, cloaks. Over time more leather jackets were used or the cloth riding jacket was replaced. Leather jackets protected inadequately against rain, so cloaks were needed in addition. Cloth clothing dried faster, whereas soaked leather clothing did not. The clothing of the Swedes, even of the Swedish officers, is said to have looked poor at Breitenfeld, while the clothing of the Imperial forces, especially their officers, was more splendid.

On the battlefield of the Thirty Years' War the most diverse international troops met, e.g. Scottish units. There were also Englishmen and Irish. According to Richard Brzezinski / Richard Hook (Gustavus Adolphus's Army. Infantry and Cavalry. Königswinter 2006, p. 43) the English provided 7 regiments between 1624 and 1632.

One of the earliest Scottish regiments was the Mackay Regiment. It was founded in 1626 and served on the European continent until the end of the Thirty Years' War, initially under the Swedish king Gustavus Adolphus.

Three further Scottish regiments served in the green brigade. Later the aforementioned regiment served under the Danish king.

The depicted soldiers are clothed in the typical Scottish dress. They wear — in addition to the Scottish cap — the kilt or the trunk hose in a certain checked woolen fabric (tartan). It was a fabric made up of horizontal and vertical stripes in various colors on a colorful background.

The soldier on the right also shows a cloak made of that very fabric. He also wears the typical small leather purse at the front.

Whether the Scots actually wore tartan in battle is not entirely certain. Presumably they too received coloured uniforms.

Many soldiers enlisted voluntarily and the decision for a particular side could also have religious reasons. This motive must not, however, be overestimated, for there are many counterexamples. Often economic hardship prompted entry into the military. There was also legal compulsion to serve in the military. This applies, for example, to the conscription of recruits in Sweden. Most conscripts came from the peasant milieu. The steadily increasing recruitment of ever younger men had strong effects on the structure of the population. According to Geoffrey Parker (The Thirty Years' War, Frankfurt/Main 1987, p. 283) the total losses of the Swedish army in the period 1621 to 1633 are estimated at 50,000 to 53,000 men. Afterwards losses rose again and led to partial depopulation in Sweden and Finland. Peasant production suffered enormously. There was, however (also in Sweden), the possibility of providing a mercenary or substitute soldier. This was financed by the municipality or the village or the relatives (Mikko Huhtamies, Ersatzsoldaten in Europa in der frühen Neuzeit, AMG Bulletin, vol. V, issue 1, 2001, p. 29). In other armies criminals were conscripted for military service or military service was offered as an alternative to punishment. Pardoned convicts, for example, served to reinforce the Spanish troops. Locals were sometimes forced into service or beaten-down or decimated units were taken over. Moreover, voluntary recruitment of mercenaries continued to provide replacements. This mostly privatized process was largely shaped by mercenary leaders and entrepreneurs.

The usual conscripts were often poorly trained. "The veterans who had already stood in the fire were called 'tried' or 'shot' servants. They were the backbone of every regiment. Every colonel relied on these old 'war throats' and was therefore always prepared to let them get away with a lot. With fatalistic equanimity they endured the horrors of battle and gave the young recruits the necessary support. Far more important than their seasoned combat behavior, however, was that they knew the necessary survival strategies. They did not fall behind on the march, could cure themselves of light wounds and illnesses, knew how to build a weatherproof hut in an emergency, found the last sack of grain from the peasants and did not let themselves be cheated by the sutlers" (Frank Westenfelder, Mercenaries in the Thirty Years' War. The everyday struggle for survival).

The armies of the Thirty Years' War regularly included an enormous baggage train, just as in the time of the Landsknechte. The baggage train, however, was not yet militarily organized. The wagons were hired with the drivers. Nevertheless, or precisely because of that, the baggage train was subject to strict discipline. It was subordinate to an ordnance master. A harness master was responsible for a certain number of wagons. If the vehicles were loaded with armament material, they were under the artillery.

Armies of the time moved very slowly and their equipment and provisioning was a major logistical challenge. Worn-out clothing and lost or damaged weapons had to be replaced. Likewise the expended ammunition, e.g. of the artillery in a battle or a siege. But killed, wounded or exhausted horses also had to be replaced.

The basic allotment of provisions per man of two pounds of bread, one pound of meat and three liters of beer regularly demanded great effort. Thus a larger army carried about 20,000 head of cattle and thousands of horses. These too had to be fed. The baggage train also included numerous soldiery wives and children as well as servants and prostitutes. Geoffrey Parker (The Thirty Years' War, Frankfurt/Main 1987, p. 290) gives figures for two Bavarian regiments (1646): one regiment consisted of 480 foot soldiers and was accompanied by 74 servants, 314 women and children, 3 sutlers and 160 horses. The other regiment of 481 horsemen was accompanied by 236 servants, 9 sutlers, 102 soldiers' wives and children and 912 horses.

The maintenance of the army often took place by foraging, by contributions or requisitions or even plundering. "Kontribution served in the Thirty Years' War as a collective term to denote all contributions to the supply and financing of the troops stationed in the country" (Regina Fürsich). These contributions were in fact taxes and were levied not only in enemy territories but also in the lands of allies and neutrals. The already mentioned war entrepreneur Wallenstein in particular developed this practice into a successful business model and systematically exploited the territories occupied by his army to the last.

The staple foods were bread and meat. Due to unpaid wages, soldiers often had to obtain food from the local population by force. Thus war fed war, i.e., war also covered its costs. Rations varied greatly between armies; for example, members of the Bavarian-League troops were entitled to about 1,300 grams of bread per day. The entitlement of Swedish troops is said to have been lower. Since logistical structures were often lacking or overwhelmed, plunder, organized raids and scorched-earth actions were commonplace. Houses, crops, livestock and the entire livelihood of the local population were destroyed. This approach frequently provoked peasant uprisings and the local population became an outright enemy. In part organized resistance occurred, e.g. by the so-called Harz marksmen. Protection letters had to be bought at high price. Entire regions were devastated and impoverished.