The Prussian Army under Frederick William I (1713 - 40) - Chapter 13 - The Officers.

A major achievement of Frederick William I as a military organizer was the formation and education of an officer corps focused on him, while the king no longer had to contend with the formerly very autonomous regimental proprietors. Early on the state had acted against the omnipotence of the colonels; their powers and privileges were curtailed and control bodies were intended to ensure the proper use of financial resources. Both the Elector and the estates had an interest in limiting the military's powers. Centralization soon became noticeable in military affairs, for example in the filling of officer positions: in 1659 it was determined that regimental proprietors were only allowed to dismiss officers based on a judgment reached by the regular legal process. In 1672 the Elector then decreed that officers in the future had to be "tüchtige, capable und kriegserfahrene, auch uns anständige Personen" (competent, capable and experienced in war, also decent persons to us), and in 1684 the principle was established that the rank of officers should always be determined by length of service. Under King Frederick I the confirmation right became a right of appointment for officers, and thus the absolutist sovereign increasingly intervened in the internal affairs of the units. Under the regency of Frederick William I, in which the Prussian state was to become the third strongest military power in Europe, this development reached its conclusion¹.

Parallel to the army, the officer corps also grew: whereas in 1713 it still numbered 1,163 persons, by 1740 it had already increased to 2,523 officers. In that year it made up 3.3% of the total army strength and was largely of noble origin, although it was still more permeated with bourgeois elements than under Frederick the Great.

In his political testament of 1722 Frederick William I analyzed the nobility of the individual provinces, and despite his critical remarks it becomes clear that the king saw the native nobility as an ideal source of officer recruits. Since the recess of 1653 the nobility had been deprived of political power, but it remained at the top of the social pyramid and was only gradually accustomed to royal service. The recruitment and creation of a local military leadership class did not occur without royal pressure. Frederick William I practically decreed compulsory entry into the army for the native nobility and forbade service abroad. Already under his predecessor, King Frederick I, the recruitment of the nobility had made progress, but only the Soldier King succeeded in creating a service nobility. Thus, according to the classification tables of 1718/19, for example, 340 male members of the Neumark nobility were in royal service, namely 287 in the army and 53 in higher civil service. In addition there were 111 junkers who served outside Prussia². In 1724 it was determined that all the nobles of Pomerania served or had served in the army³. This, however, apparently did not yet satisfy the king, since in a decree of 09.10.1738 he complained to all chambers that according to the vassal tables there were still suitable nobles who did not serve in the army. Therefore the king ordered detailed investigations and surveys of the native nobility, the results of which were to be reported to him annually.

Despite the "statization of the nobility" (Hoven), the gravamina of 1740 demonstrate a reluctance of the nobility toward the regime, and thus the reign of Frederick William I is still characterized by the competition between the Crown and the estates for real power in the state. Besides the Crown with its extensive domain holdings, the nobility was the largest landowner in the state; the landholdings of the towns, corporations and commoners, by contrast, receded in volume and importance. The noble preeminence in the countryside was based on this property structure, as well as on the manor system typical of East Elbia with its attributes of serfdom to the soil, hereditary unfreedom, compulsory service of laborers, patrimonial jurisdiction and the lord's patronage rights over church and school. This peculiar agrarian constitution deprived most of the population of the influence of the state; however, by the canton system introduced in 1733/35 the nobility had to endure a severe impairment of its autonomy through the significant intrusion of state authority into its sphere of rule. The general conscription with exemptions enforced by Frederick William I permanently removed large parts of the rural population from the jurisdiction of the nobility, thereby creating a direct link between the sovereign and his subjects and effecting a certain emancipation of these peasant and sub-peasant population groups.

Although officer positions were primarily intended for the nobility, this was only meant in principle, and bourgeois men with talent and ambition under Frederick William I certainly had the opportunity to enter the officer corps and even to rise to the higher ranks. Known generals from the bourgeois milieu include Carl Gottlieb von Decken (father: Joachim Decken, professor at the University of Frankfurt a.d.O.), Friedrich von Egeln (father: Friedrich Egeln, merchant) and Christian Nikolaus von Linger (father: Salomon Linger, Electoral Brandenburg ordnance master). The regulation of 1726 explicitly provided for the promotion of deserving non-noble non-commissioned officers to officer rank: "Wenn ein Unter-Officier, welcher kein Edelmann ist, sehr grosse Meriten (Verdienste) und einen offenen Kopff hat, auch dabei ein guter Exterieur, und wenigstens 12. Jahr gedienet hat, soll selbiger zum Seconde-Lieutenant Seiner Königl. Majestät vorgeschlagen werden." (If a non-commissioned officer who is not a noble has very great merits and an open mind, also a good exterior, and has served at least 12 years, he shall be proposed to His Royal Majesty as Second Lieutenant)⁴. That this also occurred in practice is proven by orders of 20.II.1727 to Colonel von Plotho and to Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau, in which Frederick William I commanded them to propose 10 and 15 respectively "capable non-commissioned officers that I can make into senior officers." Four or five of these should not be of noble origin, "but they must be truly capable people, and as far as possible those who have already been on campaign and who are capable that I can make them immediately lieutenants, of which you shall also be convinced that they are not brandy drinkers. They must also not be too young ...". Frederick William I was less restrained in ennoblements than his son; however, the practice of ennoblement, in contrast to the post-Frederician era, was strictly oriented to abilities and achievements and primarily concerned military men. On 9.VI.1729 the king elevated General Meier and his son to the nobility and wrote: "Since you are an old, brave officer, I hereby make you a nobleman and send you the patent." Johannes Friedrich August Roeseler (1665 - 1738) was ennobled in 1721, at that time regimental commander of D I and later chief of the former garrison battalion of Lilien (in Geldern). In 1722 (30.06.) the staff captain Ernst Ludwig Goetze was raised to the nobility; his father had been a horse dealer in Berlin. The captain and company commander Hans Kaspar Ernst Schulte in Infantry Regiment No. 15 (father: captain of the artillery) received his ennoblement on 21.06.1732.

In addition to this variant, officer recruits came from the cadet corps, the page service (pagerie), or were taken on directly by the regiments as junkers. The beginnings of the cadet corps go back to the Great Elector, who founded the knight academies in Berlin (1645), Kolberg (1653), Magdeburg (1653) and Küstrin (1666). Frederick I (1688-1713) established cadet academies in Berlin in 1701, in Magdeburg in 1706 and in Kolberg in 1703, which Frederick William I merged in 1716-1719 (in 1716 the Kolberg cadets and in 1719 the Magdeburg cadets were transferred to Berlin). Already in 1701, as Crown Prince, Frederick William I had secretly advocated in the War Council that the cadet company should be made a general institution and "that all boys of the nobility in the country should enroll for it"; here the idea of integrating the native nobility into the army and incorporating the junker class into the state became visible early on^5.

From the establishment of the cadet corps until the death of Frederick William I, a total of 1,612 cadets were trained, of whom 1,483 transferred to the army and 39 rose to general under his successor⁶. Of the 91 officers who rose to general in the period from 1713 to 1740, 5 came from the page service, 1 from the cadets, 30 entered a formation as common soldiers or junkers, 27 began their careers directly as officers and 28 were lateral entrants, i.e. they had previously served in other armies and only later entered the Prussian army, mostly with a higher rank.

The cadets were assigned to the regiments, where they initially served as non-commissioned officers before rising to officer rank. This was possible at the earliest after three years: "No non-commissioned officer shall be proposed to become an officer of His Royal Majesty before he has served at least 3 years with the regiment" (Regulation of 1726, p. 546). Furthermore, generals could take young nobles as pages into their care and look after their military training before they entered the regiment.

Most officers, however, began their careers as Junker (Gefreiten Corporal in the infantry and Standartenjunker in the cavalry): "Of the 11 non-commissioned officers in each company there shall always be one nobleman Gefreyter Corporal, and carry the flag; Also, besides the Gefreyter Corporal every company shall have another nobleman as a non-commissioned officer, both of whom must belong to the country at home" (Regulation of 1726, p. 5). Before the Gefreyter Corporal or Standartenjunker, however, became a non-commissioned officer, he had to "stand 3 months shield guard", "so that he in that time learn the service and the drilling". If an officer left a regiment, the colonel (or regimental commander) was to propose a suitable nobleman "who belongs to the country at home, and who merits it the most, to be an officer of His Royal Majesty", but foreign nobles were also accepted as officer recruits, although beforehand the mandatory signature was required on a "Revers", "never to leave the service of His Royal Majesty, but to serve forever".

On 02.02.1736 Frederick William I ordered the East Prussian regiments to enlist only those foreign noblemen as Junker "who would be handsome and of good stature", so body height also played a role in officer recruitment. This inconsistent replacement system basically remained in place until the decline of the old Prussian army in 1806/07. Practical and theoretical training was left to the regiments and therefore was handled differently from formation to formation.

In an obituary for his general adjutant Colonel August von Köppen in 1717 the Soldier King expressed himself about the ideal of the Prussian officer: "The officer should strive for the following qualities: fear of God, prudence, bravery, contempt of death, sobriety, vigilance, patience, inner pleasure and contentment with himself, unchanging loyalty to his lord, obedience and respect toward his superiors, attentiveness. He should endeavor to acquire hawk's eyes and quiet ears, and also forget nothing that one has once seen and heard. He needs enmity and hatred against softness and base tricks, but desire to attain renown, glory and honor. He must not be a reasoner, must perform his service and duty without fault, must possess sciences or strive to acquire them"⁷.

Central values of the officer and thus decisive driving forces of his actions were a sense of honor and the pursuit of glory. Following the ideal of steadfastness, the officer always tried to maintain composure (bearing). While national elements still had little significance, the leitmotifs—honor, glory and steadfastness—were almost overarching mental schemes of the nobility that moved or concerned the nobleman both in Prussia and in other European states. Added to this were a church-religious bond and a transformed form of knightly vassalage as further essential reference points. The old Prussian officer strove to fulfill his duties reliably and with equanimity; any other behavior would have been detrimental to his honor. Moreover, the king required frugality from his officers, a simple way of life and forbade going into debt (Regulation of 1726, pp. 595 ff.). Alongside these mostly individualistic motives there also emerged group-related ideals, e.g. regimental esprit de corps, and the officer class as such gradually began to perceive itself as a similar estate, distinguishing itself from the civilian nobility⁸, and was very well aware of its privileged position in society. Thus the noble officer possessed a firm foundation of values. But the bourgeois officer, coming from a completely different milieu, will probably also have internalized many of the value categories mentioned, presumably combined with a pronounced (bourgeois) will to achieve, the outstanding characteristic of the social climber.

The few memoirs we have from the period before 1740 make clear that the old Prussian officer of those days was firmly rooted in the Christian faith of Lutheran or Calvinist persuasion and that fear of God and trust in God significantly influenced his social behavior. The officer type associated with the Enlightenment or rationalism or the romantically sensitive type could only be encountered under Frederick the Great or his successors in the officer corps.

While the values and norms of the noble officers were quite consistent, since they came from the same social stratum, one should not imagine the officer corps as a homogeneous group. There was also a gap in the level of education here, and the economic basis was quite different. The scale ranged from wealthy landowners to middle- and landless nobles who had their pay as their only source of income.

The thesis of the personal identity of the officer and landowner according to the formula "Officer = Landowner" is incorrect, although of course there were inevitably many landowners or potential heirs among the officers. That canton district and manor coincided locally, if at all, was probably rather accidental and contrary to royal intentions. Rather, one must consider the land-poor portion of the officer corps to have been considerable, since the often very poor Prussian nobility was generally very prolific and officer positions therefore absorbed and economically sustained a large number of male nobles without sufficient material basis, while the number of manors remained limited, the noble upper class grew numerically and was also not allowed to seek foreign service, and moreover many estates were concentrated in a single hand, although pronounced large landownership was rather rare. Furthermore, military service was honorable and therefore appropriate to their status, but economically unattractive, so that many nobles who had other prospects did not serve at all or left the service prematurely, a tendency that Martiny later documented for the Electorate of Brandenburg⁹. In addition, the Hohenzollerns seem to have deliberately prevented the mixing of official and private spheres; this practice is comparable to the separation of home province and place of service practiced in the civil bureaucracy¹⁰.

With regard to national origin, for the period under Frederick William I one can still assume a certain conformity, since the king initially did not want foreigners as officers. A few examples of the national composition of the officer corps before 1740 may illustrate this statement:

The intellectual range, however, showed a differentiated structure: alongside officers with university educations, many nobles also wore the officer’s uniform who had entered the army at an early age and had received only extremely modest schooling in their childhood. Klöden reports on his father’s upbringing: “With the junior noble education at the time of Frederick William I, where education and knowledge, if they did not concern the military profession, were as good as not regarded by the nobility at all, indeed were considered inappropriate and harmful, Hans Gottfried had learned to read, write, calculate, ride, fence, hunt, bird-trap and drill ..., but outside this sphere knew nothing except the names and fates of a small number of his ancestors”¹¹. A judgment about the officer corps of Frederick William I from the year 1785 corresponds to the evaluation still encountered today¹²: “Following the example of Leopold of Dessau not only Frederick William, but the entire army, from the general down to the common soldier, shaped itself. Even his coarseness and ignorance in other knowledge was regarded and imitated as part of the military character. Everything that a good non-commissioned officer did not necessarily need to know was seen as superfluous pondering and it was considered no more indecent for a general to hardly know how to write his name than that he could not walk a tightrope. Whoever could write more was called an ink-splasher or scribbler. Even now one understands by the denomination ‘Frederick-William-officer’ a man of 5 1/2 - 6 feet in height, with a short blue coat, long sword and a constricted neck, who performs all his actions stiffly and seriously like a soldier on duty and has otherwise learned nothing”¹³. Even Frederick the Great expressed himself to his confidant d’Argens on 14.10.1762 in similar terms about the level of education before 1740: “I remember that in my father’s time study was suppressed, that scientific knowledge was in a sense considered a stain. That made the youth loathsome to it and they regarded it as a criminal act to expand the limits of their knowledge and to strive for enlightenment. I still feel the evil consequences; but these are not things I can change immediately. The spirit of the nation must take another direction...”. These judgments, however, seem unjust in their generalization, for Frederick William I not only laid the foundations for the popular schooling of the people¹⁴, but also knew very well how to appreciate the value of higher education. He did, however, place value on a realistic and practical orientation¹⁵; the king scorned purely theoretical scientific approaches. Frederick William I’s ideas about the required measure of basic knowledge become clear in connection with the educational plan of Privy Councillor v. Berlepsch for the orphaned son of Major-General v. Albe, about which the king made the following remarks: “Let his son be taught whatever you want, but Albe’s son shall not learn pedantic Latin, but history of the last 100 years, his religion fundamentally, geography and mathematics and arithmetic fundamentally; to read French perfectly, to write, fence, dance and when the years come at Halle to ride. Albe’s son shall not learn more”¹⁶. Tharau concludes: “In summary, it can be said of the level of intellectual culture of the officer corps under the Soldier King that it was by no means inferior to that of the past. True, the grand tours had ceased, but what was lost in breadth of education thereby was made up for by the moral-intellectual element that had been introduced into the officer corps through the emphasis on pont d’honneur and the notion of rank, and by the strictness and solidity that the whole life and even the pursuit of intellectual culture gained”¹⁷. For the assessment of the educational level in the Prussian generality under the Soldier King the following details are of interest: among the officers promoted to major-general in the period 1713 to 1740, Carl Gottlieb von Dechen (from 1716 major-general), Erdmann von Glasenapp (from 1714 major-general), Kurt Hildebrand Freiherr v. Loeben (from 1713 major-general, chief of No. 26), Achaz von der Schulenburg (from 1719 major-general, chief of D V, later Knight Academy at Wolfenbüttel), Arnold Christoph zu Waldow (from 1731 major-general, chief of K 12) attended the University of Frankfurt (Oder); Christoph Martin Graf von Degenfeld-Schonburg (from 1722 major-general) the grammar school at Schwäbisch Hall and then the universities of Utrecht and Leiden; Curt Christoph Graf von Schwerin (from 1720 major-general, transferred from Mecklenburg service, chief of No. 24) the University of Leiden (later Greifswald); Adelf Friedrich Graf von der Schulenburg-Beetzendorf (from 1728 major-general, chief of D III) the University of Utrecht (previously the Knight Academy at Lüneburg); Wilhelm Dietrich von Buddenbrock (from 1728 major-general, chief of K 1), Erhard Ernst von Roeder (from 1714 major-general, chief of No. 2) the University of Königsberg. The following attended: Georg Joachim von der Wense (from 1718 major-general, chief of D I) the grammar school at Merseburg; Georg Friedrich Heinrich v. Borcke (from 1736 major-general, chief of No. 29), Georg Levin von Winterfeldt (from 1720 major-general, chief of K 12) the grammar school at Stettin; Friedrich Wilhelm v. Dossow (1732 major-general, chief of No. 31) the Joachimsthal Gymnasium (later the Knight Academy at Kolberg). These are mostly officers from significant noble families who had achieved advancement into the leadership elite of the Prussian army; thus they are individual cases. For the majority of officers the statements made above about education likely hold true.

The group of officers was now sharply separated from the non-commissioned officer corps, which was also documented by the fact that the articles of war of 12.07.1713 applied only “before the non-commissioned officers and common soldiers,” while the regulation of 1726 contained extensive “orders by which all officers in future must conduct themselves” (Regulation of 1726, pp. 525 ff.). The essential aim of all these provisions was the maintenance and strengthening of “subordination.” This was to be “observed with the utmost exactness among the officers in a regiment from the general to the youngest ensign” (Infantry Regulation of 1726, p. 526). Obedience and strict execution of orders were demanded; contradiction and opposition upon receiving orders were forbidden. It was clearly stated that zeal and commitment in duty were expected from the officer: “... that officer who does not perform his devoir from his own ambition, but must be compelled to his service, does not merit being an officer” (Regulation of 1726, p. 220). Moreover, the officers had to know the regulation (order of 17.12.1729). Outside of drill time and the concluding review the officer’s service was characterized above all by extensive drill and guard duties. In training the company commander should “not rely so much on the non-commissioned officers” and should have the recruits learn to drill partly by himself, partly through the officers of the company (Infantry Regulation of 1726, p. 221). In an ordre from 1730 the king summarized the service requirements particularly addressed to the regiment owner or commander as follows: “Thus I command you hereby by grace to adhere closely and to introduce accordingly my will, that it be at your regiment, in the order and exactitude in the whole service, in charges, and in all matters, whatever name they may have, always in such order as if I were constantly present. As indeed the service in the garrisons should be kept so exact and orderly as if the enemy stood before the gate. Whereby you must also attend to the neatness of uniform and hats and leather equipment, and see to it that the uniform be made clean and good, and that it fit properly on the body and not hang about. If I myself do not find the regiment in this order, or if in my absence something is neglected, and not everything is as my orders and the regulation demand, and I come to know of it, then I will sharply consider the commander and every regiment officer, without some excuse. The commander shall also strictly urge all the senior officers to their devoir, that they do not neglect themselves, as has happened to date, and if they do not do their devoir, they shall be severely punished. If the staff officers do not do their devoir diligently and exactly, it shall be reported to me likewise, and if it is not reported to me, the commander shall be responsible, likewise the captains and first lieutenants. I have also come to know that in the companies, because of the poor uniform in boots, shoes and shirts, things often do not go correctly, and desertions occur, and people are caught again about which complaints have been made. I do hope, however, that I have not such lazy and duty-forgetting officers in the army. But as in a flock of sheep there are also scabby ones; thus I hereby command the commanders of the regiments to diligently inquire, that both senior officers, non-commissioned officers, drummers and privates receive their due ...”¹⁸. The Regulation of 1726 determined unambiguously: “If it should be found that a soldier has not been properly provided with pay and quarter-money, then the captain of the company shall be cashiered.”

Advancement in the hierarchy of ranks fundamentally followed the principle of seniority. According to Frederick William I promotion should be governed by length of service. Officers of princely blood were not granted a claim to faster promotion. Thus promotions did not follow a true merit principle, because the king was careful not to do any “injury” to the other officers. However, breaches of duty, transgressions, indiscipline — if the king learned of them — could of course mean the end of an officer’s career at any time. A promotion was generally only to be made when a position became vacant. The long period of peace under the Soldier King led to a certain aging (of the staff officers and the generality) and to long intervals between one promotion and the next. This was particularly painful for the subordinate ranks, who had to accept meager living conditions due to relatively low pay rates, though some officers could supplement their salary through parental allowances or allowances from their own assets. Moreover, prices before 1740 were still in an acceptable relation to pay and the cost-of-living situation varied from garrison to garrison, from province to province.

There were, however, also fortunate officers who reached a higher rank quite early. Thus v. Geßler was promoted on 21.01.1714 to major in the dragoon regiment v. Pannewitz; he was only 26 years old. That seniority did not in every case determine allocation of rank positions or even the awarding of a company or a regiment, but that performance-oriented motives could also play a role, is evidenced by an incident from 1738: a vacated company of the dragoon regiment v. Geßler (D IV) was by royal order not awarded to Rittmeister v. Engelbrecht, although he would have been next in line by rotation. In response to a complaint by the said officer the king answered: “You have to blame yourselves that you were passed over with the company this time. For why did you not bring as good horses at the taking over of the last remount as the previous time? Potsdam, 23 Jan 1738.”

The range of salary rates (net) in the infantry ran from 386 thalers, 9 groschen, 6 pfennigs for a colonel down to 6 thalers, 6 groschen and 5 pfennigs for a second lieutenant or ensign (Regulation of 1726, pp. 581 ff.). The adjutant was additionally paid as “forage money for one horse” 3 thalers. The captain (company commander) had to “maintain the musket, sabre and bayonets, and pay all expenses that arise in the company.” If a regiment received a new set of muskets and in the first ten years a captain left, his successor was to pay him 800 thalers for the muskets, bayonets, carbines and drums. After the ten-year period the new company commander only had to reimburse 500 thalers (Regulation of 1726, p. 608). The company was practically regarded as the property of its holder and had a defined value. More important than the fixed value of the stock of the weapons and equipment mentioned above, however, were the opportunities for enrichment that arose from the self-management of the company, particularly from the leave system. The company commander operated on profit and loss; from his profit he had to cover, among other things, the costs of recruitment. He was thus practically like an entrepreneur, although the full strength and the quality of his unit were subject to strict inspection.

The king welcomed it when recruits were “handsome” (letter of 08.04.1731 to Major-General v. Schwerin); therefore officers should “be very active in recruitment” (letter of 20.10.1733 to Colonel v. Plotho), only then could they hope for advancement. An essential criterion for a good company was the height standard, i.e. the soldiers’ stature, but drill skill and discipline were also critically judged by the king as essential characteristics of an effective unit. Since abuses in company management often provoked desertions, Frederick William I repeatedly admonished the responsible officers that the soldiers should receive everything due to them (wages, small uniform items, etc.). For such offenses the duty-forgetting officers faced severe punishments. Company holders whose companies did not conform to the norms of the order of 13.09.1732 had to reckon with punitive flat-rate deductions. In the cavalry the remount was a matter of royal interest and at times a rebuke from Frederick William I was quite severe. If, on the other hand, a formation made a positive impression, the king did not spare praise and recognition: “I am glad to hear that everything is still in good order with the regiment, and that it also drills diligently” (Frederick William I on 4.05.1731 to Johann Caspar von Herztberg, commander of No. 9).

Not every regimental or company holder was a good “host.” When Major-General Martin Arend von Dockum (1665 - 1732), chief of D VI, was stabbed to death in a duel by Lieutenant v. Woldau, he left 9,000 thalers in debt. On 1.06.1732 the Soldier King therefore wrote to the widow and asked her to procure at least 3,000 thalers. When an officer finally took over a company it could be that he could not immediately fully enjoy the improved income situation. Bernd von Marwitz (1661 - 1726), for example, as company commander had to pay his predecessor 20 thalers monthly, and Friedrich Casimir von Botzheim (1672 - 1737), chief of No. 7, when he became captain and head of the departed Captain von Quoss’s company on 11.11.1704, had to leave to him as an invalid monthly half a captain’s salary. And when in 1713 Captain Justus (Friedrich) Maximilian v. Hembyze was retired from Infantry Regiment No. 8, he received a grace pension of 12 thalers monthly “from the youngest company.” In addition to the pay, officers could be rewarded with monetary gifts, real estate or other benefices (e.g. district governorships).

The general service regulation of 1726 contained drastic provisions for the marriages of officers, whereby younger officers were only permitted to marry if the bride was wealthy, whereas the marriages of older officers with higher rank had to be primarily socially appropriate¹⁹. In principle, however, both Frederick William I and Frederick the Great preferred that officers remain single and concentrate on their official duties. Many disapproving or irritated letters to this effect from both rulers have been preserved, sometimes in harsh and even cynical words. On 13.09.1734 Christoph Burggraf and Graf zu Dohna-Schlodien (1702 - 1762, from 1745 major-general and chief of No. 4, later of No. 23 and then of No. 16) received permission to marry, but it was accompanied by the king’s drastic remark: “I answer your letter of 28 August by saying that according to your opinion the world would die out if you did not marry” (Priesdorff, Vol. I, pp. 311 ff.).

Like marriage, a request for leave also required permission, though the reason had to be justified. As a rule leave was granted in the case of marriage, at the death of a close relative, for other family (inheritance) matters, or (for older, meritorious officers) also for recuperation or restoration of health (sometimes for several weeks or even months); nevertheless this was rather the exception and official obligations always took precedence. According to a decree of the king dated 26.08.1738 no officer (in East Prussia) was allowed, with the permission of his commander, to be outside his garrison for longer than two nights and, in the interest of equality, the king did not wish that one major-general should receive more leave than another.

In the period from 1713 - 40, 382 officers of the field infantry and artillery died, 106 in the garrisons and 136 in the cavalry (a total of 624). During this period there were discharges of: 868 officers from the field infantry and artillery, 78 officers from the garrisons and 256 officers from the cavalry (a total of 1,202). Retirement was difficult to obtain. The Regulation of 1726 contained no provisions for the handling of officers’ requests for retirement, not without reason, for Frederick William I granted such permission only very reluctantly. Requests for dismissal from royal service were often refused, especially if it concerned a capable and proven officer: thus the request for discharge by Friedrich Jakob Heinrich von Briest on 18.06.1739 was refused with the following justification: “You are one of the best officers of the regiment. You must only be cured.” The retirement request of Lieutenant-General Peter von Blanckensee was also repeatedly denied. When in 1736 an infantry major demanded retirement, the king refused him with the words: “It is not fine of you that you want to feed chickens, if the old M. (the major’s deceased father) knew it, what would he say.” Above all the king was reluctant to discharge old officers, but he could also react very angrily to applications from younger officers: when a Lieutenant von Kirschendorff (No. 11) repeatedly requested his discharge, the monarch decreed: “He shall not get it; if he comes again with it, he will be put into the guard.” The granting of pension pay was purely an act of grace and oriented to merit and need; provision for the survivors of deceased officers was not the rule. Lieutenant-General Stephan v. Dewitz, chief of K 8, was retired on 15.04.1723 with 500 thalers; Schnackenburg cites further examples, for instance General-Major v. Lilien in 1724 with 600, General-Major v. Montargues (chief of the engineer corps) in 1726 with 1000 and 1739 General-Lieutenant v. Rittberg with 400 thalers were discharged. Retirement with a higher rank also occurred, for example Rittmeister Graf v. Wittgenstein (K 2) was released in 1722 as lieutenant-colonel. Only officers with limited continued fitness for service were transferred to the garrison formations or to the provincial regiments. Senior officers were also appointed fortress commanders and junior officers to garrison majors or were given positions in the civil administration, e.g. as salt factors. Another form of provision was the bestowal of district governorships or vacant feudal estates.

On King Frederick William I the military writer Georg Heinrich v. Berenhorst passed a quite accurate judgment in his reflections on the art of war when he wrote: “The king himself had his regiment and his company, was colonel and captain in the strictest sense, lived so, thought so, and, being a warlord, almost tacitly consented to be regarded as a general under Leopold’s superior insight. With the officers down to the captains he — the king — acted like a comrade, with the subalterns — lieutenants and ensigns — like a father. He would have sent himself to the guard if he had been caught in an article of clothing that was not of the mountarness”²⁰. Numerous pieces of evidence exist about Frederick William I’s personal intercourse with his officers. They impressively document the patriarchal relationship between him and the “gentle brothers and sons,” as he sometimes called the officers, and testify to the king’s concern for the life fates of his officers. His utterances in this regard are more than mere formalities. Thus he wrote on 27.02.1727 to Major-General Georg Levin v. Winterfeld: “Marwitz very poorly ill, is a brave fellow one would not like to lose. Make it so that you be healthy for the review, are consequences of excesses which now come home, he who loves Venus in youth must in old age atone for it.” In 1739 Reinhold v. Derschau (1679 - 1742) fell seriously ill; the king sent him through his adjutant-general 10 bottles of wine and tried his hand as a medical adviser: “... he should not eat fruit, but take strong bouillons to regain his strength.” On 07.01.1722 Frederick William I wrote to Colonel v. Marwitz: “... write me how your health stands and what you lack, where I can help you let me know; I will do it with pleasure.” The death of General v. Beschefer affected the king deeply: “I am heartily sorry that I have lost so high a brave officer and friend as Beschefer, I am sensibly chagrined and am not well today, for I did not go hunting. It affects me as if he were my blood relation” — here true mourning is evident. In the circle of his officers Frederick William I felt comfortable, therefore he sought personal contact with them; on 14.09.1720 he wrote to Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau: “If Your Serene Highness wants to come here tomorrow, it will please me, but you must accept forbearance, as I have no cook here (in Potsdam) and I go to dine at my officer’s.” According to Carstedt the Soldier King “often dined with his generals”²¹. The contemporary biographer of the Soldier King (Fassmann) reports interesting details about the personal dealings of Frederick William I with his officers: “All generals, colonels, lieutenant-colonels and majors are accustomed to kiss His Majesty when they have not seen him for some time and are called to court or come there with royal permission, or when His Majesty on a journey arrives at their place. This also happens when a regiment passes the special review before His Majesty, and His Majesty is accustomed thereby to display the assurance of his grace and satisfaction”¹³. Indicative of the king’s frugal lifestyle is a letter of 01.07.1726 to Major-General v. Marwitz: “My dear Major-General von Marwitz, I will be with God’s help in eight days’ time at 3 o’clock in the afternoon at your place in Halberstadt. But I will not stay the night, rather go on to Hornburg. You shall therefore have a tent pitched before the gate and present me a good soup and a piece of sausage; also a good glass of wine and very clean water, but in no case should you incur any expense, which I expressly forbid you herewith ...”²². The king had an astonishing memory for people and names and above all during the annual reviews the officers could experience their supreme commander face to face. These inspections were feared, however, because the king could be extremely ungracious in the case of inadequate performance or perceived failure. If he was not satisfied with the appearance or the drill skill of a unit, he would customarily depart without farewell, whereupon harsh criticism and severe sanctions threatened up to a stop of promotions or even cashiering.

Leopold Prince of Anhalt (1676 - 1747) was the military advisor and confidant of the Soldier King, and one can quite fairly say that the prince was bound to his royal lord by a close friendship. Leopold Prince of Anhalt-Dessau²³ was born on 03.07.1676 in Dessau and was already appointed on 05.01.1688 as colonel and proprietor of the Imperial Alt-Diepenthal Infantry Regiment. On 13.09.1693 he became head of the Prussian Infantry Regiment No. 3 (Halle), of which he remained proprietor until his death (09.04.1747). From 14.03.1696 a major general, he became ruling prince of Anhalt-Dessau in 1698, but stayed in the Prussian army and in 1701 also became governor of Magdeburg. On 14.03.1703 the prince advanced to lieutenant general, on 20.01.1704 to general and on 02.12.1712 to field marshal. Previously he commanded the Prussian auxiliary troops in the War of the Spanish Succession, took part in the sieges of Kaiserswerth, Venloo and Roermond, in the battles of Höchstädt (20.09.1703 and 13.08.1704), was in Lombardy at Calcinato, Cassano, Turin, Susa (1705) and fought on the western theater at the capture of Tournai, in the Battle of Malplaquet, at the capture of Mons, Douai, Landrecies and the citadel of Mons. In 1715 he fought in Pomerania against the Swedes and in 1734 in the Polish Succession War in the Rhine campaign. On 06.12.1735 Leopold Prince of Anhalt-Dessau also became governor of Küstrin. The person of the Old Dessauer is closely linked to the history of the old Prussian army; he contributed significantly to the training of the firing tactics typical of the Prussian army. "Leopold did his best in the matter (note: the 1715 campaign). Now he had, as far as the army was concerned, the full confidence of the king, which verged on reverence. Both were united in the ultimate aim of making something extraordinary out of the Prussian army.... But Leopold did not forget, alongside the aforementioned efforts, to put into practice his maxim, by which he had known how to convince the king and most of the generals, namely to work toward such superiority in shooting that the enemy could be mowed down as soon as they entered the effective range of the small musket. All other wisdom the man might set aside in his head, but he did not boast of it"²⁴. In lively intellectual exchange with Frederick William I he made a decisive contribution to the development of the Prussian army through numerous improvement proposals, but—like the king—he was one-sidedly focused on the infantry. Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau was, alongside his role as territorial prince, in military respects an instructor and tactician, commander and military writer²⁵. Already at the time when Frederick William, as crown prince, was expanding his power position in the army, Leopold belonged to the officers closely associated with him. On this Hinrichs writes: "In this, the truly giving part had to be Prince Leopold by reason of his age and practical experience, while the crown prince processed the suggestions and innovations coming from him, incorporated them into the overall reform and strove for their application on a large scale. Prince Leopold laid in his regiment the foundations for the merciless exactness of Prussian drilling, for the mastery of weapon use and tactical movements—achievements whose transfer to the entire Prussian infantry was the work begun by Frederick William I as crown prince, by which he set his musketeers and grenadiers at the head of every European infantry. Leopold's work was possible precisely on the basis of the arbitrariness and variety of drilling in this transitional period of the War of the Spanish Succession, which allowed certain talented officers to experiment within their command areas and try out innovations. Thus the parade step was probably invented by a Hessian captain who had trained his company 'so that every fellow would keep step with all the others.' This was not the ordinary equal step to the drum, already known to the Landsknechte, but the 'peculiar slow drill step, performed with sharply audible placement and a stretched knee,' knowledge of which was likely brought to Berlin by the later Field Marshal von Kalckstein, who had seen it as an officer in the War of the Spanish Succession. Prince Leopold recognized in the disciplined drill step an important means for his highest tactical task, to combine fire and movement, since it gave the long lines of platoons 'a firmness and carriage that at the time had immediate combat value'"²⁶. Added to this was the introduction of iron ramrods, which replaced the fragile wooden version that often broke in the heat of battle. Yet Leopold's significance did not exhaust itself in military matters; to some extent he even became an internal political advisor to Frederick William I, especially on economic questions, since the prince demonstrated not only organizational but also economic skill—for example as a colonizer in East Prussia. The published correspondence is an eloquent testimony to the fruitful relationship of the two men. The drillmaster of the Prussian army crowned his successful military career with the victory over the Saxons allied with Austria at the Battle of Kesselsdorf in 1745. His relationship with Frederick the Great, however, was not without strain. Moreover, all five of his sons became Prussian generals, three of them even field marshals. Among Frederick William I's favorites besides the "Old Dessauer" were Gottfried Emanuel von Einsiedel (1690 - 1745), Christian Reinhold von Derschau (1679 - 1742) and Johann von Lehwald (1685 - 1768, from 1752 field marshal). Lehwald earlier belonged to the crown prince's regiment. Colonel von Koeppen is also counted among the king's favorites. To his chief adjutant, Hans Christoph Friedrich Count von Hake (1699 - 1754), "the king on his deathbed gave many important orders for his son and his future government, and two days before his death gifted him his best riding horse, with the words: this is the last thing I will give you, keep it in memory of me"²⁷.

Rank lists 1713-40