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The Prussian Army under Frederick William I (1713–40) - Chapter 1 - The Prussian State in the Year 1713

In the midday hour of February 25, 1713, Frederick I, King in Prussia since 1701, died in the Berlin Palace. Already on February 24, 1713, the dying king had summoned the heir to the throne, his son Frederick William, together with his wife and Prince Frederick, who had been born on January 24, 1712, to bless them. With Frederick I died a monarch whose figure easily recedes into the background between the three dominant personalities of Brandenburg-Prussian history — the Great Elector, the Soldier King and Frederick the Great. Married to the intellectually significant Sophie Charlotte (1668–1705), he was not only devoted to the fine arts, but during his reign pursued the elevation to kingship with skill and great energy. Because the Habsburg emperor was in urgent need of Brandenburg's military assistance in the looming struggle with France, he finally yielded to the persistent pressure. Frederick I's self-coronation took place on January 18, 1701, in Königsberg. The royal dignity was based on East Prussia, which stood outside the imperial association, and with it the scattered possessions of the House of Hohenzollern began the slow coalescence into a state unit; henceforth the dispersed holdings, differing in tradition, economic structure and interests, had an overarching — ideal — point of reference. This increased the influence of the central government in Berlin. The royal crown was symbolic in that it also embodied, in domestic politics, the absolutist claim to rule. The advancement in rank was also necessary so as not to lose political weight within the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. As early as 1697, Elector Frederick Augustus I of Saxony (1694–1733) had become King of Poland. From the familial relations of Elector George of Hanover (1698–1727) — his mother Sophia was the great-granddaughter of King James I (i.e. James VI) — there also arose the Wettin claim to the English crown. After the last monarch of the House of Stuart died without issue, this claim was realized in 1714. Prussia could not be left behind in this respect. By the coronation it also assumed, in succession to Electoral Saxony, the role of Protestant protector in northern Germany, since the Saxon elector had earlier converted to the Catholic faith in view of the Polish crown. In the still strongly religiously shaped 18th century this was a factor not to be underestimated, which continued to have an impact during the Seven Years' War. In that respect, the royal dignity was more than mere satisfaction of personal vanity.

The core of the Prussian state in the year 1713 consisted of the Kurmark and the Neumark. After the death of the last Duke of Jülich, in 1609 and 1614 respectively Cleves (1,793.8 sq. km), the County of Mark (2,790.6 sq. km) and Ravensberg (915.1 sq. km) were added to the Electorate of Brandenburg. Thus the core territory was expanded by areas on the Lower Rhine and for the first time included western territories. In 1618 the former Teutonic Order land and now Duchy of East Prussia (36,180.9 sq. km) — initially as a Polish fief, since the Treaty of Oliva in 1660 as a sovereign component — was added to Brandenburg. After the end of the Thirty Years' War (1618–48), the Brandenburg Electorate was awarded in the Peace of Westphalia the bishoprics of Halberstadt, Minden (1,198.1 sq. km) and Cammin, as well as the County of Hohenstein, Western and Farther Pomerania (19,120.0 sq. km) and the claim to the Archbishopric of Magdeburg (together with Halberstadt 8,185.6 sq. km). However, the elector did not succeed in securing all of Pomerania, since the Swedes initially retained Western Pomerania with Stettin and the mouth of the Oder. As compensation for this, some formerly ecclesiastical principalities were assigned to the electorate. Magdeburg was acquired in 1680 and parts of Western Pomerania (5,193.7 sq. km) only in 1720. Through the aforementioned acquisitions, the Prussian state territory in 1713 comprised a total of 112,266.7 sq. km; for comparison: in 1440 the dominion of the Margraves of Brandenburg had been only 29,477.5 sq. km. The population increased under Frederick III/Frederick I from 1,113,700 to 1,672,000, i.e. by 47%. Regardless of territorial gain and population increase, the material conditions at the accession of Frederick William I were, however, a cause for concern. The record of his father's government was sobering despite obtaining the royal crown; Frederick I had failed as a ruler. The deployment of Prussian troops on the battlefields of the War of the Spanish Succession had not solidified the young kingdom's position in foreign policy; it could not assert its own political interests in the Northern War, which took place in parallel to the War of the Spanish Succession, and could not even prevent incursions by the belligerent parties into Brandenburg-Prussian territory. The last years of the regency were moreover filled with intrigues among the cabinet ministers and general favoritism and mismanagement; however, court conditions conformed to the usual practices of the age. The finances were shattered and marked by corruption. The financial demands of the court in Berlin and the simultaneous maintenance of a large standing army as a necessary export commodity had ruined the state budget despite foreign subsidies. Heinrich, however, argues that liquidity difficulties do not yet allow conclusions about the substance [1] and points to a considerable coin and precious-metal hoard as well as the economically significant effects of a construction boom in the towns and villages of the middle provinces.


[1] Gerd Heinrich, Geschichte Preußens. Staat und Dynastie, Frankfurt am Main 1981, p. 142; for the person of Frederick I see also: Werner Schmidt, Friedrich I. Kurfürst von Brandenburg/ König von Preußen, Munich 1996.

The Brandenburg-Prussian State in the 18th Century
The Brandenburg-Prussian State in the 18th Century

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The Prussian Army under Frederick William I (1713 - 40) - Chapter 16 - The Colorful Coat (The Infantry).

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