The Old Prussian Non-Commissioned Officer Corps - Insider Views of an NCO Group

Between the privates and the officers stood the non-commissioned officers as an intermediate link in the vertical structure. If one considers the Old Prussian army as a social formation, from the beginning of the 18th century a separation between the (senior) officer corps and the NCO corps can be observed, which was also reflected clearly in the fact that the Articles of War of 12 July 1713 applied only to NCOs and privates, i.e. no longer to the officers. With the reservation of officer positions for the native nobility as a means of its statization, the first third of the 18th century saw a social decline of the NCOs, who now together with the privates comprised the ranks. Nevertheless, in this precise system of superiority and subordination they, as holders of the lowest ranks and functionaries, had a weighty significance; the framework and conditions of existence of this NCO group therefore deserve to be the subject of consideration.

From 1 October 1735 the ten musketeer companies of an infantry regiment together counted 40 sergeants, 30 middle NCOs and 30 corporals, the two grenadier companies 2 sergeants, 4 middle NCOs and 12 corporals. Accordingly, an establishment of a regiment included 118 NCOs. Per musketeer company there were thus 10: namely 4 sergeants (including the sergeant major, since there was no separate sergeant major pay on the establishment), 3 middle NCOs (quartermaster, captain d'armes, lance-corporal) and 3 corporals. The grenadier company had only 9 NCOs because it did not carry a flag and for that reason also had no lance-corporal. The cuirassier and dragoon regiments consisting of 5 squadrons counted 60; the dragoon regiments with 10 squadrons therefore comprised 120 NCOs. The establishment of the hussar regiments (10 squadrons) counted 80 NCOs. The ranking and the distribution of NCOs to the individual units of the company were determined by body height. In 1787 the organization of the infantry was reformed; an infantry regiment now had a total of 144 NCOs: 48 sergeants (including 12 sergeant majors), 36 middle NCOs and 60 corporals. The musketeer and grenadier companies now had the same number of NCOs, namely 12 each. From 1799 an infantry regiment comprised 148 NCOs (excluding the III. musketeer battalion); the number of NCOs was thereafter again different for musketeer companies with 10 and for grenadier companies with 14. The newly formed fusilier battalions had 48 NCOs each. From 1787 the cuirassier regiments counted 80, the dragoon regiments 75 and the hussar regiments 150 NCOs.

The NCO corps was filled from the privates; the corresponding replacements were usually provided by the group of locals, but foreigners also rose in rank (cf. appendix, table 1). Frequently these were soldiers' sons: for example, in 1805 their share of the NCO corps at No. 3 (Halle) was 9% and at No. 16 (Braunsberg) 11%. Little is known about the social origin of the domestic NCOs. According to Knapp 1) the sons of free köllmisch farmers were preferentially made NCOs. Köllmer were free farmers in East Prussia (and Lithuania), so this statement can only apply to those units that had their recruitment districts in that region. In the artillery many bombardiers and NCOs were sons of educated bourgeois families whose aim was promotion to officer. The conditions in the technical troops were not, however, typical for the Old Prussian army, but it is documented that even in other regiments "Schulzen- or also good burgher sons" served as NCOs.

A prerequisite for transfer to the NCO career was at least four years' service in the regiment. When an NCO position became vacant the company commander (captain/rittmester) proposed three capable soldiers; the appointment was made by the colonel. If a company lacked suitable replacements, one could promote a soldier from another company to NCO.

Aspirants were to be "brave" (-valiant) soldiers, preferably with war experience. Writing skills alone were not to decide a promotion in rank; they did not want "pen-fencers" or "scribe-boys"! Thus good military aptitudes and abilities were required. A contemporary critic, however, complained that NCOs were chosen "more by number of years of service than by their merits"².

Preferentially chosen, however, were long-serving soldiers who had proven themselves in war; according to Lossow these were preferred over younger candidates³. Frederick the Great openly stated this principle in his Political Testament of 1752, rejecting outright the promotion of students or other young men (unless they were noble) to NCOs. The king pointed out that a battle-hardened and "brave" soldier could earn respect among the common soldiers, whereas the "scribe" on the one hand lacked a commanding tone, i.e. authority, and on the other hand in his opinion was not capable of enduring the hardships of a campaign⁴.

Hiller gives an example:

"This sergeant major Lammers was appointed sergeant major by His Majesty King Frederick II himself at the review at Brackwede. At the special review at the time all recruits and advanced men were presented. The captain of the company presented a younger NCO of good conduct (behavior) and with the quality of a neat handwriting for promotion to sergeant major; the king looked through the other NCOs and chose the oldest of the sergeants with a grey beard and white hair, with the words: 'He shall be sergeant major'; this was Lammers, who boldly replied: 'I cannot write, Your Majesty,' upon which the king said: 'Let the young fellow help him write!"'⁵. Of the 10 NCOs of an infantry company "always one nobleman shall be lance-corporal (and carry the flag)".

The artillery did not receive lance-corporals until 1787. From 1763 five of the lance-corporals already received commissions as ensigns and were allowed to wear the portepee (portepee ensigns/sabre ensigns), but they were not yet real officers and still belonged to the NCO corps⁶.

On this Berenhorst:

"To assist education, Frederick prescribed ensign cadets with ensign patents and silver sword tassels among the senior and junior NCOs. He wanted to make them more fit for the society of officers ..."⁷.

The body of lance-corporals was not to be undermined by rapid promotion. The ensign cadets (lance-corporals, standard-bearer cadets) as officer candidates passed only through the NCO corps and can therefore be neglected here.

NCOs were no longer punished with the cane but with a special (fuchtel) blade and were addressed as "Sie"⁸_. Fuchtel blows were considered less humiliating than flogging with the cane. Sergeant majors and quartermasters were handled "with some consideration" and regarded as "useful instruments of good discipline" and "intermediaries between the flock and the shepherd". General Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Seydlitz, commander of Cuirassier Regiment K 8 (Ohlau etc.), even had the deceased quartermaster of the life squadron buried with officer honors 9). In the I. Battalion of the Life Guards (No. 15 I) the sergeant majors had the rank of premier lieutenants of the army 10). According to parade order of 28 May 1741 sergeant majors and quartermasters were no longer to be struck with the fuchtel. When in 1803 a lieutenant of Infantry Regiment von Kunheim (No. 1, Berlin) nevertheless struck a sergeant major with the fuchtel, the officer was confined after complaint by the affected sergeant major and reported to the king. Since 21 November 1789 sergeant majors, quartermasters and chief artillerymen wore the portepee like the officer¹¹. The senior hunters of the field hunter corps also enjoyed this privilege¹².

The regulations demanded harsh punishment of excesses committed by NCOs and listed as sanctions: "shield-guard with commoner's pay for a certain time, perpetual shield-guard" or the sentence "to the cart". They could also be degraded to private. According to Berenhorst NCOs were sharply punished for the slightest lapse and then received "a huge number of blows with the flat blade".

After 12 years of service non-noble NCOs had the possibility of rising to the officer rank. NCOs who had "very great merits and an open head" were then, bypassing the ensign rank, promoted directly to second lieutenant. The transition from NCO to officer was, however, for non-nobles mainly practiced in the garrison and hussar regiments and in the technical troops (artillery), while such mobility in the field regiments of the infantry, cuirassiers and dragoons was rather the exception. Fundamentally, however, this possibility of advancement from NCOs in the hierarchy existed. On 20 November 1727 Frederick William I ordered Colonel von Plotho: "to propose 10 capable NCOs who are fit so that I can make them senior officers. Four of them shall not be nobles, but they must be really capable men, and as far as possible those who have already been on campaign and are capable that I can make them immediately lieutenants, of which you shall assure that they are not brandy-drinkers. They must not be too young ...". In a similar letter of the same date to Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau, five of 15 NCOs were to be promoted to the officer corps despite their non-noble origin. In 1741 it was ordered that departing grenadier lieutenants should be replaced by suitable sergeant majors. NCOs who particularly distinguished themselves in the Bavarian Succession War of 1778/79 were to receive noble patents and be promoted to officers. In 1780 Frederick the Great admonished General von Löllhöfel that "from time to time good quartermasters should also be proposed for officers, so that there are not so many young fellows as officers among the hussars". In an order of 2 April 1784 to Major General von Thun the king demanded that a quartermaster should replace the departing Lieutenant von der Golz. When in 1787 the officer establishment of infantry regiments was increased from 50 or 51 to 55 positions, King Frederick William II determined on 27 November that within the framework of this reorganization "two long-serving sergeant majors or sergeants shall advance to lieutenants and, with further good conduct, also be pardoned with further advancement".

As assistants to the officer, in peacetime NCOs were responsible for training recruits; besides drill duty, guard duty predominated, supervision of the soldiers in civilian quarters and barracks, and obligations as an aid to the police. In the cavalry the remount service played a role. For the guard infantry's guard duty the sergeant majors were, however, only to command the guard, read and report the companies, while the remainder of the duties fell to the officer on duty (captain) (parade order of 11 March 1750). The visiting NCOs were to be constantly "seen in the districts and pay close attention where something might occur" (government order of 13 January 1803). Mente mentions an NCO who was to ensure "order and cleanliness" in and outside the artillery barracks in Breslau¹³. Since soldiers sometimes sold uniform and equipment items, NCOs had to keep precise inventories (parade order of 7 December 1804).

Being detached to recruitment commands outside the borders meant variety but also high demands and sometimes risk. That individual regiments often detached the same NCOs for recruitment for years was viewed as a grievance: "... for when the NCOs stand on recruiting in the realm for years, they thereby become unfit for service with the regiment"¹⁴.

NCOs were thus enormously burdened in service, and this without sufficient career prospects. Overall the service was difficult and hard, but monotonous. In peace as well as in war the responsibility for preventing the ever-threatening desertion was added. Thus on 1 October 1756 an NCO of Infantry Regiment No. 3 (Halle) wrote home: "Here in Türmitz I received 54 men into my billet; I had to watch them to prevent desertion and that was the second sleepless night." According to parade order of 24 January 1754 in Berlin "... an NCO must always accompany" when "soldiers go out through the gate."

Moreover, specific circles of duties were traditionally or by regulation assigned to the individual ranks. Corporals were primarily responsible for training the recruits; they were to accomplish this "with the best manner ... (and) without the slightest brutality." The sergeant was an "old-serving NCO, who is better paid than the others, otherwise in nothing different from them. The cavalry has no sergeants"¹⁵.

The lance-corporal bore the flag. Besides the lance-corporal and the captain d'armes, the quartermaster was one of the three middle NCOs of the company; in a work from 1705 he is described as the company's quartermaster. According to his special function he had to ensure accommodation for the troops on marches in the assigned localities, assisted by some quartermaster's marksmen.

The captain d'armes belonged to the specialist NCOs; he handled "the procurement, safekeeping and distribution of clothing and weapon pieces." In addition to overseeing uniform, weapons and ammunition he had to attend to the sick. He was to perform his duty "not with brutality, but with kindness because of the love he has for the men," but he was allowed to punish malingerers among the sick. Like the sergeant major he was of special importance in the area of company economy.

The sergeant major kept the company muster roll and represented the company's interests vis-à-vis the commander. According to Streit (p. 64) he was "particularly appointed to work with the pen, and performs all written business in the company; in the proper sense he is the living register which the company commander leafs through daily to inform himself exactly of the state of his company." In the artillery the NCO ranks were: chief artilleryman, artilleryman and NCO¹⁶; among the hunters the senior hunters held this position.

NCOs carried the cane and had the right to limited corporal punishment of the privates, but they had to "refrain from proper beating." A parade order of 25 April 1788 forbade the NCOs (of D V Pasewalk etc.) to take the cane when drilling, because these were "no ornament for the cavalry" ¹⁷. The Old Prussian NCO corps is sometimes accused by contemporaries of brutal treatment of people¹⁸, yet the regulations and numerous government and parade orders and some preserved official letters condemn and prohibited excessive use of force, since soldiers were not to be made "desperate" and an increase in desertion was feared. It was expressly forbidden for NCOs to strike soldiers "in their districts and rooms (whether they are drunk or not), but rather to arrest them or report them to the company"¹⁹.

According to the regulations of 1743 the pay situation for NCOs was as follows: in the infantry a corporal received 3 thalers, a middle NCO 3 thalers, 1 groschen, 6 pfennigs and a sergeant 4 thalers. In the cavalry (cuirassiers/ dragoons) the pay rates were a little higher; here the quartermaster received in "pay and meal money" 6 and the corporal 4 thalers. In the hussars the quartermaster received 5 and the corporal 4 thalers. Senior hunters received 10 thalers monthly. The relatively low status of the garrison troops is visible in the pay differential to the main arms: here the sergeant received 2 thalers, 10 groschen and the corporal 2 thalers. As with the privates, NCOs were forbidden to incur debts.

Outside drill time only 2 NCOs per company were allowed leave at the same time; in the cavalry, due to the smaller establishment and the increased workload caused by the horses, only 1 NCO per company could be on leave. If an NCO wanted to marry he required the permission of the regimental commander; however, "when an NCO cannot make his special fortune through a marriage, the colonel shall not allow him to marry at all, especially when he is still a young NCO"²⁰. Despite this restrictive regulation many NCOs were married (see appendix, table 7). NCOs sometimes displayed high ages and long service lives; a few examples: Infantry Regiment No. 10 (Bielefeld, Herford) in 1766 had 5 NCOs over 60 years old; a sergeant of Captain von Bandemer's company counted 66 years of life and 46 years of service. A sergeant of Infantry Regiment No. 14 (Bartenstein, Schippenbeil, Pr. Friedland) was 60 years old in 1792 and had already completed 39 years of service. A sergeant major in the depot battalion of that unit counted 65 years of life and 45 years of service. Infantry Regiment No. 23 (Berlin) had in 1784 six NCOs older than 60. In Infantry Regiment No. 58 (garrisons like No. 14; that regiment was then in Goldap, Oletzko, Gumbinnen) served a 59-year-old NCO with 40 years of service in the III. musketeer battalion. In the life squadron of the Guards du Corps regiment (K 13) there was still in 1788 a 65-year-old NCO who had entered service in 1741 and had served in this elite formation since 1744. The oldest NCOs in Dragoon Regiment D V. (Pasewalk etc.) in 1764 were two corporals: both 63 years old and 40 and 45 years in service respectively. The oldest quartermaster in Hussar Regiment H 8 (Stolp, Lauenburg, Bütow etc.) was around 1784 a 52-year-old hussar who had already held that charge for 23 years (cf. also appendix, tables 2–5).

Provision was not regulated, but employment in lower grades of the civil administration was common. Discharged disabled NCOs were to receive positions as gate clerks, mill attendants, police riders, outward riders etc.²¹. According to Ledebur literate NCOs were employed as inspectors, gate clerks, wood wardens, rural policemen, gamekeepers, and chief foresters. The placement in schoolmaster positions is criticized due to the lack of suitability of many NCOs, but in the literature this measure's significance and volume are downplayed²². Frederick William I complained in an order of 6 January 1740 to Lieutenant General von Glasenapp that many "Schulzen- or also good burgher sons" served only briefly as NCOs in order to leave as soon as possible and, as part of veterans' provision, obtain a post in the civil administration. NCOs, however, were to be discharged only when unfit for service and to "do the service truly and not lie at home"²³. When soldiers became unfit for service due to illness or age and were discharged, they sometimes had to wait a long time for provision, because the state's financial situation did not allow a satisfactory solution to this problem. The inadequate system of disabled veterans' provision and the resulting "need of discharged warriors" was already criticized by contemporaries. Disabled NCOs were also affected by this misery; for example at No. 3 (1805) 13, at No. 8 (1783) 7 and at K 8 (1756) 3 disabled NCOs were in some cases listed as candidates for support for years. Besides assignment to a civilian post, accommodation in invalid and garrison companies, in the "new garrisons" or in the invalid house were further possibilities of support. The granting of assistance in the form of a money pension, the so-called "Gnadenthaler", was usually too small.

Contemporary judgments about the Old Prussian NCO corps vary, but are mostly not without sympathy. According to Berenhorst the NCOs "could hardly be entirely bad"²⁴. Suckow particularly laments the lack of education among the NCOs. He describes them as men of "advanced" years and calls them "old, hard heads." Often married and usually burdened with numerous offspring, the low pay forced them to earn a side income, which usually consisted of a previous trade²⁵. Wachholz, however, paints a gloomy picture²⁶: for him the NCOs were a kind of automatons, subjected to strict discipline and mechanically performing their heavy duty, always expecting the adjutant's blade and ever ready to swing the cane over the soldier's back. "Accustomed to their profession from youth, they quietly continued their meagre lives, moved within the narrow circle of their duties like the ox in the treadwheel, enjoyed no happiness and felt no sorrow."

Nevertheless, as functionaries and bearers of authority they enjoyed high esteem²⁷; above all Frederick William I and Frederick the Great repeatedly commented in this sense on the position and importance of the NCOs: Frederick William I evaluated the NCOs as "the foot of the company"²⁸. For him the NCOs were "the older the better." Already as crown prince and regimental commander of Infantry Regiment No. 15 in Neuruppin Frederick the Great commented on the NCOs: "I now come to your design concerning the NCOs. It is certainly excellent to obtain the required service from these men; it is also undeniable that they are paid too poorly, and yet the small service depends on our NCOs, and if we do not have reliable people it could go badly for us in war, for our officers cannot do double duty"²⁹. In a letter of 9 August 1747 to Margrave Charles the royal field marshal recommended "to retain the old NCOs with the regiment as long as possible and not to abolish them, because they make the base of those companies"³⁰. Frederick the Great also criticized the dismissal of old NCOs in a letter of 21 June 1783 to General Georg Ernst von Holzendorff, commander of the 1st Artillery Regiment and inspector of the entire artillery³¹.

The Old Prussian NCO corps certainly included some odd types like the NCO Zutzel, about whom Magister Laukhard (soldier in Infantry Regiment No. 3/Halle) relates so eloquently³², but the bulk of the NCOs were serious and dutiful soldiers³³, usually deeply religious, enormously burdened in service and, it cannot be denied, living in financially constrained, if not downright poor, circumstances. In the descriptions of contemporary officer memoirs we encounter them repeatedly; as flag (standard) cadets the later superiors in the first years of their service career usually had close contact with the NCOs, often living with them and learning the first military basics there— their reports are almost uniformly positive. The problem of alcoholism should not be concealed here, and harsh treatment of people did occur. Such excesses are often to be understood as a consequence of overload; the background of lacking career prospects should not be forgotten. Ultimately, however, the NCOs were decisive forces in daily service and indispensable braces in battle; they were indeed the "base (foundation) of the company" and contributed substantially to the drill proficiency, especially of the Old Prussian infantry.