Napoleon and Prussia - Reflections on the Collapse of the Old Prussian Army in 1806

In 1806 a confrontation occurs between post-Frederick Prussia and the young French Empire. This clash was to become a bitter lesson for the once-respected military power of Prussia. As the danger of war intensified that year and the conflict between France and Prussia began to take shape, Austria and Russia had already been defeated. Now Prussia stood alone on the battlefield, halfheartedly supported by Saxony. King Frederick William III had great difficulty deciding on taking up arms and had hoped for a diplomatic solution until the last moment. Prussia's declaration of war was also attributable to the urging of the strengthened war party in the country, which included high-ranking military officers as well as politicians, prominent members of society, and even members of the royal family.

Since the Separate Peace of Basel (1795) Prussia had stood aside, had not taken part in the struggle of the established powers against the French Republic, but sought its salvation in armed neutrality and engaged principally in the East. France rightly interpreted Prussia’s hesitant behavior in foreign policy as a weakness. On 12.09.1806 Napoleon, for example, wrote to Talleyrand, the minister of foreign affairs: "The idea that Prussia could dare to bind itself alone with me seems so ridiculous to me that it requires no discussion..." (Schulze, Briefe Napoleons, p. 198).

Even when Austria and Russia in 1805 attempted to curb French expansion, Prussia did mobilize, but primarily with a view to feared violations of Russian neutrality. However, after French troops under Bernadotte 2) had traversed Prussian territory without respecting Prussian sovereignty, Prussia occupied Hanover. Only then did it move closer to Austria and Russia (treaty with the Tsar of 03.11.1805), but the surrender of an Austrian army detachment at Ulm and the defeat at Austerlitz (02.12.1805) caused the nascent alliance to collapse. By then it was, however, too late for a Prussian intervention. It was not only the king’s personal weakness that prevented an energetic Prussian posture; speculations on territorial gains likely influenced Prussian diplomacy at least as much.

On 15.12.1805 a treaty (of Schönbrunn) with Napoleon was concluded that awarded Hanover to Prussia. In return Prussia had to cede Ansbach-Bayreuth, Neuchâtel, Cleves and the fortress Wesel. With this clever political maneuver Napoleon brought Prussia onto a collision course with England and at least temporarily neutralized it as a potential rival. In March 1806 Joseph Bonaparte became King of Naples, in May Louis Bonaparte became King of Holland. In July the Confederation of the Rhine was established; the end of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation had come. Consequentially, in August Francis II renounced the German imperial dignity and contented himself thereafter with the title: Francis I, Emperor of Austria. That month it became known that Napoleon had begun negotiations with England over the future fate of Hanover, a political affront to Prussia. Thus Prussia’s diplomatic failure became evident, and the favorable moment for a cooperation of Prussia with Austria and Russia had now been missed.

But instead of realistically assessing the political situation despite the clear provocation or rather contempt by France, it was now thought necessary to respond with force, although the mobilization of 1806 was not intended to be more than an armed demonstration, essentially a warning shot at the French emperor. For him too the looming conflict came at an inconvenient time; he primarily feared a Prussian rapprochement with Russia. The reputation of the Prussian army had been dented since Valmy (battle of 20 September 1792); yet it remained intact and it was above all the Prussian cavalry that caused the French emperor concern. Domestic pressure on the Prussian king grew ever stronger and so he finally yielded to the pressure of the "patriots." The wheel of war began to turn.

On 08.10.1806 the French marched into Saxony in three columns. Their strengths, according to Chandler (Napoleon, 1978, p. 79), were 41,000, 70,000 and 50,000 men. Peter Paret sketches this deployment in his account of the Battle of Jena as follows: "Napoleon advanced in three columns, separated by one to two days' march. In the center on the Bamberg–Leipzig road Bernadotte's I Corps, Murat's cavalry, Davout's III Corps, the imperial headquarters and the Guard, together 70,000 men. On the right on the Bayreuth–Plauen road the 50,000 men of the IV and VI Corps under Soult and Ney. On the left on the Bamberg–Coburg–Saalfeld road the somewhat weaker V and VII Corps under Lannes and Augereau. These 160,000 men formed what Napoleon called an enormous 'bataillon carré', which could deploy to either side and in which each division could enter the battle and fight until others came up to support it" (Cyril Falls/ ed., Große Landschlachten, Frankfurt a. M. 1964, p. 116).

Peter Paret presents the starting situation on the Prussian–Saxon side as follows: "The Prussians had decided to preempt the expected attack by quickly advancing against the Main, and hoped to defeat the French units in detail before they could cooperate. The unfortunate tendency to try to cover everything meant that, including 18,000 Saxons, only 120,000 men were available. The assembly of these inferior forces proceeded too slowly. When the army reached the northern edge of the Thuringian Forest at the end of September, the enemy was already concentrated in Bavaria, and the opportunity for surprise was gone. The next week passed with consultations in the war council. On 08 October the main army of 53,000 men, with the king present, was in the Erfurt–Weimar area, Rüchel's and Blücher's corps near Eisenach. On the Saale between Saalfeld and Jena stood Prince Hohenlohe's detachment with 43,000 men, and smaller units were scattered between Meiningen and Magdeburg. Brunswick and Hohenlohe remained west of Napoleon's lines of advance; only a detachment of six battalions under Tauentzien watched the French advance on the right bank of the Saale..." (ibid., pp. 117–118).

The alliance with Russia only becomes effective after the coming catastrophe at Jena and Auerstedt in the subsequent Polish campaign.

Already the preliminary engagements on 09.10 at Schleiz (Tauentzien) and on 10.10 at Saalfeld (Louis Ferdinand) ended unhappily; the latter was killed in action.

In the unfortunate double battle of Jena and Auerstedt on 14.10.1806, at Jena the main body of the French troops and Napoleon faced the corps of Hohenlohe (30,000 men) and Rüchel (13,000). Rüchel only engaged later in the ongoing battle, as his starting position on 14.10 was Weimar.

A description of the Battle of Jena is found in Count Yorck von Wartenburg (Napoleon als Feldherr, Berlin 1904, p. 264 ff.): "At 4 o'clock in the morning the emperor went to this corps, spoke to the soldiers, announced to them that the Prussian army was completely cut off, and reminded them of Mack’s similar situation a year earlier on the same day; at 6 o'clock the corps marched off, advancing in the dense fog of the cold October morning against the enemy position at Closwitz–Lützeroda. After a prolonged firefight the fog began to clear gradually around 8 o'clock, and the corps, now only perceiving its objectives, advanced against Hohenlohe's much weaker vanguard with its right flank extended, drove it out of Closwitz and by about 9 o'clock pushed it back against the Dornberg with heavy losses. Lannes then pushed on and utterly scattered the enemy vanguard; by about 10 o'clock he took up position on the line Closwitz–Lützeroda."

"Thus sufficient ground was gained on the heights and 'the emperor would have wished to postpone it for two more hours, to come to close quarters, in order in the position he had just taken after the morning attack to await the troops that were yet to arrive, and especially his cavalry' (Fifth Bulletin, Jena 15 October). He had, however, to learn the lesson we already emphasized at Austerlitz, namely that only the moment and the direction of opening an attack lie in the hands of the commander; a breaking off and resuming of the battle usually becomes impossible."

"Even while Lannes was still engaged in the final fighting, Soult had also climbed the plateau and was advancing before Zwätzen at 10 o'clock. There a hostile detachment now advanced against him from Rödigen. It had been sent by Hohenlohe the previous evening to Dornburg to occupy the Saale crossing there and had now reassembled near Rödigen upon the sound of the cannon. It nevertheless failed to reestablish connection with the army; Soult soon repelled the attack and forced it over Nerkwitz behind the brook there. It then withdrew toward Apolda."

At the same time Hohenlohe himself had also moved and brought his army into line on the Vierzehnheiligen–Isserstedt line. Meanwhile further French troops had arrived on the plateau. Ney with his vanguard forced his way between the two divisions of Lannes toward Vierzehnheiligen and occupied the village before the Prussians; the Guard marched up in reserve behind Lannes, Augereau deployed on the Flohberg between Cospeda and the Schnecke. Hohenlohe now advanced in extended line against the French forward line; this was formed by Ney at Vierzehnheiligen, to his left stood Suchet toward Isserstädt, to the right of Vierzehnheiligen Gazan. The emperor held the Guard at Dornberg, as he had no other reserve yet."

"In front of Hohenlohe's advancing line the French skirmishers fell back, and the lightly held Isserstädt was abandoned; however, the attack faltered before Vierzehnheiligen, artillery fire was directed at the village, and the Prussian infantry line, delivering volleys, fell into a stationary firefight. Thus it remained indecisive until around noon, the French defending and holding Vierzehnheiligen, the Prussians not launching a decisive assault. At that time Leval's and Legrand's divisions from Soult, Marchand from Ney, arrived on the left bank of the Saale, and the emperor, now in possession of fresh reserves, ordered the part of his army present thus far to advance in a general attack on the Prussian line. Soult turned against the left wing, the Guard attacked Vierzehnheiligen, and Augereau moved against Isserstädt and the Schnecke, where Hohenlohe's right wing, the Saxons, stood. The combined pressure of these masses could not be withstood by the Prussian line, already shaken by two hours of standing under French skirmisher fire; it was thrown back and its retreat was soon transformed into a complete rout by the pressing French. It was 2 o'clock."

"At this time Rüchel arrived on the battlefield, but his weak corps could no longer change the day's fate; advancing over Kapellendorf toward Groß-Romstädt he at first pressed back the forward French detachments, but was soon attacked by superior forces and after a short fight completely thrown back. The resistance offered on the right Prussian wing by the Saxons in their position on the Schnecke was now also broken; while Augereau attacked them frontally, the emperor sent Marchaud over Isserstädt into their flank, and so they were cut off and largely captured. By 4 o'clock everything was decided, the emperor was completely master of the battlefield on all points and drove his columns in the direction of Weimar, where the defeated enemy had fallen back, in pursuit. The cavalry reserve, which had only just arrived, and Ney's corps, now fully assembled, advanced to Weimar and once more threw back the enemy who had attempted to make a stand there. Lannes reached Umpferstädt, Soult Schwabdorf. The emperor returned to Jena in the evening, still convinced that he had defeated the main army."

At Auerstedt the departing Prussian main army under Brunswick (50,000 men) encountered a French army corps under Davout, whose 27,000 men succeeded in defeating the Prussians and forcing them to retreat.

Regarding this parallel sequence of battles August Fournier writes (Napoleon I., Vienna/Leipzig 1922, vol. II, p. 100): "While this was happening at Jena, where 53,000 Prussians faced 96,000 French (though in the decisive hours only 54,000), Brunswick at Auerstedt came to blows with Davout. And despite the almost twofold superiority the Prussians had here—50,000 against 27,000 French—they too lost the battle. Initially, after a rash cavalry attack by Blücher, they were in advantage and should have secured victory if the dense fog had not for hours prevented a correct appreciation of the enemy and vigorous action—the same fog which did not, however, prevent the French from successfully defending the contested village of Hassenhausen against three sluggishly arriving Prussian divisions in succession and gradually assembling their forces—and if General Kalckreuth had led his reserves (18,000 men) into the fight. He did not do so because he received no order, and an order could not be received because the commander-in-chief, mortally wounded, could no longer command and any unified leadership ceased. Thus it became impossible to clear the road via Naumburg, and the king, who now took over the supreme command, ordered the retreat to Weimar, where he hoped to find Rüchel's and Hohenlohe's forces intact. But instead of comrades he met the triumphant enemy—a moment of cruel disappointment and grave personal danger at once. Soon the headquarters with the remnants of the army were in a headlong flight before the advancing French...."

The further course of the campaign, at the end of which the Prussian–Saxon army had in practice ceased to exist, proceeded now blow after blow:

16.10. Capitulation of Erfurt (14,000 Prussian prisoners)

17.10. Skirmish at Halle (Prussian loss: 5,000 men)

25.10. Davout's march into Berlin

28.10. Capitulation of Prenzlau (140,000 Prussians surrender under Hohenlohe)

Stettin falls (5,000 more prisoners)

07.11. Capitulation at Ratkau/Lübeck (10,000 Prussians surrender under Blücher)

08.10. Capitulation of Magdeburg (22,000 Prussians surrender under Kleist)

While the king withdrew to Königsberg in East Prussia and the Prussian troops not involved in the autumn campaign continued fighting alongside the Russians, the theater of war in the West was practically over. The Prussian army had disintegrated all too quickly.

The failures of the 1806 campaign are misleading if one remembers the quality and achievements of the Prussian army before 1763. The defeat in this year, so rich in catastrophes for Prussia, is however only the culminating point of a longer process of gradual decline that began already under Frederick II. After 1763 the king’s main attention was directed to the shattered economy, and thus the focus of his efforts was the civilian sphere, exhausted by the Seven Years' War. Conditions within the army ossified. The reorganization of the replacement system after 1763 emphasized the group of foreigners; the central royal recruitment resulted in an inferior influx. The curtailing of the company economy provoked abuses and embezzlements. A lacking supply system and stagnating promotion led slowly but steadily to an aging of the leadership ranks (cf. Jany, Geschichte ..., vol. III, p. 433 and Francois, Napoleon I. Schicksalswende, p. 55). Tactics and practical training withered into drill-tactics and reached a peak of perfection in the manual, in parade charges and in evolutions according to artificial schemes. Mathematics made its way into tactics. Yet as long as the strict king watched the army with Argus eyes, it remained a crack force. First deficiencies had, however, already appeared in 1778/79.

After 1786 stagnation turned into decay. The leave system degenerated beyond the bounds of acceptability, arrogance replaced knowledge and skill among officers. Reforms failed or remained embryonic. The revision of the canton constitution of 1792 merely codified the existing grievances and thus wasted the chance for a genuine reorganization, although the shortcomings of the replacement system were known (for Prussian reform plans before 1806 see among others Goltz, Frhr. v., Von Roßbach bis Jena und Auerstedt, Berlin 1906, p. 227 ff. and Faull, Otto-Heinrich, Betrachtungen zur Entwicklung der Wehrpflicht in Brandenburg-Preußen von 1500 - 1814, Rostock 1939, pp. 33 ff.). Increasingly extensive exemptions watered down the principle of universal conscription. Drill periods were further reduced, and the conception of service declined.

In 1806 the old Prussian army comprised 7,166 officers, including 150 generals and 935 ensigns and cornets (according to other sources: a total of 7,096 officers, namely 142 generals, 885 staff and 6,069 subaltern officers). Not included were the 197 officers of the invalid formations. The total number of officers counted to the infantry, 1,735 to the cavalry, 289 to the field artillery, 80 to the fortress artillery, 74 to the engineer corps, 16 to the sapper corps and 8 to the pontooner corps. 230 officers were stationed in positions outside the front. The leadership was not only over-aged but also lacked experience in commanding large and mixed formations. Apart from inspections there were no higher commands; generals, as chiefs of their regiments, essentially performed the duties of a colonel. Only at maneuvers did the different branches meet, otherwise they were isolated in their garrisons. Exceptions were the large cities, such as the residence Berlin. The infantry had 125, the cavalry 203 garrison locations. The infantry was stationed in the larger and medium-sized towns, the cavalry in the smaller ones. The artillery was concentrated largely in Berlin and in the few fortresses.

The officer corps of that time was dominated by the nobility, but there were also bourgeois officers. Thus in 1806 there were a total of 661 bourgeois officers, namely 6 colonels, 3 lieutenant colonels, 29 majors, 139 captains or staff captains and 484 subaltern officers. The existing bourgeois officers concentrated in the hussars/towarsysz and the technical troops:

Infantry regiments (grenadiers/musketeers) 27

III musketeer battalions 84

Jägers and fusiliers 95

Hussars and Towarsysz 95

Cuirassiers/

Dragoons 2

Field artillery 205

Fortress artillery 68

Engineer, sapper, pontooner corps 42

other positions 43.

The national mix of the officer corps in 1806 was relatively colorful; in particular the Polish and French share was considerable. In the 1806 rolls there are 1,059 bearers of Polish (819) and French (240) names. This need not necessarily mean that these officers were actually born outside Prussian borders; they could well have been native Prussians. Especially after the accession of former Polish territories, more Poles entered the Prussian officer corps. Traditionally the share of Frenchmen among engineers was large (1806: 1/5). Among regimental chiefs and commanders in 1806 one finds 25% foreigners in the infantry, 20% in the cavalry/artillery and 33% among the fusiliers.

There were indeed efforts by a small circle of alert, critical officers to educate themselves scientifically and to apply military-theoretical insights in practice. Thus Scharnhorst founded a Military Society on 02.07.1801, which initially consisted of seven officers and two civilians. On 24.07.1802 this society adopted a constitution and by about 1805 already counted some 200 members. A sister society arose in Potsdam. The main subject of this forum was the changed mode of warfare (see Lehmann, Max, Scharnhorst, vol. I, pp. 309 ff.). But it was only a minority, and the actual leaders remained too wedded to the good old days.

The deficiencies of the Prussian army became apparent in 1806 and ultimately led to catastrophe: weaknesses in organization, a ponderous administrative structure, leadership errors, an overestimation of one’s own and an underestimation of the enemy’s forces, poor logistics, a vacillating stance in foreign policy and in military questions, an inflexible tactic, too slow decision-making processes and warfare too strongly shaped by 18th-century concepts (keyword: limited war).

They actually wanted to remain at a posture of massive threat. This can already be seen from the deployment (and dispersion) of military forces in the autumn campaign of 1806. Of the 174½ battalions, 255 squadrons and 56 batteries existing at that time, only 94½ battalions, 145 squadrons and 26 batteries entered the battlefields of Jena and Auerstedt. The missing formations were either detached or held back. Thus only 54% of the infantry, 57% of the cavalry and 46% of the artillery were affected by the military catastrophe of 14.10.1806.

This is also why the measures lacked dynamism and the decisive personalities lacked decisiveness.

The king’s character structure here—like his dependence on advisors—certainly exerted a fateful influence.

After the defeat at Jena and Auerstedt and an initially orderly retreat, a frightening disintegration soon became apparent. Under the vigorous pursuit by the French troops—above all the massed cavalry under Murat and the army corps under Bernadotte, which had been idle at Auerstedt—the remnants of any order and combat readiness collapsed. Shameful capitulations followed, with some exceptions worthy of praise, such as the defense of Kolberg under Gneisenau and Nettelbeck.

While Blücher's capitulations at Ratkau/Lübeck can still be called honorable, the circumstances of the capitulations at Erfurt, Hameln, Prenzlau, Magdeburg, Stettin, Küstrin etc. are more than doubtful to plainly bad. The neglect of the fortresses and in particular their garrisoning with veritable old men or incapable commanders proved a serious mistake. While the infantry in the confrontation with the French proved to be immobile but essentially steadfast and brave, the cavalry failed completely. It was, however, distributed among various brigades and in its fragmentation was not capable of a concentrated deployment. "The Prussian cavalry at the Battle of Jena was in the proper sense commanded by nobody and the individual brigades, left to chance and themselves, could do little, so that for the sum of their entire effectiveness as much as nothing comes out" (Reports on the deeds and fates of the cavalry, vol. I, cited in Schöning, K. W. v., Geschichte des 3. Kgl. Pr. Dragoner-Regimentes, p. 339). It is, however, criticized that by individual charges and actions it could have shielded the infantry from the harmful effect of the fire of the French tirailleurs.

The Prussian light infantry regiment proved itself under York in the engagement at Altenzaun on 26.10.1806. Scharnhorst's contributions at Auerstedt are criticized in the literature, yet he later skillfully managed to withdraw the heavy artillery from the enemy.

The Prussian army was made up of both domestic and foreign personnel. Numerous critical contemporary judgments exist about the result of this combination. For example, Carl Friedrich von Blumen-Kramer in the Fusilier Battalion von Rühle writes in his memoirs: "Our army consisted largely of foreigners, who were indeed our better soldiers, but only migratory birds on whom one could not rely, especially in misfortune. The local men, on the other hand, always remained peasants who could do some drilling but knew nothing of field service" (ibid., Von Jena bis Neiße. Military and cultural-historical pictures from the years 1806–19, Leipzig 1904, p. 10). It is noteworthy that in 1806 the foreign share was only 36% (foreigners/locals = 4:7) and that many foreigners were among the conscripted; thus their good performances are not entirely reflected by their poor reputation.

As contemporary memoirs report, there were many remarkable individual deeds. At Eichroth, 50 hussars under Hellwig liberated some 4,000 Prussian prisoners from French custody (originating from the capitulation of Erfurt). The deeds of the Freikorps of Schill and Count von Götzen (in Silesia) as well as the efforts of many officers and men to reach the remainder of the Prussian army in East Prussia must not be overlooked in an overall assessment.

In the Polish campaign the Prussians under L'Estoq took an active part in the fighting. 5,000 men under Scharnhorst prevented a French victory at Preußisch-Eylau (07 to 09 February 1807). That a reorganization of the Prussian army could take place so rapidly from 1808 onwards and that it could already contribute decisively to the victory over Napoleon from 1813 shows that the good substance of the old Prussian army was not destroyed in 1806/07. The leading men of the reorganization (Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Boyen, Grolmann, etc.) had already been active in leading positions before 1806. The victories of the Wars of Liberation were in part won under the command of officers who had already served in 1806. Of the Prussian officers employed at the outbreak of the autumn campaign, 7 generals, 31 staff and 152 subaltern officers fell. Up to the beginning of the Wars of Liberation—mainly because of the required reduction of the armed forces—4,933 officers left service. Only 208 officers (17 generals, 50 staff and 141 subaltern officers) had to leave their service due to misconduct. In total, 3,898 officers already active in 1806 later took part in the Wars of Liberation that were successful for Prussia, of whom 317 fell in the period from 1809 to 1815. Thus the Prussian officer corps (and the entire Prussian army) ultimately rehabilitated itself. The prerequisite for this was, however, a comprehensive social and military reform.