Foreigners in the Old Prussian Army

The replacement system of the Old Prussian Army, which combined the canton system and recruitment¹, resulted consequently in a composition of natives and foreigners; the rank-and-file therefore consisted of two completely different components.

While the group of natives ultimately formed the backbone of the Old Prussian Army and the human reserves in the cantons made the regiments practically 'immortal', the foreigners shaped the appearance of the units in the garrisons outside the annual drill period². They constituted the standing service element, which handled the military everyday life during the absence of those on leave from the countryside and towns³ in the form of extensive guard duty and a limited drill service for the greater part of the year.

Recruitment was necessary given the army's size relative to its small population base; in particular the extensive army enlargement under Frederick William I — the Prussian army was increased from a strength of 38,500 men in 1712 to a force of 81,000 men (including artillery and garrison infantry) in 1739 — could not be carried out solely on a national basis. Although Frederick William I initially pursued the ideal of an army composed exclusively of natives, he had to acknowledge very early on that this goal could not be realized given Prussia's sparse population. For this reason the 1714 regulation already referred to the possibility of supplementing forces with foreign recruits; further details were then set out in the ‘Disposition and Orders, according to which the Royal Prussian Infantry Regiments from the date of 13 Sept. 1732 shall conduct themselves regarding recruitment’. An extensive leave system served to finance the costly recruitment of foreigners (before the introduction of central royal recruitment), while domestic economic life was kept intact by the extensive leave of natives.

"In order to spare the human stock in the country, officers were sent to all imperial cities to recruit foreigners as recruits ..."⁴. Complementing this we learn from Wachholz⁵: "The foreigners were for the most part recruited in the so-called Empire, by which name one designated the lands of the minor imperial princes and the imperial cities of southern Germany, either at the king's expense or on behalf of the regiment ...". Recruitment took place in Anhalt-Bernburg, Anhalt-Köthen, Baden, Bremen, Verden, Hamburg, in Hanover (forbidden in 1721), Hesse-Kassel, Holstein, Electoral Mainz, Mecklenburg, Münster, Palatinate-Zweibrücken, Electoral Saxony (forbidden in 1720), Silesia (after Prussian seizure and before the introduction of the canton system), Württemberg, Würzburg and Zerbst, but Prussian recruiting commands also operated in the imperial hereditary lands, especially in Bohemia and Hungary (all recruiters were recalled in 1736), in Brabant, Alsace, Italy, Corsica, Livonia, Lorraine, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia (especially in the Ukraine), Sweden, Switzerland (Schaffhausen) and Thuringia.

As Elector of Brandenburg the Prussian king was permitted to recruit in the imperial cities of Cologne, Nuremberg and Frankfurt am Main⁶. These populous cities represented a suitable 'district' for the recruiting commands, for which only 'sensible and respectable officers are to be taken' and 'not young officers who spend money unnecessarily'⁷.

The recruiting officers were to seek '8-, 9- and 10-inch fellows'. The local competition came from recruiters of other countries and princes, but also from other Prussian regiments⁸. Because of the blatant pressure to meet standards regarding the quality of recruits (height!), recruiting excesses repeatedly occurred, which greatly harmed the reputation of the Old Prussian state and sometimes led to serious foreign-policy difficulties (e.g. 1729 with Hanover, 1733 with the Netherlands and 1754/55 with Ulm)⁹.

According to Schmoller 'at times 800 - 1000 Prussian recruiting officers were abroad', the aforementioned author estimating the cost of recruitment for the period 1713–35 alone at 'in total 12 million thalers'¹⁰.

After 1763 the replacement system was revised by Frederick the Great: 'Previously captains recruited their companies themselves from the funds that were paid to them semi-annually. This method had led to some abuses; officers recruited with force to save money; everybody cried out, no prince wanted to tolerate such violence in his territory. The system was therefore changed so that General Wartenberg alone collected the semi-annual instalments, of which the captains, in addition to their pay, received 30 thalers monthly; the surplus was used for recruitments, which annually produced 7 to 8,000 soldiers raised abroad. These formed, together with the women and children they brought with them, a military colony of about 10,000 persons' (Frederick the Great)¹¹.

Royal recruitment was introduced after the Peace of Hubertusburg (15.02.1763) as part of the reorganization of replacement relations, and most regiments were deprived of the autonomous recruitment of foreigners. This, however, involved significant cuts in the enrichment opportunities afforded by the company economy, which hit company owners hard and led to various imbalances. Berenhorst estimates that the average annual income of company owners in the worst case fell from 1,600–1,800 to 600–700 thalers¹², which took much of the attractiveness from the company economy¹³. Some regiments, however, were privileged through immediate traffic, certain leave funds, or even by retaining their own recruitment. The reform of foreign recruitment had, on the one hand, a rationalizing effect, but on the other hand contemporary testimony indicates that the quality of foreign recruits declined, while some company commanders tried to compensate for the lost profit opportunities in other, dishonest ways. This impaired the army overall in its moral substance.

By the 'Royal Prussian Recruiting Manifesto' of 01.02.1787 recruitment was newly regulated. Royal recruitment was decentralized, i.e. regiments again recruited themselves. For this they received a set flat rate of recruiting funds, but the pay of those on leave, except during the drill period, remained the responsibility of the royal treasury. During the first years of the reign of Frederick William II royal recruitment was reintroduced.

The inspection of recruitments in the Empire was located in Frankfurt a. M. (later in Erfurt); the General Inspector was initially Lieutenant General Friedrich Wilhelm von Lengefeld, from 1792 Major General (later Lieutenant General) Johann Ludwig von Seibert. Due to political change foreign recruitment became increasingly difficult in the late 18th century, as through territorial swaps and secularization more and more suitable recruiting areas (e.g. Ansbach-Bayreuth, many imperial cities) were lost. Furthermore, through the Polish partitions of 1793/95 Prussia acquired vast territories which then became domestic and were no longer available for foreign recruitment.

The foreign recruitment described above was the core of recruitment (as counterpart to conscription under the canton constitution). Other variants of replacement procurement included provision by princes, the incorporation of prisoners of war, and the acceptance of deserters into recruitment. In particular the forced integration of prisoners of war and the acceptance of deserters, however, produced results of questionable value. Above all the latter form of recruitment was a double-edged affair. As a rule states concluded cartels among themselves against the acceptance of deserters from foreign armies¹⁴, as well as agreements on their mutual extradition.

The admission lists, however, show that the bulk of foreign recruits consisted of experienced soldiers: for example, of the 111 and 119 members of the two grenadier companies of the garrison regiment von Rettberg, 65 and 97 respectively had already served under another flag¹⁵. Similar figures are known from other units. An instructive incident from 1756 is revealing: In September 52 soldiers of the grenadier battalion Gemmingen — composed of the grenadier companies of the Wesel regiments — deserted. As justification it was pointed out that '... the Neuwied as well as the Jungken grenadier companies are consistently composed of foreigners, the vast majority of whom have served three to four masters, have deserted from one to another and partly were recruited as deserters, partly came by transfer from those regiments which sought thereby to cleanse themselves, to the said grenadier companies'.

Deserters were attracted above all by the bounty and the stable living conditions¹⁶ in the Old Prussian Army (pay and provisions). Under pressure to complete their company or regiment and given the high requirements regarding height, recruiting officers paid little attention to the actual origin of the foreign recruit pursued. If the recruit had been a former Prussian soldier, however, a provision of the 1743 regulation had to be observed: 'When a deserter has himself enlisted with a regiment without confessing his desertion and without a pardon letter; then such a deserter, when he comes into His Majesty the King's lands and is recognized by the regiment from which he deserted, shall be extradited again upon reimbursement of the costs'¹⁷.

Since with the cavalry, which was usually quartered in the countryside, a desertion from colours was much easier to accomplish than with the infantry housed in towns, Frederick the Great fundamentally did not want deserters in this arm of service: 'not only is one at risk with such people that once they are used to running away they may again make off with horse and all, but I moreover want the cavalry to endeavor to recruit capable farmhands and the like' (Royal Order of 30.05.1748 to Reiner Julius von Schwerin, regiment chief of D II.). In practice, however, many deserters also served in the cavalry, especially among the hussars.

The numerical relation between natives and foreigners was not left to chance but was officially standardized early on. In 1740 Frederick the Great inherited an army that counted only one third foreigners; natives thus predominated by far. For economic reasons and to preserve the able-bodied men in the cantons as a reservoir for emergencies, the king aimed to shift the quotas. The 1743 regulation therefore stipulated: 'The chiefs of the regiments shall see to it that each company has two thirds foreigners and only one third local children...'¹⁸. This directive, however, remained only a theoretical approach, for regiments were still dominated by native soldiers. After the demobilization of 1763 there were demonstrably 103,021 local children, 11,033 Saxons and only 36,626 foreigners serving in the Old Prussian Army¹⁹. After 1763 a large number of cantonists were discharged and replaced by foreigners, whose share then steadily increased.

On 24.10.1764 it was ordered 'that each fusilier or musketeer company shall consist of 71, each grenadier company of 79 local children, not counting the drummers and carpenters ...'²⁰. An infantry regiment was henceforth to have, excluding the two grenadier companies, 710 natives and 510 foreigners; taking the grenadier companies into account, there were 868 natives versus 626 foreigners²¹. A nationality list in the preserved regimental book of the Infantry Regiment von Saldern (No. 5, Magdeburg) from the year 1771 corresponds to this norm²². In the cuirassier/dragoon regiments the ratio of natives to foreigners was to be 420 to 300 and in the hussar regiments 600 to 420. In 1765, according to Jany, there were 71,005 natives to 56,639 foreigners. Through the augmentations of the later years ever more foreigners were enrolled into the regiments, so that ultimately the almost parity ratio of 1776 was reached. At that time 78,767 natives and 78,280 foreigners served in the army²³. This composition remained until the death of Frederick the Great in 1786.

From 1787 a infantry company counted 76 foreigners and 93 natives (= cantonists), a fusilier company 75 foreigners to 90 natives, for cuirassiers and dragoons 66 to 96 and for hussars 75 to 75. Now a specific numerical ratio was also prescribed for non-commissioned officers and musicians. According to Jany, in 1788 (excluding officers) 105,924 natives and 81,236 foreigners served in the army²⁴.

As recruitment gradually stagnated and the required number of foreigners could no longer be raised, the authorized strengths were reduced in 1799/1800.

According to the order of 06.12.1800 a grenadier company now counted 40 foreigners and 153–154 natives (95 on duty and 98–99 on leave without free-watchers) and a musketeer company 76 foreigners and 82 natives (93 on duty and 65–66 on leave without free-watchers). In 1802 only 80,496 foreigners served in the army, whereas 139,324 natives served (1804).

So-called nationality lists in the regimental books detailed the national origin of the foreigners and at the same time served as proof of compliance with the prescribed numbers in the respective unit. In this regard the regiments were strictly monitored; on 8.07.1743, for example, the commander of K 5 (Adam Joachim Count von Podewils) was admonished: '... to recruit more good and cavalry-worthy foreigners', since too many local children served in the regiment²⁵. In May 1769 the king reprimanded the insufficient number of foreigners in No. 14 (Hartenstein et al. / East Prussia). In 1780 Frederick the Great decreed:

'... because of the still lacking foreigners in the regiments of Luck and of Ingersleben I hereby answer you that nothing more shall be taken from the cantons for that reason and the fixed number of natives must not be exceeded, but what is missing in foreigners must be replaced again by foreigners'²⁶.

The examples given in the annex show that not only infantry but also cavalry included soldiers from all nations: 'As with the infantry, the cavalry counted a large number of foreigners among its ranks, most of whom had deserted from the Austrian cavalry regiments stationed on the frontier. Among the brown hussars I even saw several gypsies who distinguished themselves advantageously by their martial appearance'²⁷.

Foreigners were undesirable in the artillery before 1740:

'The artillery battalion shall not recruit outside the country at all, but the captains shall seek to take only local children; for although among the local children almost as many rogues are to be found as among the foreigners, it is nevertheless the custom everywhere that for the artillery only local children should be taken' (Frederick William I to Major General von Linger)²⁸. Under Frederick the Great foreigners also served in the artillery; thus the king recommended in 1743 to von Linger to recruit the missing personnel abroad 'among good men'. After the Peace of Hubertusburg (1763) the number of natives and foreigners was precisely determined. According to this the field artillery was to have 3,600 natives and 1,350 foreigners.

The bulk of the foreigners came from the Empire; speakers of other languages as replacements only became a common phenomenon in the wake of the high losses during the Seven Years' War and especially after 1763. The evaluation of the various nationalities, however, was quite different. Thus the recruitment of Frenchmen was prohibited or only exceptionally tolerated depending on the quality of the recruit²⁹. On 25.09.1741 Frederick the Great ordered the acceleration of recruitment of the regiments on the Lower Rhine, 'but I no longer want Frenchmen to be enlisted. You must only seek to get good Germans'³⁰. In a letter to the chief of Regiment No. 44 the king forbade the recruitment of Frenchmen, but limited this provision exclusively to 'real Frenchmen coming from France' and excluded 'Swiss, Mompelgarde and other such French people'³¹. However, Frenchmen were considered particularly suitable for service in free battalions and efforts were made to concentrate them there³². By order of 2.07.1798 the recruitment of Frenchmen was again prohibited. This ban, however, again referred only to national Frenchmen³³.

One gladly accepted 'good Poles'³⁴, for example in No. 2 in 1795 there were a total of 145, in No. 8: 65 (1783), in No. 35: 25 (1756), in D I.: 192 and 204 (1776 and 1785 respectively), in D IX.: 154 (1753). Especially among the hussars many Poles served; the hussar regiment (H 8) counted, for example, a total of 282 Poles in 1782. Over time, particularly after the acquisition of West Prussia (1772), the Polish element in the Old Prussian Army grew ever stronger.

Mecklenburgers traditionally formed a strong contingent among the foreigners; they were considered as good as reliable and were therefore even granted leave to return home outside the drill period³⁵. In particular No. 34, K. 2 and D V recruited in Mecklenburg. In the latter unit in 1764 of 659 foreigners (including non-commissioned officers and drummers) 135 came from Mecklenburg.

While under Frederick William I recruitment in Saxon territory was prohibited in 1720³⁶, Saxony, especially in the Seven Years' War, provided a large share of the foreign recruits. In addition to the incorporation of the entire Saxon army into the Old Prussian army in 1756, Saxony in the same year still had to provide 9,284 additional recruits³⁷. In 1763 11,033 Saxons served in the army.

That religion still played a significant role at that time is also evident from the fact that Protestant Alsatians and Hungarians were considered good and reliable and that, among the prisoners of war, soldiers of the Evangelical confession in particular were selected (»because the Catholics cannot be trusted«)³⁸. When in 1760 captured hussars were willing to enter Prussian service, the king ordered that only Evangelicals be accepted. Above all, the hussar arm developed by Frederick the Great benefited from the strong influx of (Protestant) Hungarians, who as a rule had deserted from the Austrian army.

That religion still played a significant role at that time is also evident from the fact that Protestant Alsatians and Hungarians were considered good and reliable and that, among the prisoners of war, soldiers of the Evangelical confession in particular were selected (»because the Catholics cannot be trusted«)³⁸. When in 1760 captured hussars were willing to enter Prussian service, the king ordered that only Evangelicals be accepted. Above all, the hussar arm developed by Frederick the Great benefited from the strong influx of (Protestant) Hungarians, who as a rule had deserted from the Austrian army.

Lossow describes the composition of the foreign contingent as follows: »As is well known, the army consisted half of locals, half of foreigners. The foreigner was recruited, and their number made up half of the force, among whom, however, many were so-called «skisierte» foreigners. The latter were counted as soldiers' sons, and generally anyone who was not born in the canton of the regiment. This greatly reduced the number of those actually born abroad, since locals from a Prussian province were also regarded as foreigners if the regiment in which they served did not have its canton in that province«³⁹.

From the artilleryman Mente we learn furthermore interesting internal details: »The recruited foreigners had, namely, their various classes, namely: from the Reich, i.e. from the small and smaller states of the German Reich, furthermore deserters from almost all European armies, and finally the sons of the soldiers of the unit, who, although ex officio liable for military service, were nevertheless provided with a bounty, albeit of a smaller amount than in the two other categories. These soldiers' sons were, however, often presented as foreigners and listed as such, consequently unfit, in the company roll. Apart from the recruited foreigners there were at that time also the so-called 'baptized' foreigners, with whom the following was the case. The inhabitants of the royal residence towns, the free mining towns, such as Silberberg, Reichenstein and Tarnowitz, and furthermore other towns which possessed a special privilege, were, like the sons of all royal officials, not liable for military service. If young men from these towns and categories nevertheless voluntarily entered military service, they were in most cases stamped as foreigners. These so-called 'baptized' foreigners were then, since a bounty was charged for them, at their entry into service, but especially before the special review, imprinted with some town from the German Reich as their birthplace in such a manner that they were able to answer the inspector's relevant questions appropriately, so that it was one of the rarities that a high superior discovered such a tacitly permitted but of course always improper act. Woe to the baptized foreigner if, through a poorly passed examination, he became a traitor. He thenceforth no longer slept on roses  «⁴⁰.

In this context the so-called Rotgeschriebenen should also be mentioned. According to Dette these were natives who had enlisted voluntarily even though they were not liable for service41. The Rotgeschriebenen are therefore not identical with the "baptized" foreigners mentioned by Mente, since that involved an embezzlement and thus fraud. The former, however, is official practice. According to the cabinet order of 6.12.1800 the Rotgeschriebenen included:

a) natives who had been declared insecure by proper certificates (uncertain cantonists!),

b) natives who could not earn a living in the countryside and who, at their own request, wanted to remain permanently with the regiment as servants, and

c) the soldiers' sons.

This group was called Rotgeschriebene because they were entered in the muster rolls of the regimental books like all other foreigners with red ink; the natives were listed in black and the recruits sometimes in green.

In the kaleidoscope of foreigners the soldiers' sons (of the foreign element) were a relatively stable component. In the regimental books they are as a rule recorded separately. Thus, in a preserved regimental book of the Infantry Regiment von Hacke from the year 1783 (No. 8, Stettin) a list is devoted to the soldiers' sons ("under arms"). There are 191. For the Dragoon Regiment von Katte (DIV, Landsberg a. W., Waldenberg, Bärwalde) the number of soldiers' sons for some years is recorded: 1755: 13, 1765: 14, 1785: 4, 1796: 92, 1804: 146⁴². In the Dragoon Regiment v. Irving (D III, Friedeberg i. Nm., Driesen, Arnswalde, Berlinchen) in 1805 a total of 159 soldiers' sons stood in rank and file and in the same year in the Infantry Regiment v. Winning (No. 23, Berlin) there were 166. The soldiers' sons were already clothed as children from company funds; their upkeep was secured by so-called "children's monies." In the regimental school they enjoyed a—albeit meagre—education. They were bound to their father's regiment. On entering military service they also received a—albeit smaller—bounty, but no capitulation. They often began their military careers as drummers, and then, as soon as they were strong enough, served as musketeers or fusiliers. Firmly rooted in the regimental unit and familiar with the military environment from childhood, they often rose to the rank of non-commissioned officer. At least two of them even became generals: Johann Benedikt Jacob von Groeling and Friedrich Wilhelm von Rohdich. While Groeling's father was a cavalryman with K 6, Rohdich was the son of a non-commissioned officer in the King's Regiment (No. 6, Potsdam).

In view of the fact that among the foreigners there was also a more or less large number of unwilling, deceived or downright criminal people, and that the institution of recruitment (especially before 1740) was associated with many excesses, foreigners and recruitment are mostly judged negatively⁴³.

»The greater part of the foreigners are French, Austrian, Dutch, Saxon deserters; a ragtag (Aufraff) from all European nations« (Berenhorst)⁴⁴. Prittwitz reports from the time of the Seven Years' War: »These recruits mostly consisted of deserters and of people persuaded into service, even perhaps forced men from various nations. They were in part extremely unreliable, so that as a precaution one could not put a musket into their hands, but had to let them follow on wagons«⁴⁵. According to another infantry officer (Suckow)⁴⁶ the »... present crew« consisted of »recruited foreigners« who were »...mixed together from all countries, mostly adventurers, enfants perdus, roving knights without a fatherland«. And Loebell adds: »Since the regiments in those times had many recruited foreigners (non-Prussians), there were numerous dissolute people among them who were difficult to rein in. It required great severity and perpetual supervision to keep order among them«⁴⁷. Klöden, son of an artillery non-commissioned officer, also paints a negative picture: »Only a third (author's note: correctly half) of the army consisted of native and levied cantonists and country children. The other two parts were mercenaries, who often only allowed themselves to be recruited to escape the penitentiary, and at the first opportunity ran away again; another part was composed of people who had proved to be notorious good-for-nothings, with whom nothing could be done, and whom one could not move to order by any corrective means, except by the harshest punishments ... «⁴⁸.

A generalization of this and other negative judgments must, however, be avoided, since it would not do justice to the composition of the foreigners. The foreigners did not have a homogeneous structure. It is often overlooked that the foreign contingent also largely consisted of reliable elements, e.g. the soldiers' sons. The unreliable foreigners, however, attracted attention through various excesses and their public punishments and above all shaped the image of the infantry in the garrisons. These "loiterers and loafers of Europe" (Suckow)⁴⁹ furthermore provoked a pronounced guard system to prevent desertions and a draconian penal system to discipline these "migratory birds"⁵⁰. The security measures also burdened the population of the garrisons and the surrounding villages. In particular the punishment of running the gauntlet outraged both contemporaries and posterity alike, who were imbued with a new image of man. Moreover, it should be noted that conditions varied from regiment to regiment. Above all, regiments without a canton had a particularly high proportion of foreigners and therefore inevitably had many unreliable soldiers in their ranks (cf. the figures of No. 39 in the appendix). Furthermore, the situation in the different branches of service must be assessed in a differentiated manner. It is striking, for example, that most negative reports describe the internal state of infantry regiments. In the cavalry, by contrast, volunteers predominated, which naturally had a positive effect on the climate in the units. The situation in the garrison units was, however—even in the officer corps—particularly poor, desertion losses there being particularly high⁵¹. This does not apply to the garrison grenadiers⁵².

Nachwelt gleichermaßen. Im übrigen ist zu beachten, daß die Verhältnisse von Regiment zu Regiment unterschiedlich waren. Vor allem Regimenter ohne Kanton wiesen einen besonders hohen Ausländeranteil auf und hatten damit zwangsläufig viele unzuverlässige Soldaten in ihren Reihen (vgl. hierzu die Zahlen von No. 39 in der Anlage). Ferner ist die Situation bei den verschiedenen Waffengattungen diffe­ renziert zu bewerten. Auffällig ist z.B., daß die meisten negativen Berichte den inneren Zustand von Infanterie­ Regimentern beschreiben. Bei der Kavallerie dienten hingegen überwiegend Freiwillige, was sich natürlich positiv auf das Klima in den Einheiten auswirkte. Die Situation in den Garnisoneinheiten war dagegen - selbst im Offizier­korps - besonders schlecht, die Abgänge durch Fahnen­flucht hier besonders hoch⁵¹. Dies gilt nicht für die Garnison-Grenadiere⁵².

For Blumen, despite their potential unreliability, the foreigners were the "better" soldiers: "the natives always remained peasants who could drill a little, but knew nothing of service in the field"⁵³. Suckow believes that the "foreigners, who were mostly advanced in years ... were more suited to endure the hardships (of a campaign)". The former Prussian General v. Fink takes a different view. From his own experience he considers the natives to be more capable and explains this observation by their life as peasants. To have the foreigners accustom themselves to hardships in time, he advises setting them to work⁵⁴. In reality, however, many foreigners already worked as Freiwächter and thus constituted an important gain for the economy—especially when they brought particular skills⁵⁵. In order to bind the foreigners to the Prussian state and thus make them, from the military's point of view, more reliable, their marriage was deliberately promoted⁵⁶. After discharge from military service the foreign soldiers were, for demographic-policy reasons, to remain in the country with their families if possible. The number of foreign soldiers domiciled in Prussia in the 18th century reached about 300 - 400000 people57. Counterproductive, however, was the prohibition that foreign soldiers were not allowed to acquire property⁵⁸.

Frederick the Great knew of the unreliability of many foreigners. For him they consisted "of the yeast of the people", only "work-shy rabble and frivolous people" would, in his view, allow themselves to be recruited. He preferred the natives "to all the bad stuff from Saxony and Mecklenburg" and reproached the replacement of good native children by "deserters and other run-away rabble." In his writings he therefore emphasizes the stabilizing effect of the cantonists in the regiments: "Mixed with the foreigners these give an excellent composition" (Political Testament of 1768). Nevertheless, for economic-policy reasons the king from the beginning of his reign strove to increase the proportion of foreigners in the army and to spare the native population. He pursued this approach even more consistently after 1763, since the reconstruction of the state, which had been worn down by the Seven Years' War, was now the focus of his efforts.

Ultimately the combination of mercenary and militia resulted in an ambivalent outcome, since the army subsequently consisted of two components entirely different in origin, mentality and purpose59. At the same time, two opposing constitutional principles of military organization stood opposite each other in these two groups: on the one hand the foreigners, who served under time-limited capitulations against payment of a bounty and represented a relic from the era of mercenary armies; on the other hand the natives, who served in the formation of peasant succession under a general conscription with exemptions and who, as an institution, represented a decisive step toward a national people's army. After the collapse of the old Prussian army in 1806/07, the canton system, as opposed to recruitment, proved to be the only viable system for the future.