Napoleon in Russia

According to Nigel Nicolson (Napoleon in Russia, Cologne 1987), the 1812 campaign against Russia was avoidable, i.e., it was willed by Napoleon from the outset. Napoleon did not accept the warning remarks of his confidant Armand Augustin Louis (5th Marquis de) Caulaincourt (09.12.1773 in Caulaincourt in the département Aisne, † 19.02.1827 in Paris), nor did he accept the peace assurances of the Russian Tsar Alexander I (1777–1825). This confrontation was ultimately a consequence of the Emperor’s prior conquests, in particular the “duel between France and England” (Dmitri Merezhkovsky, Napoleon. His Life. Napoleon as a Man, Berlin 1928, p. 185).

The main point of contention was above all the so‑called Continental Blockade. On this, Martin Göhring (Napoleon. From the Old to the New Europe, Göttingen 1959, p. 112 ff.) writes:

"It became increasingly apparent how much his system rested on force and was more and more centered on his person. This is clearly evident in the handling of the Continental system. He had founded it in the name of the continent; and what opportunities for the unification of the European economy did it offer! How many believed it would come to that! He, however, turned it into a system of pure arbitrariness. Averse to any ideology, he declared: 'I am a man of practice, I start from the facts and draw the broadest conclusions from them.' The most immediate was: to place alongside the system of political dependencies one of economic dependencies, or to supplement the former by the latter, in other words to make the economy the servant of politics. Part of this may be explained by what the historian Rose hints at in his judgment: He was too much a Caesar to be a good merchant; but perhaps more by this: a character too autocratic to open himself to the spirit of true cooperation. Playing Europe off against England while at the same time trying to make France the dominant economic power were two things that excluded each other; to try to establish vassal-like relationships in the economy had to lead to the opposite of the political end that was being pursued. Certainly, the economy of individual countries initially received strong impulses; alongside existing industries new branches developed. But the bloom lasted only briefly. Perhaps unconsciously, Napoleon destroyed their foundations. Because he soon saw them as competition to France, he sought to eliminate them by suitable trade treaties, decrees of all kinds and protective tariffs. Thus he did not remove customs barriers but erected new ones. How much he remained attached to mercantilist thinking is shown by a sentence from the year 1810: His intention is to promote exports from France by all means and to increase the inflow of cash...".

On the European continent itself only Russia remained as a potential opponent and rival, which, like France, displayed expansionist tendencies and at best only half‑heartedly observed the Continental Blockade directed against the Kingdom of Great Britain. It was precisely this that Napoleon accused the Tsar of, yet this argument was not very convincing given the remaining French trade relations (grain!) with Britain. For Russia as an agrarian country the restricted and hampered economic relations with Britain meant a heavy loss, but equally for the island kingdom, since it needed timber for its fleet. Alexander was also annoyed by the Grand Duchy of Warsaw founded in 1807 and by the French annexation of the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg in 1811.

War was a foregone conclusion. Already at the beginning of 1811 Napoleon began the preparatory armaments and in the middle of that year he set June of the following year as the start of the campaign against Russia.

This campaign was only half‑heartedly supported by Prussia and Austria, although Metternich had favored an alliance and a restrained support for Napoleon. The princes of the Confederation of the Rhine had no real choice. Thus Napoleon wrote in April 1812 to the King of Württemberg: "... if they have given me the smallest reason to doubt their inclination to a joint defence, they have, I confess, entirely lost it. For I prefer enemies to uncertain friends" (quoted after Bouhler, Napoleon, Munich 1942, p. 210/211).

Military success was to be ensured by forming a gigantic force (Grande Armée). "Napoleon put over 700,000 men against Russia. 611,000 of them crossed the border during the campaign. These troops were in a sense a mirror of the universal empire. Among them were counted 300,000 Frenchmen, including those from annexed territories, 180,000 Germans, among them the 30,000 Austrians of Schwarzenberg and the 20,000 Prussians of Yorck, 9,000 Swiss, 90,000 Poles and Lithuanians, 32,000 Italians, Illyrians, Spaniards and Portuguese. These contingents were extremely unequal in value and reliability. Never had the Grand Army reached such total strength, and never had it been so motley and so loosely connected; the French of old France made up hardly a third of it" (Georges Lefebvre, Napoleon, Stuttgart 1989).

According to York von Wartenberg (Napoleon as Commander, Berlin 1901, Vol. II, p. 98 ff.) the Grande Armée was organized as follows:

From 24 June 1812 began the multi‑day crossing of the Grande Armée over the Neman. Philippe Paul, Count de Ségur, describes this in his work Napoleon and the Grand Army in Russia (licensed edition Birksfelden‑Basel n.d., p. 26 ff.) as follows:

"This first signal of war greatly stirred the Emperor; whether prudence or presentiment was the cause is another question. Three hundred marksmen immediately crossed the river to protect the laying of bridges.

Then all the French columns emerged from the valleys and woods and advanced under the protection of dense darkness in the greatest silence; one would have had to touch them to recognise them. No fires were allowed, no sparks struck; they rested with arms in hand, as if in the presence of the enemy. The green rye, wet with heavy dew, served the men as bedding and the horses as fodder.

The night, its coolness that disturbed sleep, its darkness which lengthened the hours, increased needs and impeded the use of the eyes—whether one looked about to distract oneself or sought encouragement in the looks of others—the dangers of the coming day, all combined to make the situation serious and significant; yet the expectation of a great day upheld the spirits. Napoleon’s proclamation had just been read aloud: in the silence we repeated the memorable passages, and the genius of conquest inflamed our imagination.

The Russian border lay before us. Already our eyes pierced the dawn to take possession of the land promised to our fame. It seemed to us that we heard the cry of joy of the Lithuanians at the approach of their liberators, as if they stood pleading on the riverbanks awaiting us with longing. Here we lacked everything, there we believed we would find everything: the satisfaction of our needs, a kindly welcome, grateful treatment. What, we thought, was one bad night if the day must soon come with its heat and all its illusions! The day came, but showed us only a dry sandy waste bounded by sombre forests.

Now we looked timidly back upon our army, whose vast appearance soon raised our pride and hope again. Three hundred paces from the river on the highest point of the area stood the Emperor’s tent. All the surrounding hills, their slopes and the valleys between were covered with men and horses. As soon as the sun rose over all these moving masses, gleaming from the mirror of their polished armour and weapons, the signal was given, and the whole immeasurable multitude immediately began to stream in three columns toward the three bridges. One saw them approach the river and, on reaching the bridges, narrow and lengthen to cross and reach this foreign soil, which they would soon devastate, but which shortly thereafter they would cover with their pitiable wreckage.

The zeal was so great that two divisions of the vanguard, competing for the honour of being the first to cross, were on the point of colliding; it took some effort to calm them. Napoleon hastened to set foot on Russian soil and took this first step into his ruin without hesitation. At first he stayed at the bridge and encouraged the soldiers with his looks; they greeted him with their usual shout and seemed more cheerful than he. Perhaps so great a beginning pressed upon his heart, or the excessive heat overwhelmed his weakened body, or the fact that he had not yet encountered an enemy put him out of sorts.

At last impatience seizes him; suddenly he dashes across the fields into the wood that borders the bank; he rides with loose reins and seems in his haste to want to reach the enemy alone. In that direction he probably covered more than an hour, still in the same solitude; then, finding no outlet, he returned and proceeded, following the course of the river, with his guard as far as Kovno. We thought we heard the guns rumbling; along the way we listened carefully for where the fight would begin, but with the exception of some Cossack detachments, on that day and the following the sky alone showed itself as our enemy. For hardly had the Emperor crossed the river when a muffled roar moved the air. Soon the day darkened, the wind rose and brought with it the gloomy roll of thunder. This threatening sky, this roofless earth filled us with dread. Some of us, earlier full of enthusiasm, grew very quiet and wished to see in it a bad omen. They believed that these fiery clouds were gathering over our heads and descending upon this land to deny us entry.

This storm was indeed entirely in the style of the invasion. For several hours the heavy black clouds thickened and weighed upon the whole army. From its right to its left wing over a stretch of fifty hours it was endangered by flashes of lightning and drenched with rain. The country roads and fields were flooded, and the oppressive heat suddenly turned into a penetrating cold. Ten thousand horses perished on the march and especially in the subsequent bivouacs. Many wagons were left without teams in the sand, and many men succumbed.

The Emperor, who had taken shelter from the first fury of the storm in a monastery, left as soon as it was practicable for Kovno, where the greatest disorder prevailed. The thunder could no longer be heard; its roll above our heads no longer attracted attention, for although this phenomenon, common at that season, had appeared ominous to some of us, for the majority the time for omens was past. Doubts, acute in some, careless and blunt in others, earthly passions and pressing needs had withdrawn the human soul from the heavens from which it had come and to which it will return. The army saw in this great misfortune merely an untimely natural event. Far from seeing in it a heavenly sign that disapproved a war for which they were not responsible, they only resented the fate that had happened to produce such a dreadful spectacle.

On the same day a particular misfortune was added to the general distress. Before Kovno Napoleon found the bridge over the Wilia broken by the Cossacks, thus delaying Oudinot’s march. Angry about this and intending to show he yielded to no obstacle, he ordered a squadron of his Polish Guard to throw themselves into the Wilia; these chosen soldiers obeyed without hesitation.

At first they managed very well and kept order; when the water rose higher they redoubled their efforts and thus reached by swimming the middle of the river; then they were seized by the force of the current; the horses, made skittish thereby, left the track and were carried away by the stream without swimming; their riders fought for their lives as best they could, but struggled in vain and, exhausted, resigned themselves to their fate. Their destruction was inevitable, but they had sacrificed themselves for their fatherland, before whose eyes and for whose liberators they perished. At the moment of being swallowed by the waves they raised a cheer to Napoleon: 'Long live the Emperor!' Three were observed in particular who, while their mouths were still above the water, repeated the cry and sank immediately afterwards. The army was seized with terror and admiration.

As for Napoleon, he ordered with great vivacity and determination what was necessary to save the greater part, although he did not appear particularly moved, perhaps because self‑control had become his habit or because he considered emotion in war a weakness that he must not show and which he must master, or finally because he foresaw greater misfortunes for which the one just described was nothing.

After the bridge over the Wilia had been restored, Marshal Oudinot with the second corps could take the road to Keidani; during this time the remainder of the army still crossed the Neman, which took three full days. The Italian army did not move forward across this river until 29 June at Pilony; the army of the King of Westphalia arrived only on 30 June at Grodno…"

The remaining parts of the army crossed under Marshal Macdonald in the north at Tilsit and later under Jérôme in the south at Grodno.

The theater of war was mostly above the Pripet Marshes. The main army under Napoleon marched to Vilna. On the right flank Marshal Macdonald oriented toward Riga. Opposing him were Russian troops under Wittgenstein and Tutchkov. Beyond the Dvina stood the 1st Russian Army under Barclay. The left flank was commanded by Jérôme—Napoleon’s brother and King of Westphalia. Opposing him were Russian troops under Dokhturov and further south the 2nd Russian Army under Bagration. Still further south and still on this side of the Russian border were parts of the Grande Armée under Claude‑Victor Perrin (called Victor, *07.12.1764 in Lamarche; † 01.03.1841 in Paris) and Count Jean Louis Ebenezar Reynier (*14.01.1771 in Lausanne; † 27.02.1814 in Paris) and the Austrian contingent under Prince Karl Philipp Johann Nepomuk Joseph zu Schwarzenberg (*15.04.1771 in Vienna; † 15.10.1820 in Leipzig). Opposite them stood the 3rd Russian Army under Tormasov beyond the Bug River. This was the starting situation.

What followed was the advance with endless marches over dusty and bottomless country roads. The Grand Army advanced toward Vilna. This Lithuanian capital—also called the Jerusalem of the North—lay roughly 70 miles (= 112 km) ahead. Even on this stage there were significant losses of soldiers and horses. Vilna was reached on 28 June 1812 and occupied without major Russian resistance. The hope of recuperation and adequate provisioning there proved illusory, as the existing supplies were quickly consumed through indiscipline and looting.

In response to the incursion into the Russian Empire Alexander now sent his Minister of Police Balashov to Napoleon. He was to deliver a letter from the Tsar and signal a willingness to negotiate, but only on the condition that the French withdraw behind the border. A report by Balashov exists on the conversation between the Russian envoy and Napoleon (cf. Eugen Tarlé, 1812. Russia and the Fate of Europe, Berlin 1951, p. 66 ff.). The discussion proceeded—as could be expected—very one‑sidedly and ended unsuccessfully.

Napoleon remained in Vilna until 16 July and lost precious time through this long stay.

At this point the Russian troops were already pursuing a scorched‑earth strategy and retreated in an orderly fashion toward Vitebsk. In response to the clear numerical French superiority and the enormous renown of the commander Napoleon, the Russian side adopted a defensive strategy: the Russians fell back into the expanses of their country and long avoided a direct confrontation. Whether this style of Russian warfare was consciously pursued from the beginning or is only an interpretation in retrospect is disputed. This reading was in any case intended to justify the bloodless abandonment of large parts of the Russian Empire, but it was also controversial among the Russian commanders and regarded as lacking honour.

Vitebsk was reached by Napoleon on 29 July 1812, and here too the Emperor lingered for a long time in the hope of a Russian peace offer—namely two weeks.

There were only isolated skirmishes with the Cossacks and it was not possible to encircle Bagration in the south; the Emperor primarily blamed his brother Jérôme for this.

Barclay abandoned the fortress of Drissa and united with Bagration before the holy city of Smolensk. Here the Russian side put up the first notable military resistance.

Before and in Smolensk there were the first serious military engagements between the Grand Army and the Russian troops.

The first larger outpost skirmishes took place at Ostrowa (25/26.07.1813) and at Mogilev (23.07.1812).

The battle for Smolensk took place in the period 06.08. - 1808.1812. The main battle was on 17.08.1812.

On the French side 175,000 men were involved, of whom only 45,000 were actually engaged.

On the Russian side 135,000 men were involved, of whom only 35,000 were actually engaged.

The Grand Army had crossed the Dnieper, assembled 175,000 men on the southern bank and attacked the city directly. The forward bastions and suburbs were captured, and a mighty cannonade set the old town—mostly made up of wooden houses—on fire, but could do little to the powerful fortification walls. The actual city was defended by relatively small Russian troops, first under Rayevsky and then under Dokhturov. Beyond the river stood the Russian main forces under Barclay and Bagration. The former held the Petersburg suburb. The Russians offered fierce resistance but then withdrew along the road to Moscow and destroyed the three bridges leading over the river. The last Russian troops left Smolensk in the early morning of 18 August 1812. Barclay feared being outflanked by the ford at Prudishchevo and therefore ordered the retreat. The icon of the Holy Virgin was taken along.

The order to retreat met with widespread rejection and outrage among the Russian officers, and above all Bagration expressed himself very negatively about this decision. Yet by this retreat the Russian main forces were preserved for a decisive battle still to be fought. French losses are given as 10,000 (7–9,000) men and Russian losses as 15,000 (9,000) men. There are, however, very divergent figures regarding the departure of both armies. In the rearguard action at Valutino (19.08.1812) the Russians still achieved a defensive success. Here the first French general wounded fatally in this campaign was also injured: Charles Étienne Gudin de La Sablonnière (*13.02.1768 in Montargis; † 22.08.1812 in Smolensk). It was thus not possible to intercept the Russian troops marching off under Bagration.

Caption for the following image:

"On 17 August at daybreak the small arms fire along the whole line resumed, interrupted from time to time by brief pauses and rare cannon shots. It became continuous and general in the afternoon when the Emperor—having come to the conclusion that the Russians would not risk a battle but would restrict themselves to the defence of Smolensk and were continually throwing more troops into it—ordered an attack on the city from all sides. On the right, under the thunder of their 60 guns, Poniatowski’s brave Poles stormed into the suburb before them and tried to destroy the connecting bridges to the right bank; in the centre Morand and Gudin under Davout assaulted the two fortified suburbs of the southernmost part of Smolensk, and on the left wing Ney with his battle‑hardened troops, leaning on the Dnieper, attacked the Russians in their position outside the western wall. All Russian positions were taken after stubborn murderous fighting and they were driven back behind the ramparts and walls. These, however, put an end to further advances. In vain did the thunder of the guns of three army corps and the Guard roll without pause, in vain did the enemy guns reply from the ramparts, towers and the monastery; in vain did the twelve‑pounder batteries of the Guard and of the I Army Corps drive up close to the city, uncovered, into enemy artillery and small arms fire to shoot storm‑gaps into the thick enclosing wall, the splendid work of Tsar Boris Godunov. All attempts failed, and only the late night put an end to a fight that had cost such great sacrifices of men without yielding proportionate results, to make way for a new spectacle. For from the city, of which from our bivouac we saw nothing but the domes of the cathedral, several columns of fire rose over the plateau that sheltered it, like from a mountain peak, which, increasing ever more, finally united into a great blaze that lit up the night and illuminated the charming fields of Smolensk far and wide. In the gentle breeze of a warm summer night this sight recalled the volcanic eruptions of Vesuvius; and gladly did we surrender to the magical illusion, thinking of neither the serious circumstances under which we saw all this nor of the cause of the fire, and not in the least suspecting how calamitous its consequences would be."

Quoted from: G. De Faber du Faur, Napoleon’s Campaign in Russia 1812. With text by Major F. von Kaussler and introduction by Armand Dayot, Leipzig 1897, p. 129–130.

This failure was above all attributed to Junot, Napoleon’s former adjutant (Jean Andoche Junot, duc d’Abrantès (*24.09.1771 in Bussy‑le‑Grand, Côte‑d’Or; † 29.07.1813 in Montbard).

On 18 September 1817 Napoleon commented on these events to Gourgaud as follows: "At Ostrowo and at Vitebsk I managed to cut the Russian army off from the road to St. Petersburg. At Smolensk Junot did nothing but foolish things, likewise at Valutina. I had sent you there. You reported to me that Junot could cut off the Russian rearguard, but he would not bring himself to advance. You asked him, 'Sir Duke, what shall I answer if the Emperor asks why you did not march?' He replied in an embarrassed tone: 'You can say that night fell and that I took up a position.' I therefore relieved him of his command that very night." (Napoleon’s Thoughts and Memories. St. Helena 1815–18. By General G. de Gourgaud, Stuttgart 1901, p. 188).

On 18.08.1812 Napoleon wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Maret, Duke of Bassano: "Duke of Bassano, at this moment I come from the battle; the heat is awful, and there is much dust, which takes a lot out of us. We had the whole enemy army here; it received orders to give battle and did not dare. We have stormed Smolensk. It is a very large city with a wall and considerable fortifications. We have killed 3–4,000 of the enemy, wounded three times that number, and found many guns here; several of its divisional generals are said to have fallen. The Russian army is marching very upset and discouraged in the direction of Moscow. Schwarzenberg and Reynier have together beaten the Russians" (quoted after: Napoleon’s Letters. Selected and edited by Friedrich Schulze, Leipzig 1912, p. 289).

Carl von Clausewitz criticises the French approach as follows: "So far in the battles around Smolensk we have only spoken of the Russian motives, but we cannot refrain now from dwelling for a moment on the French. We confess that here we find the most incomprehensible thing in the whole campaign. Bonaparte was with his 180,000 men on the 7th, when Barclay tried his offensive, mostly between the Dnieper and the Dvina; only Davout with his 30,000 men had just crossed the Dnieper at Rossanna. It was therefore easier and more natural for him to advance on the road which leads from Vitebsk to Smolensk than on that which goes from Minsk. But Smolensk was in any case not evidently an operational objective for him; it was rather the Russian army that he had tried in vain from the outset to bring to battle. It was opposite him, so why did he not assemble his troops to go straight against it? Furthermore it should be noted that the road from Minsk to Smolensk continues to Moscow, and at Smolensk crosses to the right Dnieper bank, so that Bonaparte would have had to return to that bank. Had he gone directly against Barclay, the latter would scarcely have been able to withdraw to Smolensk, at least not to remain there, because the French army on the right bank would have threatened the road to Moscow much more than when it was on the left, where Smolensk and the river covered the road for a time. Under these circumstances Smolensk would have fallen without a stroke, Bonaparte would not have lost 20,000 men before it, and the place would probably have been preserved, because the Russians at that time were not yet so practiced in the system of burning ..." (quoted after: ibid., The Russian Campaign of 1812, Stuttgart n.d., p. 72 ff.).

Napoleon hesitated whether to continue the advance. His inner circle advised against it and pointed to the already deteriorated condition of the Grand Army. They also feared the ever‑lengthening supply routes. For this reason it was indeed considered to establish winter quarters in Vitebsk and Smolensk and to resume the campaign the following year, unless the Russian side yielded earlier. In the end Napoleon decided on a further advance toward the old Russian capital Moscow. Overall Napoleon stayed in Smolensk from 18 to 25 August 1812. They had to hurry, for soon autumn rains would turn the country roads into mud and hamper or even prevent the advance. Moreover, the Russian main army still existed and was moving off to the east.

Of striking importance were the provisions and other supply problems of the Grand Army, which arose very early, even before reaching Vilna.

Thus the French Marshal Mortier (Édouard Adolphe Casimir Joseph Mortier (*13.02.1768 in Le Cateau‑Cambrésis, Département Nord; † 28.07.1835 in Paris) wrote in a letter home: "From the Neman to Vilna I saw nothing but ruined houses and abandoned supply and ammunition wagons. Already 10,000 horses have been lost because of the cold rain and because they ate unripe rye they were not accustomed to; the stench of the horses that died along the roadside is unbearable. But that is not as bad as the inadequate supply. Several soldiers of my Young Guard have already died of hunger" (quoted after Nigel Nicholson, Napoleon in Russia, Cologne 1987, p. 61).

Another eyewitness reports: "There are no proper roads in Lithuania; the country roads were ruined by the guns in the rain, impassable for wagons with ordinary teams. The horses lived only on green fodder, on grass and grain in the fields, and this often had to be fetched from far away. The vanguard had the advantage of arriving first and finding some food which the enemy and the fleeing peasants had not had time to spoil or take; but it had to remain in closed ranks against an enemy very prone to raids and, when pursued by the enemy, had to leave behind what it could have used. Therefore there was often a shortage of everything. Detachments had to be sent out to forage, which had to advance far to the sides if they hoped to reach untouched villages that did not expect such visitors. These detachments were exposed to great dangers and hardships and often returned unsuccessful; if they had captured provisions they often lacked wagons and horses for transport, and even when this was successful they often only returned to their advancing regiments after several days, where what had been found was wholly or partly consumed, taken away from them or spoiled. This burdensome and uncertain method of provisioning had highly disadvantageous effects. Many people fell ill, the horses became emaciated and sickly. The men learned to wage war on their own account, i.e., to pillage villages, to plunder and to compensate for their constant privations by all sorts of excesses. Many fell behind, gathered into bands, chose their leaders, quartered themselves in villages and manor houses and posted outposts against both Russians and French, who were equally enemies. These inseparable disorders arising from the kind of warfare practised so far early loosened the bonds of discipline, reduced the number of fighters, ruined the resources of the country, embittered the people driven to despair and provoked them to resistance and often to the torturous killing of prisoners. The plundering soldier is not content with what he needs: he destroys what he cannot carry away and mistreats the inhabitants. Not the strictest discipline could preserve order, for that is only possible when the soldier’s necessary needs are provided for in a proper manner by regular distribution. The starving and suffering soldier obeys only the command of necessity and urgent need and no longer listens to the voice of the commander" (quoted after: Theodor Rehtwisch, 1812. The Fall of the Grand Army and Its Background, Friedenau–Berlin, p. 322 ff.).

The Württemberg regimental surgeon Heinrich von Roos adds:

"Up to this point there were no sick; I had left none behind beyond the Neman; even the wing man who had been operated on in Rastenburg had completely rejoined us recovered. But as our miserable makeshifts regarding food for men and horses began, their health also declined. For some time we might still have fared well had the supplies we collected beyond the Neman been able to follow us.

From there we left the main road to Vilna, marched right along side roads, often poor country lanes, saw no enemy and few but friendly country folk, and all the more dirty Jews.

In the evenings we halted to feed. The sickles and scythes were loosened for the first time and green seed and grass were mown. Seven regiments need much, and more than they need spoils, and more than they need they spoil. No village was nearby, but there was a small church which it was said even then held a large stock of flour, valuables, etc.; yet none of us approached it and it remained a legend. As here, so I later never saw any of our men plunder a church. These desecrations were always committed by our predecessors or successors, and I have often convinced myself that the less busy infantry is more inclined to such acts than the cavalry; for the latter, in caring for their horses, tack and numerous weapons, have less time for it.

As we advanced daily toward Vilna we had warm days. We made do badly in every respect; bread was rare, and flour, milk, wine and spirits a great rarity. Because of the heat and bad water the ice cellars were searched and lumps of ice were carried on horseback, until they, passed from one to another, were absorbed and melted. There was nowhere to buy anything, since sutlers could not follow the rapid marches. Officers had to make do with what their servants or the soldiers stole and plundered, and there were few opportunities for that; hence already in the first days beyond the Neman, the great shortage had to produce the greatest disorder. Very rarely was there hay and oats for the horses, and even when there was, the latter could not chew the oats because the fresh grass and corn feed had dulled their teeth.

Such a way of life could not remain without consequences for long, and already then riders and horses began to suffer from diarrhoea. The former became pale, weak and lean; the latter dragged themselves along painfully and likewise became thin...." (quoted after: With Napoleon in Russia. Memoirs of Heinrich von Ross (ed. by Paul Holzhausen), Stuttgart n.d., p. 21 ff.).

Overstretched supply lines, persistent shortages of food and forage, overly long marches, poor quarters, disease and indiscipline quickly led to enormous losses of soldiers, horses and draft animals. The Russians’ scorched‑earth tactics added to this.

After crossing the Dnieper the Russians now finally wanted to stand and put an end to the constant backward movement, yet the withdrawal continued. This and the associated continual cession of Russian territory had turned "public opinion" against the commander-in-chief - Prince Michael Andreas Barclay de Tolly (1761 - 1818). His strategically correct approach was not understood nor were its consequences approved. Tsar Alexander I. reacted by removing him from command and appointed the popular Prince Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov-Smolensky (1745 - 1813) as the new commander-in-chief of all Russian forces. He reached the army on 29.08. and at first continued the retreat, but he now intended to accept a decisive battle before the gates of Moscow to defend it. "Now he was, although only 67 years old, a frail man who mounted his horse only with great effort and therefore had to avoid every danger. But he possessed the troops' confidence to a high degree, and this prestige allowed him to retreat even further and only in the broken terrain at Borodino, where the Kolocha flows into the Moskva, to risk battle" (August Fournier, Napoleon, Leipzig 1922, Vol. III, p. 100).

According to Philip Haythornthwaite (Uniforms of the Napoleonic Russian Campaign, 1977, p. 13) "at that time ... the 'Grande Armée' numbered roughly 133,000 men, had fewer than 30,000 horses, and all units had been decimated by disease and the exhausting march into Russia. Kutuzov had fewer men (around 125,000), but fresher troops and a stronger artillery (640 versus 587 guns), yet in this total were also the 15,000 'opolchenie', the 15,000 half-trained recruits and 7,000 Cossacks only conditionally useful in a regular engagement."

According to Cyril Falls (Great Battles on Land, p. 128) "the Russian commander Prince Golenishchev-Kutusov ... could oppose Napoleon with just over 120,000, whose patriotic and religious enthusiasm did not fall short of the French enthusiasm for their emperor. The dogged bravery of the Russians matched the impetuosity of the French."

The aforementioned author breaks down the strengths of the two armies there as follows:

The Russians stood on a ridge line before the Kolocha River, which further upstream flows into the Moskva. Strong redoubts had been thrown up in front of their left flank. The left flank was commanded by Bagration (2nd Army), the right by Barclay (1st Army). The III Corps under Tuchkov was shifted during the battle from the right to the left flank. On the extreme right flank the Cossacks under Platov were positioned. The village of Borodino in front of the right flank had been fortified.

Eugene Tarle (1812. Russia and the Fate of Europe, Berlin 1951, pp. 204/205) describes the composition and deployment of the Russian army as follows:

"The Russian army under Kutuzov's supreme command at Borodino was composed as follows: On the right flank and in the center Barclay de Tolly commanded. On the right flank stood Miloradovich with his troops, which consisted of two infantry corps - the 2nd and 4th (19,800 men) - and two cavalry corps - the 1st and 2nd (6,000 men), a total of 25,800 men. In the center stood Dokhturov with one infantry corps and one cavalry corps (together 13,600 men). The reserves of the right flank and the center (36,300 men) were directly under Kutuzov's command. Altogether there were on the right flank and in the center 75,700 men. The whole was called the 1st Army, since its core was formed by Barclay's former 1st Army.

On the left flank Bagration commanded. The core of his forces consisted of the 2nd Army, which had been led by Bagration up to the Battle of Smolensk. Its name was retained for the entire left flank; Bagration became 'second commander-in-chief'.

This left flank consisted of two infantry corps (22,000 men) and one cavalry corps (3,800 men), together 25,800 men; in addition 8,300 men were in reserve. Bagration therefore had at the opening of the fighting 34,100 men, i.e. about one and a third times fewer forces than the 1st Army. To the regular troops, with a total strength of 120,800 men, at Borodino were added 7,000 Cossacks and the 10,000-strong Moscow and Smolensk levies. Without the Cossacks Kutuzov thus had 120,800 men with 640 guns at his disposal. These figures result from several sources. Toll gives slightly lower numbers: "On that day there were 95,000 men of line troops and artillery available, 7,000 Cossacks, 7,000 men of the Moscow levy and 3,000 men of the Smolensk levy, a total of 112,000 men and 640 guns."

The Russians prepared in their own spiritual way for the impending bloody confrontation. "With us the muster was solemnly read before all the regiments; the miraculous icon of the Mother of God of Smolensk, which they did not want to let fall into the enemy's hands but had taken from Smolensk, was carried in solemn procession through all the bivouacs; the troops and banners were blessed and sprinkled with holy water, and music and song resounded throughout the camp all day long, until at lights-out everyone sought rest and to gather strength by sleep for the next day" (Friedrich von Schubert, quoted in: Eckart Kleßmann (ed.), Napoleon's Russian Campaign in Eyewitness Accounts. Berlin - Darmstadt - Vienna 1964, pp. 168 ff.).

On the French side the guard hunter and sergeant François Bourgogne, who had served in the army since 1806, reports in his memoirs about the day before the battle: "On the 6th preparations were made for the great battle to be fought the following day: some repaired their weapons, others put the first-aid kits in order, some made their wills, carefree spirits sang or slept. The entire Imperial Guard received the order to don parade dress" (quoted in: War Experiences. By François Bourgogne, Stuttgart n.d., p. 21).

On 05.09. an advanced redoubt at Shevardino was already captured by the French.

Napoleon planned a frontal battle. The proposal of Marshal Louis-Nicolas Davout (* 10.05.1770 in Annoux, Département Yonne, Burgundy; † 01.06.1823 in Paris) to envelop the left wing of the Russian position was rejected by the Emperor. Of that proposal only a limited flanking movement by the V Corps under the supreme command of Józef Antoni Poniatowski (* 07.05.763 in Vienna; † 19.10.1813 near Leipzig) remained. The preference for an apparently unimaginative frontal attack on an enemy in prepared and fortified positions is attributed on the one hand to "his dwindling strength" (Haythornthwaite), and on the other hand this approach was motivated by the fear that the Russian army might in the event escape a flanking attack by making a premature march away. But Napoleon needed this battle, preferably a decisive engagement.

This motive becomes clear in a conversation Napoleon had in exile on St. Helena with General G. de Gourgaud:

"Gourgaud: Shouldn't a flank march with the right wing have been made at the Moskva? Napoleon: I could have made that march and thereby forced the Russians to give up their position; but I considered theirs weak enough to be taken by force, and I needed this battle."

(quoted in: Napoleon's Thoughts and Memories. St. Helena 1815-18. By General G. de Gourgaud, Stuttgart 1901, p. 188).

The aforementioned Fournier describes the battle in his biography of Napoleon (Vol. III, pp. 102/103) as follows: "Early in the morning, at about 5 o'clock, the first cannon shot fell on the right flank; by 6 o'clock the battle was already underway: on the left flank, where Eugene, advancing against Barclay's army, captured the village of Borodino, and in the center, where Davout, accompanied by Ney on the left and Murat on the right, advanced against Bagration's fortified center, whose left flank Junot engaged and Poniatowski tried to envelop with the (severely reduced) Poles. The fighting was carried out with endless ferocity, and the historian is unsure whether to attribute the greater share of heroism to the attacker or the defender. Now captured, the Russian redoubts were soon lost again, then won again and lost again. Napoleon's foot soldiers and horsemen, and the German cavalry regiments in particular, achieved the extraordinary, and so it was that - after Bagration's heavily exposed and initially insufficiently supported army was almost annihilated and its commander mortally wounded - the enemy position was finally taken. But no more. The Russians, however, retired from it only to reform a few thousand paces further back and offer fresh resistance. The divisions of Ney and Murat, terribly battered, were no longer capable of renewed attack. Here, at the moment when the enemy had not yet recovered, a strong reserve should have intervened to crush him completely. Such a reserve stood ready; it was 20,000 men of the Guard; Murat and Ney earnestly begged for its advance: Napoleon refused. "And if a second battle takes place tomorrow," he answered, "with what shall I fight it?" Hardly had he given the order to shell the withdrawn enemy center with cannon. He was not recognized, and everything was ascribed to the fever of a chill and the pain he had suffered during the day, but above all to the frayed nerves that after so much nerve-racking excitement could not cope with a new task. He had indeed not been at his full height and therefore on 7 September 1812 at Borodino won only a battlefield, not a battle. The Russians, despite their enormous losses - 52,000 dead and wounded, while the French lost only 28,000 - remained overnight in their last positions and only the next day withdrew further along the Moscow road. Even the Tsar was made to believe by their commander that it had not been a defeat, which in Petersburg was then taken as a victory of their arms and propagated as such."

The attacking French were exhausted and the onset of darkness ended the battle. The artillery of both sides had fired up to that point. During the night the Russians marched off. According to Peter Young, of the roughly 250,000 men who were involved in the battle, about 28% were wounded or dead by the end of the engagement. The losses were distributed between the two belligerent parties as follows: 30,000 French and 40,000 Russians. Losses among the leadership were also very high; among others, the Russian commander Prince Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration (1765-1812) fell.

The aforementioned Peter Young assesses the Battle of Borodino as follows:

"If Kutuzov later had his army fit for further fighting, he owed this more to his opponent than to his own skillful dispositions. Neither in the planning nor in the conduct of the battle did Napoleon live up to his reputation. His original plan showed flaws. Poniatowski's corps with both open flanks was not strong enough for its task. The reinforcement of Eugene by two divisions of Davout on the eve of battle was a considerable mistake. If Davout had had five divisions from the start, he could have achieved rapid success in the Semenovskoe sector. Also little was done to fix Barclay's army and thus prevent the transfer of forces to Bagration.

Napoleon had two opportunities to smash Bagration's wing. He missed the first chance by insufficient strength in the initial attack. He lost the second when he failed to exploit Ney's success by committing the Guard or at least the Young Guard. In truth he more or less left the conduct of the battle to his generals; when he intervened it was more to their detriment than to their advantage. The great strategist did not prove himself here to be an equal tactician. Certainly he knew how to use his old weapon, artillery, effectively, but otherwise he contented himself with amassing deep columns of horse and foot and then leaving the rest to his generals.

Among the French Marshal Ney, "Le brave des braves", was the real hero of the battle, who honestly earned his title "Prince de la Moskva". On the Russian side it was admirable how Bagration bought time for Kutuzov to correct his original errors. Equally deserving of mention is Konovnitsyn's superior leadership during the crisis of the battle.----" (quoted in: Cyril Falls (ed.), Great Battles on Land, Frankfurt a. M. 1964, pp. 138 ff.).

On 19.09.1812 the Grande Armée reached Moscow. Napoleon was delighted at the sight of the city, but he waited in vain for a formal surrender of it by an appropriate deputation. Moscow had largely been evacuated and was therefore empty.

Philippe Paul Count de Ségur describes in his work: Napoleon and the Grande Armée in Russia (Darmstadt n.d., pp. 199 ff.) the euphoria upon reaching Moscow:

"Between us and Moscow, this veiled and dominating city, there yet lay a height called the Salvation Hill. From this height, from which one beholds the holy city, the Russians throw themselves on their knees and make the sign of the cross; hence its name. Soon our skirmishers had occupied it. It was two o'clock, and this great city glittered in the sun with a thousand colors. At this sight they, struck with astonishment, involuntarily halted, shouting: 'Moscow, Moscow!'

Everyone quickened his step. All rushed upward in disorder: the whole army clapped its hands, repeating the cry: Moscow, Moscow! Thus sailors after a long, arduous voyage cry: Land, Land!

This city sparkling in golden radiance, the magnificent meeting point of Asia and Europe, the majestic confluence of the luxury, arts and customs of the two most beautiful continents lay now before us, an object of our most intimate gaze. What a day of glory had dawned for us! It provided the greatest, most brilliant memory for the rest of our lives. From this moment on the gazes of the astonished world were fixed upon us, every step we took now acquired historical significance. We entered this immeasurable, important scene to the applause of all peoples, proud to have set our century above all past centuries and glorified by our fame."

However Napoleon was disappointed and annoyed and "shrugged his shoulders and exclaimed with that disdainful look with which he crushed anyone who opposed his wishes: 'Ha! the Russians of course do not yet know what consequences the capture of the capital will have for them!'" (ibid., p. 203).

On 19.10.1812 Napoleon - after long hesitation - marched out of Moscow, only a rearguard remained at first. The rearguard was commanded by Marshal Édouard Adolphe Casimir Joseph Mortier (* 13.02.768 in Le Cateau-Cambrésis, Département Nord; † 28.07.1835 in Paris) and consisted of the Young Guard. It still counted 8,000 men, of whom only 400 were to reach Vilna. Its mission was to delay the reoccupation of Moscow and above all to carry out as extensive demolitions as possible in the Kremlin.

According to Nigel Nicholson and, in turn, according to Caulaincourt, the troops now available consisted of only 87,500 infantry, 14,750 cavalry and 533 guns. In addition there was a train of 40,000 carriages and wagons and numerous non-combatants, thus "a slow and unwieldy convoy of enormous length ..., instead of a light, mobile force able to strike with the speed of a cobra, as Napoleon had intended" (Nicholson).

Striking, however, was the still good outward bearing of the Imperial Guard. Military doctor Heinrich von Ross reports: "Proud and handsome, brave and looking fresh as one can on arriving in winter quarters, they marched in closed columns, well dressed and heavily laden with rations. Each had three to four white loaves packed on top of the knapsack and a bottle of brandy hanging from the saber or cartridge-belt. Behind them followed a train of baggage such as perhaps had never been seen as long as war is waged.

All the generals and senior officers had acquired new carriages and the subalterns had droschkas, all loaded with valuable items and foodstuffs. Married soldiers had wagons of every kind, loaded with everything that could be used morning and evening, entrusted to their wives. Sutler wagons were filled with wine, brandy, sugar, coffee, tea and everything necessary for long provisioning; likewise all pack horses were loaded. In short, the endless train carried riches of every conceivable kind, and the fine weather made it possible to observe and admire this colorful and highly remarkable spectacle" (quoted in: Eckart Kleßmann (ed.), Napoleon's Russian Campaign in Eyewitness Accounts, Berlin - Darmstadt - Vienna 1964, pp. 250/251).

Philippe Paul Count de Ségur adds to this: "In a three- or fourfold, unending row were half-coaches, ammunition carts, luxury wagons and wagons of every kind mixed together. One saw Russian, Turkish and Persian flags here, and that giant cross of the Great Ivan as a sign of victory: there Russian peasants with long beards led or carried our booty, to which they themselves belonged. Others dragged or pushed the fruits of their plundering even on wheelbarrows. The fools will not make the first day's march back in this way; in their mad greed they do not think of the eight hundred hours' journey over which they will have to get by" (ibid., Napoleon and the Grande Armée in Russia, Bremen p. 242).

For the retreat the Grande Armée chose the previous line of advance, now however in the direction of Smolensk, but initially marched southwest toward Maloyaroslavets and Kaluga.

About the further developments we read in the "Comprehensive History of Emperor Napoleon with the Complete Collection of his Works for Educated Readers" by Dr. Heinrich Elsner (Stuttgart 1834, Vol. I, pp. 462 ff.) the following:

"Even more unfortunate for the French was the necessity to change their retreat line via Kaluga and to resume the old road. Here from the time of the advance everything was still devastated: the people lacked food and shelter, the horses fodder: one had to forage constantly; and yet the enemy pressed on their heels.

Kutuzov, who calmly stood in his camp at Tarutino with 150,000 men, received through his vanguard the report that a French army corps was marching on Kaluga; although he did not know for certain that the French army's retreat had begun, which he only considered a weak detachment, he broke camp at once and marched to Malo-Yaroslavetz. There he encountered the French vanguard commanded by the Viceroy. A stubborn fight broke out and lasted the whole day. The Viceroy withstood all the Russians' attacks, attacks that were incessantly renewed and constantly reinforced by fresh troops, gloriously. The burning town was taken and lost seven times, but finally remained with the French, who had to mourn the death of the brave General Delzons, who fell fighting at the head of his division.

Toward evening the French main army arrived on the battlefield, Kutuzov had withdrawn a little and taken up position; the Emperor wanted to insist on his movement toward Kaluga, but the representations of the generals, and the fear of increasing the already considerable number of his wounded by a major battle, induced him, instead of marching forward, to turn to the right to gain the road to Smolensk via Vyazma, which had followed the army on its march toward Warsaw."

A few days later they reached the battlefield of Borodino: "The 28th brought us, after crossing a small river, back to the great battlefield on which so bitter a fight had been waged fifty-two days before. Corpses and debris of every kind still recalled it. Skulls and bones protruded from the ground. Almost all belonged to Russians, for as far as possible we had buried our dead. But since everything had been done in haste, the rains that had fallen since had exposed many corpses. Nothing more ghastly can be imagined than these rotting human remains that stared at us from all sides" (1812. War Experiences. By François Bourgogne. Stuttgart n.d., p. 71).

The Russian winter of 1812 set in relatively late. On 04.11. the first snow fell. Temperatures dropped to minus 12 degrees (09.11.), to minus 17 degrees (12.11.) and - after a short thaw period - down to minus 26 degrees (December). Besides the Cossacks and partisans and the pursuing regular Russian troops, the new adversaries were now: snow, frost and ice.

Dmitry Merezhkovsky (Napoleon. His Life. Napoleon as a Man, Berlin 1928, pp. 195 ff.) vividly describes the effect of the weather hardships on the retreat of the already severely decimated Grande Armée as follows: "On 28 October severe frost set in. On 8 November the French on the road to Vyazma were surprised by a violent snowstorm, so that those who did not know the Russian winter thought their last hour had come. The black sky fell upon the white, everything mingled and whirled in a white, raging chaos. The wind tore the breath from people's mouths, the snow made them blind, they froze, stumbled, fell down, never to rise again. The storm buried them under snowdrifts; little hills formed that looked like grave mounds. The whole army's retreat road was sown with such grave mounds like an endless cemetery.

The long winter nights were the most dreadful. When men had to bivouac in the open steppe at twenty degrees below zero, they were unable to protect themselves from the cutting, icy wind. For their evening meal they roasted the meat of dead horses on glowing coals, cooked a soup from thawed snow with a handful of musty flour. Then they lay down on the bare snow to rest; in the morning the bivouac site was marked by a ring of frozen corpses, by thousands of fallen horses.

And yet it was better to freeze to death than to fall into the hands of Cossacks or peasants; they did not kill their prisoners immediately but mocked and tortured them for a long time, or they simply threw them naked into the snow. If they had taken too many prisoners, they drove them on with lances like cattle to new, perhaps even worse torments.

One hundred thousand French had left Moscow; after three weeks there were only thirty-six thousand left, and even these were only living corpses, ridiculous, terrible scarecrows in colorful, lice-ridden rags - in civil coats, priestly vestments, women's dresses and caps. There were neither subordinates nor superiors any longer: misery had made all equal. Packs of hungry dogs followed on their heels; whole clouds of ravens circled above them, like above carrion."

The Württemberg officer Christoph von Yelin reports on the retreat from his own experience:

"Since on these marches the baggage wagons in the rear, many fourgons, powder wagons, cannon etc. were already damaged and even burned, the food supplies, of which one had only provisions for fourteen days, were exhausted, the greatest shortage set in, which appeared and had to become even more terrible, as on the road, already devastated on the advance, absolutely nothing more could be found or hoped for. Many tried to get by with a little sugar and hoarded it with extraordinary stinginess, but this expedient did not last long, and even such had finally to content themselves with horsemeat. At first the wretched, emaciated animals were still slaughtered, that is, one shot them through the chest. There was still sometimes salt and spice, but that soon ceased as well; no one thought anymore of shooting the animals, but cut parts off the still living animals, which stood there with widely splayed legs, often bleeding on all sides - trembling and stunned yet still standing until they ended and collapsed. The French took especially the tongues, and without killing the animal first cut them out of the living body; there is certainly nothing more abominable than the way people acted against people and animals on this retreat….

Thousands already died now of exhaustion and hunger, the horses fed meagerly on bark and old rotten straw and wood, since everything was covered and frozen with snow. The few cavalry horses were taken to keep the artillery that had been dragged so far moving. Daily the misery increased; thus we arrived on 31 October at Itorka, on 1 November 1812 at Vyazma ….

The long nights were dreadful, green wood would not burn, and until such was brought one could hardly endure it; many froze to death at this work, in which the highest officers had to take part, for whoever wanted to be at the fire had to have contributed to it. Often when the fire was lit, stronger men came and drove the first away, whereupon there were often murders and killings.

Those who collapsed during the march remained lying on the road; the following wagons ran over them before they were quite dead and crushed them; no one took the trouble to lay such wretches aside or to pull them from the way, they were even robbed of their clothes before they were dead ….

The road was entirely covered with ice, and the exhausted horses, which in such cases were not even properly shod, could hardly be moved empty, the smallest rise was now an insurmountable obstacle; cannon, ammunition baggage, sutler wagons etc., a multitude of carriages taken from Moscow, chaises, droschkas etc. remained standing because one no longer thought of burning them, and fell into the hands of the Russians ….

Although I was still assigned among the few armed Württembergers, we could procure no other food than fallen horseflesh, since the dogs that were still occasionally seen with the army had for the most part already been eaten, as may have been the case with my own. One evening I prowled about to seek something by whatever means, and noticed a fine white poodle; together with a friend I immediately hunted it down, it fell into our hands and was quickly ended. We shared the meat brotherly, which served us well for a long time; when this was eaten, horsemeat came to us again, which was disgusting because it could not be properly prepared.

The preparation of such a roast horsemeat was quite simple; if one had a piece from a fallen horse, one stuck it on a pointed stick, saber or bayonet and held it over the fire, without salt, fat or spice, of which there was a lack. The heat made the sick meat quite revolting, a yellow broth like pus dripped out of it until it gradually burned to coal, whereupon one devoured it ravenously: one no longer had disgust, the worst meant for pigs would have been welcome, one was glad to have anything at all"

Quoted in: Eckart Kleßmann (ed.), Napoleon's Russian Campaign in Eyewitness Accounts. Berlin - Darmstadt - Vienna 1964, pp. 262 ff.

Engagement at Vyazma - Text

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About Napoleon's behavior during the retreat we read in Kircheisen (Napoleon. The Memoirs of His Life. Volume 13, Vienna - Hamburg - Zurich n.d., pp. 113 ff.): "In the midst of this immense calamity Napoleon preserved stoic composure: one constantly saw him on horseback, or when the cold became too severe, on foot among his brave men. He wore over his uniform a Russian fur, velvet lined with sable (it was a gift from the Tsar that Napoleon had received in Erfurt in 1808) and trimmed with cords, and a cap of the same fur; when he walked he supported himself on a birch walking-stick. The soldiers marched in silence, their strength was physically and morally assaulted, they seemed to foresee even more dreadful disaster than the sufferings that already weighed them down. And yet no complaint, no voice of revolt in their ranks: all eyes were turned on the great man and all felt that on him alone all hopes still rested (Soltyk, 330)."

Smolensk had indeed been partially destroyed on the advance, but it now held the depots with the urgently needed supplies. Since September 1812 the French under the supreme command of Marshal Victor (Claude-Victor Perrin, (* 07.12.1764 in Lamarche; † 01.03.1841 in Paris) had been trying to make the city defensible. This still fortified city was intended to provide a refuge and an opportunity for provisioning and reorganization for the withdrawing main army. The troops under the aforementioned Marshal Victor numbered, according to Alan Palmer (Napoleon in Russia, Frankfurt am Main 1967, p. 218), and were planned as the main reserve.

After the French partial success in a rearguard action at Krasnoi (Krasnoe) a race to the Berezina began; however, with the news of 22.11. that Russian troops numbering 34,000 men under Chichagov had in the meantime, among other things, captured the bridgehead at Borisov, it became clear that the crossing of the river would have to be fought for hard.

The war participant Philippe Paul Graf von Ségur describes the dramatic events of the crossing over the Berezina in his work, which was already published in Germany in 1825: Napoleon and the Grand Army in Russia, impressively as follows:

"All day long the 9th Corps found itself in a truly critical situation, because it had no other route of retreat left than the weak, narrow bridge, whose approaches were moreover blocked by countless wagons and stragglers. The more the fighting flared up in front, the worse it became back here among those people. The first noise of a serious engagement, the sight of the wounded, the enemy bullets that gradually began to fly toward the bridge — all these produced for them as many episodes of terror and confusion.

So many men, horses and wagons driven and hunted by fear toward one point, urging and pushing one another, had to — bottlenecked on the bank — form a dreadful crush. Around noon the first enemy balls fell into this chaos and threw everything into despair. As in all extraordinary situations, so here the human heart showed itself in all its nakedness. One saw the most hideous outrages and the most noble, sublime actions. According to their character, some opened a terrible path with determination and fury, saber in hand. Others were cruel enough to drive their teams through the throng of the unfortunate, who, thrown to the ground, were trampled by the horses or crushed by the wheels; in their abominable avarice they had no scruple to sacrifice their fellow sufferers for the sake of saving their baggage. Others expressed their despair in a disgusting way: they wept, begged and succumbed to fear. One saw others, especially among the sick and wounded, give up their lives, slip away, and lie down on the snow that would soon become their grave...."

Continuation: "Many of those desperates who had not been able to reach the bridge on the first attempt tried to climb up the bank at the side, but were mostly pushed back into the river.

There one saw, among the ice floes, women holding their children in their arms and keeping them above the water as long as they could; soon they had disappeared.

The horrible had not yet reached its limit: the artillery bridge broke and came apart. Those already standing on it could not save themselves; they and those immediately following them were hurled into the water by the surge of the constantly advancing crowd, which did not know what had happened and paid no heed to the cries of those in front.

Everything then flowed toward the other bridge. Heavy supply wagons, cannons and other vehicles, swept away by panicked horses on a sloping surface, in a dense human crush and at increased speed, crushed everything beneath them and, when overturned in collisions, killed whatever lay in their path. These overturned wagons then became a new obstacle and the cause of whole ranks of fugitives falling to the ground, overwhelmed and trampled by the masses constantly rushing up from behind.

Thus one wave of these wretches pressed upon another. Only the cries of pain and fury were heard. In this dreadful mêlée the trampled and suffocating fought under the feet of their companions, clinging to them with their nails and teeth, but being repelled by them like enemies without mercy.

Among them women and mothers called in vain with heart-rending voices for their husbands, their children, from whom they had been parted forever in a single instant; they stretched out their arms toward them, they begged for God’s sake that they be allowed to reach them; but swept and submerged by the human tide, they perished without anyone even noticing them.

The roaring of a violent storm, the thunder of the guns, the howling of the wind, the whistling of the bullets, the blast of bursting shells, the whimpering, the cursing and the gruesome swearing prevented this senseless heap from hearing the lamentations of the victims it devoured.

The luckiest and strongest finally reached the bridge after having heartlessly stepped over piles of wounded, women, half-dead children. When they then thought themselves saved in the narrow defile, they were stopped again at every moment by a fallen horse, by a broken or dislodged plank...."

Continuation: "Unfortunately there was, on the other bank, immediately at the bridge exit, a swamp in which many horses and wagons became stuck, which again delayed the progress of those crossing.

Between these desperate people, pressed together on the only escape route, there immediately broke out a hellish fight, where the weakest and most endangered were thrown by the strongest and coarsest into the water from the bridge. Without looking back, driven by the instinct of self-preservation, these inhuman people relentlessly pursued their goal, deaf to the outbursts of rage and despair of the comrades and superiors they were sacrificing.

The night of November 28 to 29 increased all these atrocities. Its darkness did not protect them against the Russian batteries, which could easily orient themselves on the snow-covered surface by the course of the river, by the whole black mass of men, horses and wagons and by the cries that arose from it.

It became yet worse around nine in the evening, when Victor began his retreat, and his divisions, cutting through these unfortunate people whom they had hitherto defended, opened a dreadful trench. However, since a straggle still remained at Studjanka, the great heap, frozen by the cold or because they would not give up their baggage, refused to use that last night to cross. In vain fires were lit at the wagon laager; the unfortunate could not be moved. Only daylight drove them back to the bridge, which they again stormed. At 9:30 Eble set it on fire when he saw the Russians approaching.

Misfortune had now reached its extreme limit. A number of wagons, three cannons and several thousand men, women and some children remained on the enemy bank, where they wandered in despair in detachments. Some tried to swim across, others ventured onto the floating ice, others hurled themselves blindly onto the burning bridge, which collapsed beneath them; half-burned and half-frozen, they had to die a double death. Soon the corpses of each kind began to accumulate on the bridge piers, where they were carried by the ice floes. The remainder awaited the Russians. After Eble had been gone for an hour, Wittgenstein appeared on the heights and gathered the fruits of victory without having fought for it."

A Westphalian officer (Karl Christian Bühler) supplements the depiction of this apocalyptic event as follows: "At the beginning of the bridge crossing, when the first cannon shots fell and a mass of men and horses collapsed dead and wounded, over whom the way of those pressing on passed, a terrible struggle arose between those lying on the ground and those stepping over them. With teeth and cramped fingers they tried to free themselves, while wounded horses lashed out terribly and mutilated many nearby. It would have been a hideous sight if the universal misery had not blunted every feeling and if everyone had not been intent solely on their own rescue" (quoted in Philipp Bühler, Napoleon. The Comet Course of a Genius, Munich 1942, p. 231).

Also instructive is the report of the later General Marcellin Marbot (born 18 August 1782 in Altillac; † 16 November 1854 in Paris), here cited according to Kircheisen (Napoleon. The Memoirs of His Life, Vol. 13, Vienna - Hamburg - Zurich n.d., pp. 131 ff.):

"On 26 November we were at daybreak in Studianka, and one noticed that no defensive measures had been taken on the opposite bank of the Berezina. If the Emperor had not had the bridge material burned at Orscha a few days earlier, the army could have crossed the river immediately. This river, which one imagines to be enormous, is in reality not wider than the Rue Royale in Paris at the Ministry of the Navy. As for its depth, it suffices to say that three cavalry regiments of Corbineau’s brigade had crossed it at a ford three days earlier and did so again on 26 November. The horses hardly lost ground and had only about 4–6 meters to swim. At that time this crossing offered only very slight difficulties for the cavalry, the baggage and the artillery. One difficulty consisted in the fact that riders and teamsters had to wade to their knees in the water, which was bearable in the end; unfortunately the frost was not strong enough to freeze the river, there were only a few ice floes. The second difficulty was more unpleasant, for the opposite bank was marshy like the whole adjoining plain; the horses could only move on it with difficulty and the wagon wheels sank to the axle.

Corps esprit is certainly something praiseworthy, but one must be able to temper it, even to forget it in difficult circumstances. The chiefs of the artillery and the pioneers at the Berezina could not do that, for each insisted on laying the bridges independently by themselves, so that they hindered one another and made no progress. The Emperor, who arrived around midday on the 26th, ended the quarrels and ordered that one bridge be built by the artillery and a second by the pioneers. Beams and boards were immediately taken from the village houses and both the sappers and the artillerymen set to work. These brave soldiers worked with a devotion that has not been sufficiently emphasized. One saw them jump naked into the icy waters of the Berezina and work six to seven hours on end, without being given any reinforcement; the following night their bed was only a snowfield! Thus almost all of them perished when the severe cold set in.

While the bridges were being set up and my regiment, like all the troops of the 2nd Corps on the left bank, awaited the order to cross, the Emperor moved briskly from one regiment to another, speaking with the ranks and the officers. Murat accompanied him. That brave daredevil, who had performed such fine deeds when the French marched victoriously toward Moscow, proud Murat had been completely crushed since leaving that city and during the entire retreat no longer took part in any engagement. One saw him follow the Emperor in deep silence, as if he did not know what was happening in the army. Nevertheless he seemed to awaken from his stupor at the sight of the Berezina, and the few troops that had kept order until then formed at that moment the last hope.

But not only did our horses get easily out of the bank, but also the sutlers with their carts, which led me to think that it might be possible to set up these wagons without horses on both banks and thus create several passages for the infantry, which, given the crush of people that would roll over the bridges the next day, would greatly facilitate the crossing. This idea seemed so felicitous to me that, although soaked to the belt, I crossed the ford once more and communicated it to the generals of the Imperial General Staff. My plan was judged good, but no one dared present it to the Emperor. Finally his aide Lauriston told me: "I authorize you to have this passage, whose usefulness you have just so convincingly explained, carried out." To this quite unacceptable reply I could only answer that I had neither sappers nor infantry, nor tools nor other means at my disposal, and besides that I could not leave my regiment, which stood on the other bank and could be attacked at any moment. So I limited myself to giving advice that seemed good to me and returned to my post. It was the 23rd.

On the evening of the 27th the Emperor crossed the bridges with his Guard and quartered in Zaniwki, from where the cavalry received orders to follow. The enemy had not been observed anywhere.

Much has been said about the disaster that occurred at the Berezina, but no one has yet said that it could largely have been avoided if the General Staff had better done its duty. Had the crossings over the baggage wagons that I proposed been carried out on the night of the 27th to 28th, the thousands of stragglers could not have clogged the bridges the next day. When I had comfortably housed my regiment in the bivouac at Zaniwki, I missed a packhorse that carried the small war chest and the valuables of the squadron, and already feared it might have been damaged in the ford. There was certainly a mounted escort and I thought that they might have waited until the aforementioned bridges were finished. But as hours passed without their arrival and I grew anxious for them as well as for the precious goods entrusted to them, I decided to hasten their crossing personally, for I thought the bridges were blocked. I rode back at a gallop and who can describe my astonishment when I found them completely empty and abandoned, while about 100 paces away around 50,000 (?) stragglers or breakaways were encamped, who were called "field cooks." They sat calmly before huge fires and roasted horse meat (hence the nickname), with no idea that they were on the bank of the river whose crossing the next morning would cost a great number of them their lives, whereas now by moonlight they could have gained the other bank in a few minutes without difficulty and finished their supper there. No officer, no aide of the General Staff, no marshal was there to direct the unfortunate to the now free bridges. Here I saw for the first time troops returning from Moscow in total dissolution. It was heart-rending. All ranks were blurred, no weapons, no trace of military bearing left. Soldiers, officers, even generals covered with rags, shoes made of leather or cloth scraps held together with string! A confusion of thousands of people from all nations of Europe, talking loudly in their languages at one another without understanding each other.

Had they been incorporated into Oudinot’s corps, which was still in full order, it would have been easy to bring this mass across the bridges. As I had to return to Zaniwki and had only a few orderlies with me, I at least managed, more by persuasion than by force, to bring a few thousand of these unfortunates to the right bank. But duty called me back to my regiment; I had to rejoin it.

In vain, while passing by, I drew the General Staff of Marshal Oudinot’s attention to the emptiness of the bridges and how easy it would be to let the unarmed ranks cross now, since the enemy was doing nothing. I received evasive answers; everyone referred to his colleague to shift the matter onto him.

On the morning of the ill-fated day we took approximately the following position: on the left bank Marshal Victor had cleared Borisov and moved with the 9th Corps to Studianka, driving ahead of him a mass of stragglers. The Marshal had left his rearguard, the infantry division of General Partouneaux, with the order to leave the town two hours after him. Smaller detachments were to follow the corps and, by a chain of posts, indicate to those left behind the direction the main corps had taken. Moreover, the general should have sent an adjutant ahead to Studianka to reconnoiter the roads and then return in front of the division; but Partouneaux neglected all this and limited himself to being on the march at the appointed hour. He took two roads that crossed and which he did not know. Although he knew that the Berezina was on his left and that he therefore had to take the road to the left, since Studianka lies on the river, he did the exact opposite, followed some voltigeurs to the right and thus marched straight into the numerous corps of the Russian General Wittgenstein.

Soon surrounded on all sides, Partouneaux’s division had to lay down its arms, while a simple battalion commander commanding the rearguard had the wit to take the left-hand road and thus reach Marshal Victor at Studianka. The Marshal’s surprise was great when he saw only this battalion arrive instead of Partouneaux’s division. The astonishment soon turned into horror when he was attacked by Wittgenstein’s Russians, whom he had believed Partouneaux to be holding in check. Victor could no longer doubt that the general and all his regiments had been taken prisoner.

But new disaster awaited him. Field Marshal Kutuzov, who had followed Partouneaux from Borisov with numerous troops, learned of the French capitulation and hastened to join Wittgenstein to strike Marshal Victor in combination. Victor, whose corps had shrunk to 10,000 men, put up fierce resistance. His troops, among whom were also Germans, fought with true heroism, which is all the more commendable since they were attacked by two armies at once and furthermore, pressed back to the bank of the Berezina, were harassed by a large number of wagons followed by stragglers in wild tangles seeking to reach the opposite bank. Marshal Victor, meanwhile, held Kutuzov and Wittgenstein at bay all day....."

"While disorder and fighting reigned in Studianka, the enemies strove to seize the ends of the bridges and attacked Oudinot’s corps on the right bank, which was positioned before Zaniwki. For this purpose around 30,000 Russians under Chichagov advanced from Stakowo, hurled themselves with loud cries against the 2nd Corps, which counted only 8,000 fighters in its ranks. But since our soldiers had no contact with those returning from Moscow and no idea of the complete disorder prevailing among those unfortunates, the spirit of Oudinot’s corps had remained excellent and Chichagov was powerfully repulsed, even under the eyes of the Emperor, who at that moment arrived with 3,000 infantry and 1,000 horsemen of the Old and Young Guard.

The Russians renewed their attack and broke through the Polish ranks of the Vistula Legion. Marshal Oudinot was seriously wounded and Napoleon sent Ney to replace him. General Condas, one of our capable infantry officers, fell; the brave General Legrand received a dangerous wound.

The action took place in a large pine forest. The enemy artillery could only perceive our troops very imperfectly; it fired its balls without hitting, but as they flew over us they broke large branches which, in falling, killed or wounded a good portion of our men and horses. When Marshal Ney saw a strong Russian column approaching, he sent against it what remained of our cuirassier division. This order, given under the most extraordinary circumstances, was carried out in the most brilliant manner I have ever seen! The brave Colonel Dubois, at the head of the 7th Cuirassiers, split the enemy column into two parts and took 2,000 prisoners. The Russians fell into disorder and were driven back by our entire light cavalry to Stakowo with heavy losses.

On the night of the 28th to 29th the Russian guns did their utmost to increase the suffering and terrors of the unfortunates trying to reach the other bank. Despair reached excessive proportions when around 9 p.m. Marshal Victor began his retreat and his ordered divisions violently cleared everything that barred the entrance to the bridge... Let us cast a veil over these scenes of horror.....

At daybreak on the 29th all the wagons that were still on the left bank were burned, and when General Eble saw the Russians approaching he also set the bridge on fire. Some thousands of the unfortunate still left at Studianka fell into Wittgenstein’s hands. Thus ended the most dreadful episode of the Russian campaign. The event would have been less painful had the time that the Russians allowed us until their arrival at the Berezina been better used. The French army lost 25,000 to 30,000 men in this crossing.

After this great obstacle was overcome, the mass of stragglers who had escaped the terrible disaster remained still enormously large. They were marched off to Zembin. The Emperor and the Guard followed. Then came the remnants of some regiments, finally the 2nd Corps, and Castex’s brigade formed the extreme rearguard."

The remnants of the Grand Army were now on their way to Vilna and Poland. On 5 December 1812 Napoleon held a war council. Present were Murat, Eugène Beauharnais, Ney, Mortier, Bessières, Lefebvre and Davout. In this circle he explained the reasons for his planned departure from the army. The intention was generally agreed upon. The Emperor gave his last orders for the defense of the Duchy of Warsaw, for Danzig, etc., and began his departure, initially by sleigh. Napoleon was accompanied only by General Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza and Grand Equerry (see: In Private with Napoleon. Memoirs of General Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza and Grand Equerry, Bielefeld and Leipzig 1937, pp. 74 ff.). Chandler writes about this last phase of the Russian campaign: "On 5 December Napoleon left the army to its desperate fate and set off for Paris to counter rumors of his death, which had already led to an almost successful conspiracy, and to begin raising new armies. Commanded by a surly Murat, the survivors staggered on toward Poland, and the dreadful weather claimed further lives. The King of Naples soon departed for his sunny realm, leaving Eugène to command the final stages of the retreat. The Russians were content to leave the French to the elements and made no further serious attempts to engage the enemy. Thus it happened that on New Year’s Day 1813 some 94,000 surviving French and allied troops (including troops from the flanks, which had suffered less, although General York led about 20,000 Prussians into the Russian camp on 30 December) left Russia; by this time the original central army group of 400,000 men had shrunk to 25,000" (David Chandler, Napoleon, Munich 1973, pp. 113–114).

The well-known Napoleon scholar Friedrich M. Kircheisen comments on the reasons for the failure or the causes of the defeat:

"Napoleon’s campaign against Russia proved to be a great failure. As splendidly as it was prepared, so poorly was it executed. The army hastening eastward over the Neman carried the seed of death within it, just as did Napoleon’s idea of conquering the vast Russian Empire. The French ruler should never have embarked on this venture before he had ended the war in Spain and destroyed Prussia, which had been gagged but thirsted for revenge. It is incomprehensible, too, that Napoleon allowed the Prussians and Austrians to operate alone, without at least incorporating the Prussian Crown Prince as a fetter into his staff.

The enormous expanse of the Russian Empire necessitated an enemy invasion in three directions: toward St. Petersburg, toward Moscow and toward Tula, as well as a halt midway in the first year. Had Napoleon made each of the flank armies 100,000 men strong, there would at least have remained 300,000 for the march on Moscow. As events developed, after the capture of the old capital he had nothing more than the road that leads there from the frontier.

Because of his senseless rapid advance and the failure of administration, the Emperor lost more soldiers and horses on the outward march than on the return. But despite all mistakes, Napoleon was not yet lost in Moscow. He dug his own grave. Instead of managing the supplies frugally — even after the fire much remained in the cellars — he let the city be systematically plundered, so that when the army left the old capital it resembled a band of robbers returning from a successful raid. Fourteen days might have sufficed for a stay in Moscow; then the army could have set off in echelon toward Smolensk and wintered there. Instead of waiting idly for a reply from the Russian Emperor, it would have been better to seek out Kutuzov and destroy him. While the French army dwindled in numbers and inner value, the Russian commander continuously received reinforcements and could restore discipline among his troops.

Even on the retreat Napoleon could have avoided many mistakes. Why the return march on the same road the army had taken to Moscow? Why leave or detach a Mortier or a Davout, Eugène or Ney? Why the immense baggage train and taking along a disproportionately large number of guns that lacked ammunition? Why burn the bridge train at Orsha, which would have sufficed to make the Berezina crossing a quite simple operation?

Only after crossing the river of misfortune did the tremendous, persistent cold set in that finished off the French army. The catastrophe of the destruction of a half-million army, unique in modern history, could therefore by many be called a divine scourge (Napoleon I., A Portrait in Two Volumes, Vol. 2, Stuttgart and Berlin, pp. 270–271)."

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